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The seminal book Nudge by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein
demonstrates that policy makers can prod behavioral changes. A nudge
is "any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly
changing their economic incentives." This type of strategy, and the
notion of libertarian paternalism at its base, prompted discussions and
objections. Academic literature tends to focus on the positive potential
of nudges and neglects to address libertarian paternalism that does not
promote the welfare of individuals and third parties, but rather
infringes on it-a concept this Article refers to as "evil nudges." This
kind of choice architecture, which negatively influences individual
behavior, raises a variety of legal questions and challenges that policy
makers must address; yet it remains under-conceptualized.
Should the law recognize liability for evil nudges that result in
bad faith influence? This Article aims to answer this question. It
suggests the inclusion of nudges within tort law, arguing that nudges
can and should be subject to third-party liability. The inclusion of evil
nudges within tort law can be explored broadly, but this Article focuses
on one particular case study: the liability of online intermediaries for
speech torts caused by evil nudges. This case study provides a natural
starting point for considering liability for evil nudges, as designing
effective nudges is much easier in a technologically connected
environment han in a brick-and-mortar world.
This Article demonstrates that online intermediaries are not just
passive middlemen. They influence decisions through website design
and promote behavioral change among internet users. The use of big
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data, the use of artificial intelligence, and the growing use of Internet of
Things (loT) technologies enables unprecedented hyperinfluence.
Drawing on network theory, psychology, marketing, and information
systems, this Article further demonstrates how nudges influence the
process of information diffusion in digital networks. It shows that by
nudging, intermediaries can amplify the severity of speech-related harm.
This Article introduces an innovative taxonomy of nudges that
online intermediaries utilize, and explains how nudges influence,
change internet users' interactions, and form social relations.
Afterwards, it examines case law and normative considerations
regarding the liability of intermediaries for choice architecture. It
argues that the law should respond to "evil nudges," and it proposes
nuanced differential guidelines for deciding cases of intermediary
liability. It does so while accounting for basic principles of tort law, as
well as freedom of speech, reputation, fairness, efficiency, and the
importance of promoting innovation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The seminal book Nudge by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein
demonstrates that policy makers can prod behavioral changes.' A
nudge is "any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or
significantly changing their economic incentives."2 According to this
notion of "libertarian paternalism," the person who organizes the
environment in which people make decisions-a choice architect3-may
predict individuals' prospective behavior and influence them to act in a
preferred way. Nevertheless, individuals are free to opt out.4 Hence,
freedom of choice is preserved.
Thaler and Sunstein's conceptualization of nudging prompted
discussions and controversies.5 Academic literature focuses on the
positive potential of nudges, but shies away from discussing libertarian
paternalism that does not promote welfare but rather infringes on it:
"evil nudges."6 This Article strives to fill in this gap and examines the
choice architecture that facilitates defamatory content.7 Such choice
architecture negatively influences individuals' behavior, pushing them
to disseminate defamatory speech and exacerbate reputational harm.
This Article focuses on a particular case study of online
intermediary liability-namely, website operators that offer platforms
for users to create their own content, such as review websites, blogs,
discussion forums, and social networks. Intermediaries use advanced
technologies to structure the flow of information and interactions.
Moreover, intermediaries influence speech by incorporating nudges into
the twenty-first century's hyperconnected environment.8 Consider the
following examples:
1. An online intermediary operates a popular website titled The
Dirty; 9
1. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008).
2. Id.
3. See RICHARD H. THALER ET AL., CHOICE ARCHITECTURE 1 (2010).
4. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 5-6.
5. See infra Section I.A; see also infra text accompanying notes 33, 35--36.
6. See infra Section I.A, I.D (expanding on "evil nudges").
7. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 10; infra Section II.A.
8. See infra Section II.C. Intermediaries use advanced technologies to enhance their
influence. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
9. See THE DIRTY, http://thedirty.com/#F28L2h4Hpb98IDvS.99 [https://perma.cc/39DJ-
P9ND] (last visited Sept. 25, 2018); Kate Knibbs, Cleaning Up the Dirty, RINGER (Apr. 19, 2017),
https://www.theringer.com/2017/4/19/16041942/the-dirty-nik-richie-gossip-site-relaunch-
4a086aa24536 [https://perma.cclHY8J-JVPQ]. TheDirty.com publishes content that contains
4 [Vol. 21:1:1
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2. An online intermediary operates a review website and requires
users to categorize their reviews. Most of the categories
offered are negative, such as "rip off," "con artists," and
"corrupt companies";10
3. An online intermediary encourages users to publish rumors,
gossip, and defamatory content by using slogans such as "Keep
it juicy."n Some of the encouragements are general, while
others are personalized and adjusted to users'
characteristics.12
Given these intermediaries' choice architecture, defamation and
negative fake stories unsurprisingly fill their platforms. One potential
solution would be to allow victims of offensive speech to file libel suits
against intermediaries that facilitate offensive and harmful content
published on their sites. Should the law impose liability on
intermediaries for acting in bad faith by enhancing offensive speech
through nudges? How should the courts treat such nudges? Finally,
which standards of liability should be set?
Technological design organizes the world for us-subtly shaping
the ways that we make sense of it.13 Every choice a web designer makes
rumors, speculation, assumptions, opinions, and factual information. Postings may contain
erroneous or inaccurate information. See id.
10. See Glob. Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 932 (D. Ariz.
2008).
11. See Nancy S. Kim, Website Design and Liability, 52 JURIMETRICS 383, 393 (2012). This
was the slogan of the intermediary of JuicyCampus.com. See Associated Press, Lawsuits, Weak
Economy Kill JuicyCampus.com, Fox NEWS (Feb. 5, 2009),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2009/02/05/1awsuits-weak-economy-kill-juicycampuscom.html
[https://perma.cc/Y4E8-U48B]. Similarly, GossipReport.com encouraged its users to think about
and report on controversial issues. See Gene Weingarten, Lying Liars, WASH. POST (June 15, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/06/1 1/AR2008061103226.html?nored
irect=on [https://perma.cc/E6BR-8SRA]. TheDirty.com went further and included a button labeled
as "submit dirt." A Dirty Job: TheDirty.com and Liability for User Content, LAW360 (June 8, 2012,
12:33 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/347948/a-dirty-job-thedirty-com-and-liability-for-
user-content. The cellular app, Secret (that was recently shutdown), also encouraged distribution
of gossip, rumors, and personal information anonymously. See Mike Isaac, A Founder of Secret, the
Anonymous Social App, Is Shutting It Down, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/30/technology/a-founder-of-secret-the-anonymous-social-app-
shuts-it-down-as-use-declines.html [https://perma.cclM54Y-MGWC].
12. See Kim, supra note 11, at 403. Intermediaries can use big data, artificial intelligence
and machine learning to personalize encouragements. See, e.g., Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp.,
Inc., No. 17-cv-05359-LB, 2017 WL 5665670, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017).
13. See WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY'S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN
OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 22, 26 (2018) (emphasis in original) (explaining that design is everything
since "[d]esign can act as a medium, communicating on behalf of both designers and users. It can
also act upon users, constraining or enabling them in particular ways."); Julie E. Cohen, What Is
Privacy, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1913 (2013).
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affects users' behavior, interpersonal dynamics,14 and decisions to
generate and disseminate content.15 The examples above represent
three common online strategies of nudges: (1) "Focal Point"; (2)
"Channeling & Leading"; and (3) "Encouragement."16 These examples
are not theoretical. In fact, policy makers and courts discuss them
regularly.17 Yet, the scope of intermediary liability for nudges remains
unclear. Legal scholars, judges, and legislatures lack a systematic
understanding of how evil nudges influence internet users, let alone
how the law should respond." This Article aims to meet that challenge.
It strives to provide a comprehensive framework for online
intermediary liability for speech tort nudges. This framework will
entail a nuanced, context-specific analysis that is neutral to
technological advances. It can be used by judges and policy makers to
promote just and efficient decisions on intermediary liability.
Part II focuses on intermediaries' choice architectures and their
effect on social behavior, network dynamics, and diffusion of
information. Drawing on network theory, psychology, marketing, and
information systems, it provides an innovative takonomy of three main
types of nudges. This taxonomy illustrates nudging strategies and how
they exacerbate speech tort and falsehoods' harm. Reconceptualizing
the influence of intermediaries is particularly important in the age of
big data, artificial intelligence, and Internet of Things (loT)
technologies that enable hyperinfluence on a scale like never before.19
14. See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1162 (2009);
Samantha L. Millier, Note, The Facebook Frontier: Responding to the Changing Face of Privacy on
the Internet, 97 KY. L.J. 541, 556 (2008). For example, intermediaries in social networks (such as
Facebook), enhance motivation to spread content. See Grimmelmann, supra, at 1162. They are
great at making us feel like we know many people. The pictures, names, and other informal
touches make contacts look like well-known friends. See id. Thus, we share with them information
we would not have shared otherwise. See id.
15. See B.J. FOGG, PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY: USING COMPUTERS TO CHANGE WHAT WE
THINK AND Do 5 (Jonathan Grudin et al. eds., 2003); JACOB SILVERMAN, TERMS OF SERVICE: SOCIAL
MEDIA AND THE PRICE OF CONSTANT CONNECTION 8 (2015).
16. See infra Section I.D.
17. See, e.g., Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012)); Jeff Kosseff, The Gradual Erosion of the Law
that Shaped the Internet: Section 230's Evolution Over Two Decades, 18. COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 1, 40-41 (2016) (indexing several cases concerning online intermediary immunity); see also
infra Section I.A.
18. See infra Sections IIA, II.C. (demonstrating the incoherency in judicial decision and
scholarly work).
19. See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech Is a Triangle, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 67) (explaining that the problem of online intermediaries, which sets them apart
from twentieth-century mass media companies, is their dangerous ability to manipulate and
breach trust by utilizing personal data); Michael Guihot, Anne F. Matthew & Nicolas P. Suzor,
Nudging Robots: Innovative Solutions to Regulate Artificial Intelligence, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 385, 446-48 (2017) (discussing nudging and artificial intelligence). Technologies can enhance
the efficiency and efficacy of content through design and automation. See Lili Levi, Real "Fake
6 [Vol. 21:1:1
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This reconceptualization allows for a more comprehensive analysis of
intermediary liability.
Part III explores case law regarding intermediary liability in the
United States and the European Union, focusing on the inconsistency
of court decisions and differences among jurisdictions. It follows with a
discussion of normative considerations from a broader perspective.
Part IV advocates for the recognition of nudges as part of tort
law. It suggests that the negative influence caused by evil nudges can
and should be subject to third-party liability. The Article offers tailored
guidelines for determining liability of intermediaries by using
differential standards for structuring judicial discretion and promoting
proportional liability and consistency. In doing so, this Article takes
into account basic principles of tort law, as well as freedom of speech,
reputation, fairness, efficiency, and the importance of innovation.
Evil nudges are a major problem throughout society today.
Beyond the implications on individual dignity, evil nudges can influence
and change social behavior and infringe on our political security and
democracy.20 The potentially grave consequences of bad faith influence
are a wakeup call for the law to respond. This Article constitutes the
first sustained examination of the role of evil nudges in tort law and
rectifies the gap in legal scholarship on third-party liability.
21
Invaluable insights gleaned from intermediary liability can open up
new avenues of analytic inquiry and inspire further discussions on
contributory liability for evil nudges in general. Thus, this Article takes
the first step towards providing a full-fledged theoretical framework for
News" and Fake "Fake News", 16 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 20). As
research indicates, sophisticated players use data analytics and artificial intelligence to increase
the efficiency of their messages. See id. at 26. These issues are of particular importance in the
wake of the Facebook-Analytica scandal. See Alexandra Samuel, The Shady Data-Gathering
Tactics Used by Cambridge Analytica Were an Open Secret to Online Marketers. I Know, Because
I Was One, VERGE (Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/25/171617
2 6/facebook-
cambridge-analytica-data-online-marketers [https://perma.cc/WG8H-DAG7].
20. See FUTURE OF HUMANITY INST., UNIV. OF OXFORD, THE MALICIOUS USE OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE: FORECASTING, PREVENTION, AND MITIGATION 6 (2018),
https://www.eff.org/files/2018/02/20/malicious-ai-reportfmal.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6PM-
QUEA]. The improved ability of intermediaries and other stakeholders to analyze human
behaviors, moods, and beliefs by using big data allows them to apply effective evil nudges and
manipulate others. See id. This threatens a society's ability to engage in truthful, free, and
productive discussions about matters of public importance and legitimately implement broadly
just and beneficial policies. See id. The Facebook-Analytica scandal serves as a good example. See
Samuel, supra note 19. For expansion on the far reaching technological abilities and Artificial
Intelligence in particular to hinder our political security, see FUTURE OF HUMANITY INST., supra,
at 28-29.
21. See Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 56-57 (2003) ("[T]he
topic of third-party liability has received only scant attention by legal academics. . . . [L]ittle is
known about the appropriate scope of third-party liability. Specifically, legal scholarship has little
to say about the standard of liability that should apply to third parties."); infra Section I.A.
72018]
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third-party liability and adjusting tort law to meet the challenges of the
twenty-first century.
II. NUDGES AND NETWORKS: BETWEEN PSYCHOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY
A. Why Nudge?
Decision makers do not make choices in a vacuum. Instead, they
reach decisions based on cultural and social conditions-some of which
are visible, while others remain hidden. Moreover, decisions are
usually context sensitive.22 In Nudge,23 Thaler and Sunstein identify
broad ways of changing civic behavior in a predictable way without
banning options or significantly changing economic incentives.24 They
call this libertarian paternalism."25 Choice architects may predict
individuals' prospective behavior and influence them to act in a
preferred direction.26 This strategy can solve problems caused by
bounded rationality and bounded self-control.27  Nevertheless,
individuals are free to opt out; hence, keeping their freedom of choice.28
For example, people tend to stick with the status quo when using
default options.29 Knowledge of this bias allows choice architects to set
22. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 3.
23. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE MYTH OF CHOICE: PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A WORLD
OF LIMITS 198 (2011). See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1.
24. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 99, 241. For example, a GPS is a nudge.
Default rules and disclosure of relevant information (i.e., about the risks of smoking) also count as
nudges. See id. at 68; Cass Sunstein, There's a Backlash Against Nudging - But It Was Never
Meant to Solve Every Problem, GUARDIAN (Apr. 24, 2014, 2:30 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/24/nudge-backlash-free-society-dignity-
coercion [https://perma.cc/AZ8X-XDDP]. By contrast, a criminal penalty is not a nudge because it
imposes "significant material incentives on people's choices." See Cass R. Sunstein, Do People Like
Nudges?, ADMIN. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2); accord CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE ETHICS
OF INFLUENCE: GOVERNMENT IN THE AGE OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 39 (2016).
25. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY NUDGE? THE POLITICS OF LIBERTARIAN PATERNALISM 19,
55-56 (2014) (referring to a continuum of costs of choice, and that, when the costs of choice are
burdensome-it is hard paternalism, and whenever the costs are insignificant, it is soft
paternalism).
26. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism,
122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1834, 1887 (2013); Abbey Stemler, Regulation 2.0: The Marriage of New
Governance and Lex Informatica, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH L. 87, 105-06 (2016) (explaining how
choice architecture regulates the flow of information online).
27. See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1184 (2003). On the problem of bounded rationality, see Daniel
Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON.
REV. 1449, 1449 (2003) (explaining that when individuals make decisions, their rationality is
limited by systematic biases that separate the choices they make from the optimal beliefs and
choices assumed in economic rational-agent models); Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of
Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 99 (1955).
28. See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1184.
29. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 8 ("[P]eople have a strong tendency to go
along with the status quo or default option.").
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the default rules and thus influence users' behavior in their preferred
ways-knowing that most people will not deviate from the default
choice. Yet the choice architect does not forbid decision makers from
deviating away from the default choice, nor does he tax deviations from
the default-people remain free to make their own choices. This
concept can be useful for preventing self-harm, as well as harm from
third parties.30 Advocates of the nudge approach believe that choice-
preserving alternatives are preferable to mandates.31
The nudge approach has achieved widespread recognition in
public policy making, which has led to reforms.32 However, it has also
attracted controversies, objections, and ethical concerns.33 Much of the
criticism surrounding this approach comes from libertarians, who argue
that the idea of "libertarian paternalism" contradicts itself.34 They view
the "guiding" of a person's choices and the elimination thereof as
comparable.35 A debate that contemplates whether nudges are ethical
30. See Christopher McCrudden & Jeff King, The Dark Side of Nudging: The Ethics,
Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism, in CHOICE ARCHITECTURE IN
DEMOCRACIES, EXPLORING THE LEGITIMACY OF NUDGING 67, 81, 93 (Alexandra Kemmerer et al.
eds., 2016) (referring to texting while driving and fuel standards as areas where nudging is
appropriate). Nudges related to distracted driving and fuel standards are simply concerned with
preventing harm to third parties. In other words, Sunstein applies nudges as they relate to the
prevention of harm to others. See id.; SUNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 24-25 (differentiating between
nudges that prevent harm to self and nudges that prevent harm to others, yet Sunstein concludes
that both nudges can be ethical and promote welfare); SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 108. However,
critics of this philosophy caution the use of nudges, instead of mandates, for preventing harm to
others. See McCrudden & King, supra, at 69.
31. See Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. REV. 773, 783 (2014); Cass R.
Sunstein, Nudges us. Shoves, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 210, 210 (2014) (demonstrating that the nudge
concept can also be used to avoid causing harm to third parties).
32. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS 331 (2015); Pelle Guldborg Hansen & Andreas Maaloe Jespersen, Nudge and the
Manipulation of Choice: A Framework for the Responsible Use of the Nudge Approach to Behaviour
Change in Public Policy, 4 EUR. J. RISK REG. 3, 4 (2013); McCrudden & King, supra note 30, at 86;
Sunstein, supra note 24 (manuscript at 34). The nudge approach was applied to bring behavioral
change in public policy in the United States and Europe. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., TRUSTING
NUDGES? LESSONS FROM AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY 1, 2-3, 17 (2018) (describing a survey on
nudges applied by government and concluding that there is generally a high level of approval for
nudges as policy tools across different countries-including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, South
Korea, and the United States).
33. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 137; Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging 1,
12-13 (Nov. 20, 2014) (preliminary draft),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=
252 6 34 1 [https://perma.cc/BUG2-HBL5]
(listing and confronting seven objections to nudges).
34. See Heidi M. Hurd, Fudging Nudging: Why 'Libertarian Paternalism' Is the
Contradiction It Claims It's Not, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 703, 734 (2016).
35. See Hansen & Jespersen, supra note 32, at 9; Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian
Paternalism is an Oxymoron, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1245, 1265 (2005) (challenging Thaler and
Sunstein's arguments as expressed in Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 27); Henry Farrell & Cosma
Shalizi, 'Nudge' Policies Are Another Name for Coercion, NEW SCIENTIST (Nov. 2, 2011),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg
2 1228376-500-nudge-policies-are-another-name-for-
coercion/ [https://perma.cclYJJ3-F253] (arguing that nudges are paternalistic coercion); Brendan
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and whether they manipulate choices has ensued.36 Due to the
inevitability of choice architecture and the fact that there is no such
thing as a completely "neutral" design, researchers question the basis
for objections to nudges.37 Other researchers question when it is
inappropriate to use nudges38 -attempting to differentiate between
strategies of choice architecture.39
Empirical research of views regarding nudges found greater
support for transparent nudges that appeal to conscious, deliberative
thinking, as opposed to nontransparent nudges that affect subconscious
or unconscious processing of information.40 However, people's views
cannot resolve the question of when nudges should be constrained-
thus, this question remains unanswered.41 This Article does not aim to
resolve these general questions. Instead, it focuses on evil nudges that
do not promote social welfare.42 These nudges are often driven by illicit
motives43 and may lead to severe harm.44
Evil nudges are normatively undesirable, and most people would
be unhappy to be their target.45 Thaler and Sunstein briefly addressed
evil nudges and suggested transparency as a solution.46 The notion of
O'Neill, A Message to the Illiberal Nudge Industry: Push Off, SPIKED (Nov. 1, 2010),
http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/9840#.U99QveN-sl8 [https://perma.cc/P668-E2PG]
(claiming that individual choice may not exist due to manipulation caused by this policy).
36. See Hansen & Jespersen, supra note 32, at 13; John Hasnas, Some Noodging About
Nudging: Four Questions About Libertarian Paternalism, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 653
(2016).
37. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 86 (suggesting that it is pointless to discuss
liability for choice architecture because it is unavoidable); Hansen & Jespersen, supra note 32, at
8, 10 (distinguishing given contexts that accidentally influence behavior from situations involving
choice architects who intentionally attempt to alter behavior by manipulating such contexts).
38. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 15-16 (explaining that nudges do not raise ethical
questions when they promote autonomy, dignity, and welfare).
39. See Hansen & Jespersen, supra note 32, at 13 (differentiating nudges that aim to
influence behavior maintained by automatic thinking and nudges that aim to influence reflective
thinking).
40. See Sunstein, supra note 24 (manuscript at 3, 39) (explaining that a statement or an
action can be manipulative if it does not sufficiently appeal to people's capacity for reflective and
deliberative choice-thus failing to respect people's autonomy); SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 32, at
18 ("Rather, effective and publicly accepted nudges will more likely be developed with a process
that includes early participation of the affected groups, public scrutiny, and deliberation - as well
as transparent processes in governmental institutions.").
41. See Sunstein, supra note 24 (manuscript at 1, 4) ("Evidence about people's views
cannot resolve the ethical questions, but in democratic societies (and nondemocratic ones as well),
those views will inevitably affect what public officials are willing to do.").
42. See THALER, supra note 32, at 345. Nudges are merely tools. Therefore, when Thaler
signs copies of Nudge, he always adds the phrase "nudge for good." Id.
43. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 159-60; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 240-
41; Sunstein, supra note 26, at 1898; Sunstein, supra note 33, at 6.
44. See infra Sections IC, I.D (outlining a taxonomy of nudge torts and explaining their
harm potential).
45. See Sunstein, supra note 24 (manuscript at 27).
46. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 244.
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transparency, however, will not likely guarantee an acceptable public
policy.47 Even highly transparent nudges promote behavioral change,
48
and transparency does not resolve the harm caused by evil nudges to third
parties. Thus, transparency alone remains a suboptimal solution for
mitigating the problem of evil nudges.
A choice architect cannot avoid influencing decisions and
behavior.49 However, a choice architect often intentionally tries to alter
behavior by nudging and attempts to exert his own will over other people's
actions. In such cases, the influence of choice architecture is not
accidental.50 Therefore, ignoring evil nudges distorts the concept of
responsibility. The following sections will focus on a single case study
to demonstrate how evil nudges relate to the liability of online
intermediaries for speech torts.
B. Intermediaries, Social Contexts, and Online Nudges
The advent of the internet, mobile phones, and online social
networks upgraded our ability to constantly stay in touch with one
another. This revolution affords new opportunities to create social ties,
share ideas, form communities, and engage in diverse social dynamics
anywhere and at any time.5 1 Once upon a time, people thought the
internet was the harbinger of "disintermediation"-a sovereign-free
47. See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 9. Many researchers have proved that transparency
and disclosure do not fulfill their goals. See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN
YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 42 (2014); GEORGE
LOEWENSTEIN ET AL., WARNING: You ARE ABOUT TO BE NUDGED 1, 3 (2014); Sophie C. Boerman,
Karolina Tutaj & Eva A. van Reijmersdal, The Effects of Brand Placement Disclosures on
Skepticism and Brand Memory, 38 COMM. 127, 142 (2013); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Even More
Than You Wanted to Know About the Failures of Disclosure, 11 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 63,
65 (2015); Zahr K. Said, Mandated Disclosure in Literary Hybrid Speech, 88 WASH. L. REV. 419,
458 (2013).
48. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 147-48. Examples for transparent nudges are found
in graphic warnings. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 68. These nudges usually work on
intuitive thinking (System 1) in contrast to the analytic system (System 2). See DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 237 (2011) (explaining the two systems of thinking:
intuitive thinking and deliberative thinking); THALER, supra note 32, at 109; Sunstein, supra note
24 (manuscript at 24-25, 36) (noting that even when people are informed that they are being
nudged, the effect of the nudge is usually not reduced).
49. See Hansen & Jespersen, supra note 32, at 8.
50. See id. at 10.
51. See LEE RAINIE & BARRY WELLMAN, NETWORKED: THE NEW SOCIAL OPERATING
SYSTEM 270 (2012).
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medium controlled from the bottom up by users.52 Instead, it simply
created new media gatekeepers that control the flow of information.53
Intermediaries are not just middlemen; they act as centers of
power and governors of speech.54 They shape public discourse5 5 and
play an essential role in shaping social ties and directing the attention
of internet users.5 6 Intermediaries structure the flow of information.57
They influence (1) the nature of social dynamics; (2) the content that a
platforms'users create, consume, and share; and (3) the likelihood that
users further spread content.5 8 To do so, they utilize insights gleaned
from sociology, psychology, and management.5 9 These insights allow
intermediaries to predict cognitive biases and social dynamics, deploy
new sociotechnical systems, and influence flows of information
efficiently in their attempts to gain more profits.60
52. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence [https://perma.ccP4BA-XFT2]
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018).
53. Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296,
2297 (2014); Derek E. Bambauer, Middlemen, 65 FLA. L. REV. F. 1, 2 (2013); Stemler, supra note
26, at 105-06.
54. See Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private
Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1184 (2018) ("These
companies are the governors of these digital communities, and if you have an account and use the
service, you are part of the governed."); Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and
Processes Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1603, 1609 (2018) (focusing on content
moderation).
55. See TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT
MODERATION AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SOCIAL MEDIA 23 (2018) ("Platforms may
not shape the public discourse by themselves, but they do shape the shape of the public discourse.
And they know it.").
56. See Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet
Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 68 (2006).
57. See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 148
(2017) ('Massively intermediated, platform-based media infrastructures have reshaped the ways
that narratives about reality, value, and reputation are crafted, circulated, and contested.");
Stemler, supra note 26, at 105-06.
58. See Michal Lavi, Online Intermediaries: With Power Comes Responsibility, JOLT DIG.
(May 11, 2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.eduldigest/online-intermediaries-with-power-comes-
responsibility [https://perma.cc/YT78-BB7P]. For example, Facebook conducted research to target
emotionally vulnerable and insecure youth. In fact, "Facebook can figure out when people as young
as 14 feel 'defeated,' 'overwhelmed,' 'stressed,' 'anxious,' 'nervous,' 'stupid,' 'silly,' 'useless,' and
[like] a 'failure.' Such information gathered through a system dubbed sentiment analysis could be
used by advertisers to target young Facebook users when they are potentially more vulnerable."
See Nick Whigham, Leaked Document Reveals Facebook Conducted Research to Target




59. See infra Section I.B.1.
60. See JOSEPH TUROW, THE DAILY You: HOW THE NEW ADVERTISING INDUSTRY IS
DEFINING YOUR IDENTITY AND YOUR WORTH 74 (2011); Dale Ganley & Cliff Lampe, The Ties That
Bind: Social Network Principles in Online Communities, 47 DECISION SUPPORT SYS. 266, 266
(2009); Charles Kadushin, The Friends and Supporters of Psychotherapy: On Social Circles in
EVIL NUDGES
1. On Context and the Flow of Information
Multidisciplinary research addresses the three main factors that
influence the information flow: 6 1 the source of the message, the context
of the message, and the audience of the message.62 Specifically, the
likelihood that a message or idea will influence and spread depends on
who posts the message and whether the source of the message is an
influential hub in the social network; 63 the context of the message and
the way it is presented; 64 and the audience and social structures of the
message recipients in a given network. 65
Intermediaries rely on existing research and also conduct
experiments of their own.6 6 They may even allow other stakeholders to
conduct experiments on their platforms.67 Understanding context and
social graphs allows intermediaries to harness technologies and
influence flows of information in many transparent and nontransparent
ways.68 For example, intermediaries can disseminate information
through influential hubs in social networks and consequently influence
Urban Life, 31 AM. Soc. REV. 786, 801 (1966); Manoj Parameswaran & Andrew B. Whinston,
Research Issues in Social Computing, 8 J. ASS'N FOR INFO. SYS. 336, 346 (2007); Kendra Cherry,
Skinner Box or Operant Conditioning Chamber, VERY WELL MIND (Aug. 30, 2018),
https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-a-skinner-box-2795875 [https://perma.cc/W4M3-JBSR]
(explaining the "skinner box"-an apparatus that can condition behavior); Whigham, supra note
58; discussion infra Section I.C.
61. See Michal Lavi, Taking Out of Context, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 145, 150 (2017).
Insights gleaned from psychology emphasize the power of context. See id. at 147. Findings suggest
that context has more influence than the individuals who are engaged in an activity. See
KAHNEMAN, supra note 48, at 171; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1-2; Philip G. Zimbardo,
The Journey from the Bronx to Stanford to Abu Ghraib, in JOURNEYS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY:
LOOKING BACK TO INSPIRE THE FUTURE 1, 34 (Robert Levine, Aroldo Rodrigues & Lynette Zelezny
eds., 2008), http://pdf.prisonexp.org/PersonalJourney.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FGC-MX6L].
62. See Lavi, supra note 61, at 150.
63. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT: How LITTLE THINGS CAN MAKE A BIG
DIFFERENCE 60 (2002) (referring to individuals who possess a great deal of information as
"mavens"); CHARLES KADUSHIN, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL NETWORKS: THEORIES, CONCEPTS, AND
FINDINGS 144-46 (Deborah Grant ed., 2012) (referring to individual media influencers as "opinion
leaders" and "influentials"); ELIHU KATZ & PAUL LAZARSFELD, PERSONAL INFLUENCE: THE PART
PLAYED BY PEOPLE IN THE FLOW OF MASS COMMUNICATION 25 (1955); EVERETT M. ROGERS,
DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION 27 (5th ed. 2003).
64. See GLADWELL, supra note 63, at 89; Jonah Berger & Katherine Milkman, What Makes
Online Content Viral?, 49 J. MARKETING RES. 192, 192 (2012); Joseph E. Phelps et al., Viral
Marketing or Electronic Word-of-Mouth Advertising: Examining Consumer Responses and
Motivations to Pass Along Email, J. ADVERT. RES., Dec. 2004, at 333, 338.
65. See GLADWELL, supra note 63, at 158; KADUSHIN, supra note 63, at 146.
66. See BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 117 (2018);
James Grimmelmann, The Law and Ethics of Experiments on Social Media Users, 13 COLO. TECH.
L.J. 219, 240, 263-64 (2015).
67. For example, Cambridge Analytica collected information on Facebook users and
analyzed it, under the guise of academic research, to promote political purposes. See Samuel, supra
note 19.
68. See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA: How FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS US AND
UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY 58 (2018).
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the message itself.69 They can frame their platform in certain ways and
change the context of messages that users publish.70 By doing so, they
also attract specific audiences and influence the nature of social ties
among recipients.71
Intermediaries apply these insights to technology and sway
users' decisions to generate and disseminate content.72 Simple changes
in the manner they design their platforms make a difference.73 Small
cues, or "channeling factors," can result in techno-social engineering
and systematically lead individuals to change their behavior.74
Platform designs-the ways choices are presented to users, the
number of choices, and the manner in which attributes are described-
allow intermediaries to enhance cooperation, equality, and stability.75
69. See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR
DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 58 (2015); Sinan Aral & Dylan Walker, Identifying Influential
and Susceptible Members of Social Networks, 337 SCI. 337, 337 (2012) (presenting a method that
can identify profiles of "influential" members in given social networks). These insights are used in
practice to promote campaigns and influence voters effectively. See COLIN BENNETT, VOTER
SURVEILLANCE, MICRO-TARGETING AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: KNOWING How PEOPLE VOTE
BEFORE THEY DO 3 (2014); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 68, at 172 (referring to Facebook's custom
audiences service that allows advertisers efficient targeting); Daniel Kreiss, Yes We Can (Profile
You): A Brief Primer on Campaigns and Political Data, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 70, 70 (2012);
Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARv. L. REV. F. 335, 335 (2014); Charles Duhigg,
Campaigns Mine Personal Lives to Get Out Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/us/politics/campaigns-mine-personal-lives-to-get-out-
vote.html [https://perma.cc/3C2E-WQPT]; About Custom Audiences from Customer Lists,
FACEBOOK: BUS., https://www.facebook.com/business/help/341425252616329
[https://perma.ccDQV7-X9XR] (last visited Sept. 26, 2018).
70. See HARTZOG, supra note 13, at 35. For example, messages on TheDirty.com are
perceived to be negative because the name of the platform frames them as such. See Knibbs, supra
note 9.
71. See Michal Lavi, Content Providers'Secondary Liability:A Social Network Perspective,
26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 855, 856 (2016). On the importance of the strength
of ties, see id.
72. See FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 66, at 18. Technology has an important role
in influencing context. It creates affordances that can incline users to adopt different behaviors
and pursue different paths of personal development. See id.; FOGG, supra note 15, at 5.
73. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology
of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 454 (1981). Individuals react to a particular choice in different ways
depending on how it is presented. This is the "Framing Effect." See HARTZOG, supra note 13, at 35;
KAHNEMAN, supra note 48, at 374; Tversky & Kahneman, supra, at 454.
74. See Howard Leventhal et al., Effects of Fear and Specificity of Recommendation Upon
Attitudes and Behavior, 2 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20, 20-29 (1965). Channeling factors
can change behavior. For example, when students are advised to get tetanus inoculations, they are
far more likely to do so when given precise instructions where to go and what to do to get a shot.
Giving students a map of the campus with the University Health Building circled and requesting
to review their weekly schedule to locate a time to be inoculated made a difference. These small
contextual changes channeled them towards a decision to get inoculations relative to other
students who heard a lecture about the importance of inoculations. See id.
75. See, e.g., Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Designing Against Discrimination in Online
Markets, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1183, 1183, 1189, 1192 (2017) (providing a conceptual
framework for understanding how platform design and policy choices introduce opportunities for
users' biases to affect how they treat one another). The study focused on the influence of design on
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However, choice architecture can also lead to antisocial behavior. Some
business models are based on nudges that enhance extreme or offensive
content to attract users and, in turn, increase advertising revenue.6
Nudges also affect the macrolevel of a social network. They can
motivate sociological process and interpersonal dynamics by
disseminating harmful speech across the network-enhancing the
likelihood for widespread dissemination and causing tremendous harm
to one's reputation.77  This strategy may even incentivize the
dissemination of fake news to promote commercial or political
purposes,78 manipulatively influence election results, or hinder political
security in various ways.79 The recent story of Facebook and Cambridge
Analytica serves as a good example of the influences nudges can have
on democracy.80
discrimination and analyzed ten categories of design and policy choices through which platforms
may make themselves more or less conducive to discrimination by users. See id.
76. See JARON LANIER: TEN ARGUMENTS FOR DELETING YOUR MEDIA AcCOUNT RIGHT
Now 28,29 (2018) (coining the acronym BUMMER-Behaviors of Users Modified and Made into
an Empire for Rent-to describe the influence of social media business models on users). See also
VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 68, at 5-6, 9 (describing how Facebook develops algorithms that favor
highly charged or extremist content and depend upon a self-serving advertising system that
precisely targets ads by using massive surveillance and elaborate personal dossiers). But see Peter
Kafka, YouTube is Trying to Clean Itself Up by Making It Much Harder for Small Video Makers to
Make Money, RECODE (Jan. 16, 2018, 6:00 PM),
https://www.recode.net/2018/1/16/16898660/youtube-content-advertising-revenue-program-new-
rules-google-preferred [https://perma.cc/W8ZY-S83F] (explaining how some YouTube advertisers
want assurances that their content will be displayed next to brand-safe videos). On business
models premised on generating offensive content, see DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN
CYBERSPACE 6 (2014).
77. See KARINE NAHON & JEFF HEMSLEY, GOING VIRAL 20-21 (2013).
78. See SCHNEIER, supra note 69, at 54 (describing personalized microtargeting that can
be used for commercial and electoral purposes).
79. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 68, at 11 (explaining that "fake news," "propaganda,"
and "disinformation" result in the continual undermining of public trust in expertise, as well as
rational deliberation and debate); Zittrain, supra note 69, at 335. One US election study involved
Facebook users that were encouraged to click a button if they voted, which would create and share
a post about their participation with a graphic sign and pictures of people who participated.
Apparently, Facebook did not show these graphic signs to some users. Researchers cross-
referenced names with actual voting records and found that those people who saw posts that their
friends voted were more likely to vote. This study illustrates how intermediaries can influence
voting rates and even election results. See Zittrain, supra note 69, at 335.
80. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 68, at 55, 150; Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-
Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in Major
Data Breach, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018, 6:03 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-
election [https://perma.ce/5JHM-4E8U].
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C. Thresholds, Nudges, Sociological Process, and Dissemination of
Speech
Decades ago, sociologists began to examine processes of
information dissemination and developed models of social movements
and collective behavior. In Threshold Models of Collective Behavior,
Mark Granovetter articulated the key concept of a "threshold" to
explain these processes.81 A threshold is the number of people who
must reach a single decision before a given actor follows. 8 2 The model
assumes that information and ideas are considered more valuable as
more individuals accept and adopt them.83 A person's threshold for
joining an activity is defined as "the proportion of the group a person
would have to see join before he would do so."8 In this way, a person's
behavior depends upon the number of other people who already engage
in that particular behavior. Therefore, one's social network has a huge
potential to affect one's decisions to adopt and disseminate certain
ideas.85
Each individual has a different threshold for adopting and
disseminating ideas.86  There are three categories of individual
thresholds. First, "receptives" are individuals who have the lowest-
level threshold for accepting new ideas.87 Sometimes they already have
a prior disposition in favor of a newly presented idea.88 "Neutrals" have
no inclination either way; yet, with a little information or exposure to a
shared view of few people, they might come to accept an idea.89 Finally,
"skeptics" are individuals who have a high threshold for accepting ideas
and might even hold a prior disposition standing in contrast to a newly
presented idea.90 These individuals require a great deal of information
81. Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOC. 1420, 1422
(1978) (explaining that different individuals require different levels of safety for joining an activity,
such as entering a riot, and also vary in the benefits they derive from the activity).
82. See id.
83. See id. at 1421.
84. See id. at 1422.
85. See NICHOLAS A. CHRISTAKIS & JAMES H. FOWLER, CONNECTED: THE SURPRISING
POWER OF OUR SOCIAL NETWORKS AND How THEY SHAPE OUR LIVES 127 (2009); Lavi, supra note
71, at 889; Michal Shur-Ofry, Popularity as a Factor in Copyright Law, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 525,
530 (2009).
86. See CASS SUNSTEIN, ON RUMORS: How FALSEHOODS SPREAD, WHY WE BELIEVE THEM,
WHAT CAN BE DONE 19 (2009); Granovetter, supra note 81, at 1422.
87. SUNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 19 (explaining that the individual threshold depends on
a person's prior disposition regarding the information).
88. See id.; Edward L. Glaeser & Cass R. Sunstein, Does More Speech Correct Falsehoods?,
43 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 67 (2014) (explaining that because people have different prior beliefs, they
will consequently have different degrees of skepticism).




before accepting a given idea.9 1 However, once the evidence becomes
overwhelming-because the beliefs seem to be shared by many others-
skeptics will join others in accepting the idea.92
Receptives are the first to adopt and circulate an idea. A
subsequent reader then decides whether to adopt or decline the idea
according to his personal threshold. The proliferation of an idea heavily
depends on the types of individuals it encounters at the outset.
9 3 If an
idea encounters an adequate number of receptives, neutral individuals
are more likely to reach their threshold, and eventually, skeptics will
finally follow and further spread the idea.94
When many individuals adopt an idea, positive feedback forms.
95
Thus, more individuals who are likely to reach their threshold follow
them and further spread the idea. Diffusion of ideas, trends, or social
behavior begins slowly. 9 6 When a critical mass of individuals publicly
share an idea, a "tipping point" occurs, and the idea spreads like
wildfire. 97
Many times, an idea spreads to an "influential" individual in a
social network. In such cases, if he accepts the idea and spreads it, the
likelihood for reaching a tipping point exponentially increases.
98 The
proliferation of an idea, thus, heavily depends on the individuals who
encounter it at the outset.99 An individual's threshold depends on
various personal factors and social structures,100 which may affect the
collective outcome more than individual preferences.
1 0 1  The
composition of a network as either homogenous or heterogeneous, thus,





93. See id. at 24.
94. See id. at 20.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See GLADWELL, supra note 63, at 12 (defining a tipping point as "the moment of critical
mass, the threshold, the boiling point").
98. See KADUSHIN, supra note 63, at 146 (explaining the concept of "influentials").
99. See id. at 156.
100. See id. at 160-61 (referring to personal thresholds and exogenous factors, such as a
network's structures and the proportion of adopters in one's direct interpersonal environment, as
influences on people's decisions or actions).
101. See Granovetter, supra note 81, at 1430-31.
102. See Ronald S. Burt, Social Contagion and Innovation: Cohesion versus Structural
Equivalence, 92 AM. J. SOC. 1287, 1290 (1987); Mark Granovetter & Roland Soong, Threshold
Models of Diffusion and Collective Behavior, 9 J. MATHEMATICAL Soc. 165, 166 (1983) (focusing on
the homogeneity assumption in models whereby the network is composed of homogenous
individuals). In practice, people may vary from one another. Granovetter & Soong, supra, at 166.
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Social networks are the key to understanding the flow and
dissemination of information. Changes in an idea's composition, social
structure, and transition path significantly alter the likelihood of
widespread dissemination.103 The results of psychological experiments
demonstrate the influences social network structures have on the flow
of information.104 But sociological research reflects and explains these
processes on the macrolevel of networks.105 When a person with a low-
level threshold adopts an idea, others are more likely to follow due to
the network's influences.106 This dynamic generates informational and
reputational cascades that lead to an extensive dissemination of ideas
throughout the network.107 These insights frequently allow some
prediction on human behavior and dynamics in a particular given
network. The following Section explores prominent strategies of
influences on social context and outlines an innovative taxonomy of
nudge torts that can influence speech and incentivize widespread
dissemination across the network.
D. Taxonomy of Online Evil Nudges
Granovetter wrote his seminal work over thirty years ago,108 yet
it can be smoothly applied to social media. Online networks operate in
an environment designed by intermediaries.109 Technological tools
provide intermediaries with unilateral power to design architecture and
103. See KADUSHIN, supra note 63, at 157-61.
104. See, e.g., Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One
Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED 1, 1 (1956) (describing
the "conformity experiment"-whereby study subjects provided wrong answers to questions to
conform with the rest of the group). This phenomenon is defined as "herding." See CASS SUNSTEIN,
GOING TO EXTREMES: How LIKE MINDS UNITE AND DIVIDE 57 (2009); Sushil Bikhchandani et al.,
Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON.
PERSP. 151, 152 (1998).
105. See DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE 208 (2003);
Lev Muchnik et al., Social Influence Bias: A Randomized Experiment, 341 SCI. 647, 647-51 (2013)
(reporting experiment results where participants preferred to download files that were already
downloaded by others); Muchnik et al., supra, at 647 (explaining that positive or negative ratings
in review websites influence participants); Matthew Salganik et al., Experimental Study of
Inequality and Unpredictability in an Artificial Cultural Market, 311 SCI. 854, 854 (2006).
106. See Granovetter, supra note 81, at 1422.
107. Informational cascades are generated when individuals follow the statements or
actions of predecessors and do not express their opposing opinions because they believe their
predecessors are right. As a result, the social network does not obtain important information.
Reputational cascades form because of social pressures. In these cases, people think they know
what is right, or what is likely to be right, but they nonetheless go along with the crowd in order
to maintain their status. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 104, at 57; Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie,
Four Failures of Deliberating Groups 2 (Univ. of Chi. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 215, 2008).
108. See Granovetter, supra note 81, at 1420.
109. See Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 995 (2014).
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influence decision-making from the top-down.110  Intermediaries
influence context in a variety of ways, using strategies in accordance
with a myriad of business models."1 Unlike typical models of
traditional media, these models of influence do not only involve a
passive audience, but rather they affect active users who disseminate
the information as well. 112 Furthermore, data collection,113 complex
algorithms,114 and technologies-such as machine learning, artificial
intelligence (AI),115 big data,116 and IoT 117-allow intermediaries to use
data, hack the human consciousness, and enhance their influence.118
Intermediaries can identify influential hubs in a given network1 9 and
target particular users.120 They can conduct complex studies on user
110. See HAR'IZOG, supra note 13, at 34 (explaining that design can shape our perceptions,
behavior and values).
111. See id. (referring to intermediaries' power to design architecture and personalize
information); Calo, supra note 109, at 995. For more on personalization and optimization of
relationships, see FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 66, at 150.
112. See Calo, supra note 109, at 1042.
113. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 68, at 55 (giving the example of Facebook, which has
grown into the "most pervasive surveillance system in the world" and also the "most reckless and
irresponsible surveillance system in the commercial world").
114. See id. at 150 (referring to algorithmic targeting in the 2016 elections and raising the
question of what democracy would look like if algorithms governed the art of science and
persuasion); id. at 150-55 (referring to psychographic profiling that allows accurate algorithmic
targeting).
115. See Balkin, supra note 54, at 1184; Karen Yeung, 'Hypernudge': Big Data as a Mode
of Regulation by Design, INFO. COMM. & SOC'Y, May 2016, at 8 (nudging can be integrated into
machine learning techniques); Hayley Tsukayama, Facebook is Using Alto Try to Prevent Suicide,
WASH. POST (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.cominews/the-
switch/wp/2017/11/27/facebook-is-using-ai-to-try-to-prevent-suicide/?utmterm=.93d
758864ed9
[https://perma.cc/9YAC-F5MA]. For expansion on Al in general, see ADAM THIERER ET AL.,
MERCATUS CTR., GEORGE MASON UNIV., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 2 (2017);
Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 399, 404
(2017). For negative usage of AI to spread harmful speech, see FUTURE OF HUMANITY INST., supra
note 20, at 1, 3; Meg Leta Jones, Silencing Bad Bots: Global, Legal and Political Questions for
Mean Machine Communication, 23 COMM. L. & POL'Y 159, 185 (2018) (addressing the negative
usage of AI to spread harmful speech by bots).
116. See Hannes Grassegger & Mikael Krogerus, The Data That Turned the World Upside
Down, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 28, 2017, 8:15 AM),
https://motherboard.vice.comlenus/article/mg9vvn/how-our-likes-helped-trump-win
[https://perma.cc/CJP4-TR891.
117. Today, sensors in physical objects can passively collect information on individuals and
their networks online and offline. See MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
END(S) OF LAW: NOVEL ENTANGLEMENTS OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 9, 41 (2015); VAIDHYANATHAN,
supra note 68, at 101 (explaining that specific technologies and intermediaries interact with users'
minds and bodies).
118. YUVAL NOACH HARRARI, 21 LESSONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 267-68 (2018) ("You
might have heard that we are living in the era of hacking computers, but that's hardly half the
truth. In fact, we live in the era of hacking humans.").
119. On "influentials," see KADUSHIN, supra note 63, at 146. See also Aral & Walker, supra
note 69, at 337 (finding an innovative way to measure influence in decisions to adopt products in
a given social network).
120. See Aral & Walker, supra note 69, at 340.
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behavior21 and nudge more efficiently by harnessing multidisciplinary
insights and technological tools that make it easier to influence
behavior online in a persuasive way.122 Nudges increase the likelihood
that individuals reach their threshold to support an idea, repeat the
idea, and spread it further.123
As an idea circulates, it tends to gain credibility. The more
people repeatedly hear an idea, the more likely they are to believe that
idea.12 4 Nudging users to disseminate defamation and false information
reduces the likelihood for a successful correction of erroneous
information by other members of the social network.125 Repeating
informational errors not only exacerbates harm, but also undermines
efficient bottom-up private ordering by participants that commonly
outline and enforce social norms.126  Moreover, researchers have
revealed that falsehoods are disseminated significantly farther, faster,
deeper, and more broadly than the truth.127
Due to the potential harm that an intermediary's influence may
inflict, comprehensive theoretical analysis of the liability of
intermediaries in speech tort is indispensable. The following
121. See FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 66, at 117 (describing the cognition
experiment of Facebook on users' emotions); VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 68, at 154-55 (referring
to psychometrics data-driven personality quizzes used by Cambridge Analytica); Tsukayama,
supra note 115 (noting that Facebook may use Al to understand user emotions and identify
situations requiring intervention); Whigham, supra note 58 (describing a Facebook experiment
concerning the influencing of susceptible minors).
122. See THALER, supra note 32, at 341-42. On intermediaries and other stakeholders
influences on consumers by using loT technologies, see JOSEPH TUROW, THE AISLES HAVE EYES:
How RETAILERS TRACK YOUR SHOPPING, STRIP YOUR PRIVACY, AND DEFINE YOUR POWER 18-19
(2017). It should be noted that loT technologies may also similarly influence speech. See
FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 66, at 11 ("[I]t's rapidly becoming easier to design
technologies that nudge us to go on auto pilot and accept the cheap pleasure that comes from
minimal thinking. Smart environments are poised to significantly exacerbate this situation.");
HARTZOG, supra note 13, at 146 ("Companies have learned that targeted, personalized appeals are
more persuasive than ads designed for a general audience.").
123. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 65-66 (describing a cascade triggered by
nudges).
124. See NICHOLAS DIFONZO & PRASHANT BORDIA, RUMOR PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL AND
ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACHES 225 (2007); SUNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 21; Gordon Pennycook et
al., Prior Exposure Increases Perceived Accuracy of Fake News, J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 4). The recent campaign elections in the United States illustrate this
proposition. For example, it was rumored that Pope Francis endorsed Donald Trump, even though
he has done nothing of the sort. Some commentators claim that repeated exposure to this falsehood
and others like it influenced the results. See ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER
AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED PROTEST 264-65 (2017); Zeynep Tufekci, Mark Zuckerberg Is in
Denial, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/opinion/mark-
zuckerberg-is-in-denial.html fhttps://perma.cclRXN9-VB29].
125. See Bikhchandani et al., supra note 104, at 165, 168.
126. See Lavi, supra note 71, at 914, 916. For expansion on private ordering of speech
related harm online, see generally id.
127. See Soroush Vosoughi, Deb Roy & Sinan Aral, The Spread of True and False News
Online, 359 SCIENCE 1146 (2018) (finding that false tweets spread faster than true tweets).
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Subsections review several types of intermediary nudges, demonstrate
their harm potential, and classify nudges into the following categories:
(1) "focal point," (2) "channeling and leading," and (3) "encouragement."
These categories form a descriptive taxonomy for understanding nudges
in social networks. All of these strategies lead to similar results, yet
each has nuances and distinctive characteristics.
Focal point nudges influence a potential user's decision to
participate in an online platform, whereas channeling and leading and
encouragement nudges influence users only after the decision to
participate has been made.128 Moreover, the extent of transparency
with respect to the goals of the intermediary is not uniform. Some
nudges appeal to conscious, deliberative thinking, while others
influence in nonsalient, or nontransparent ways-leading to
nondeliberative decision-making, as well as subconsciously influencing
information processing.129 The taxonomy constitutes a significant
contribution by identifying these strategies and their effects on speech
torts, fake stories, and other types of harmful speech.
This taxonomy focuses on the main types of nudges and does not
purport to encompass all the possible tactics of influence. Indeed, more
strategies may develop as technologies advance. Yet, by mapping the
main nudges and understanding their effects on social networks,
updating future changes should become easier.
1. Focal Point
* A popular website is titled The Dirty.1 30
* Famous rating and review websites are titled Ripoff Report,
BadBusiness, and PissedConsumer.131
Various research fields have defined the idea of focal point or foci
in a number of ways.132 In a broader context, researchers define it as a
market around which people can organize their affairs without explicit
communication. 133 Sociologists of networks define foci as "social,
psychological, or physical entit[ies] around which joint activities are
organized ([such as] workplaces, voluntary organizations, . . . families,
128. See LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, INFORMATION AND EXCLUSION 42-45 (2011). Focal
points frame the platform itself and therefore can affect the very decision to participate, whereas
channeling and leading and encouragements are elements inside the platform; therefore, they
have no influence on the decision to participate and the composition of the participants.
129. See Sunstein, supra note 24 (manuscript at 36).
130. See THE DIRTY, supra note 9.
131. Courts have discussed the liability of these websites. See infra Section III.A.
132. See STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 128, at 42-45.
133. See id.
2018] 21
22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 21:1:1
etc.)."134 Individuals who organize themselves around the same foci
tend to form a dense cluster of interpersonal ties.135 These structures
influence the context of social networks.136
The name of a website, its design, and explicit or implicit goals
may constitute a focal point and affect the flow of information.137 First,
a focal point influences the composure and character of the individuals
that choose to take part in conversations.138 It brings participants with
similar dispositions and preferences into one virtual space,139 and
conversely sends exclusionary signals to those participants with
differing views.140 Thus, it creates an "inclusionary vibe" among some
individuals and, at the same time, an "exclusionary vibe" among
others.141 Second, the focal point affects the content that participants
create and share.142 It facilitates particular flows of information and
forms a market for certain type of ideas.143
An intermediary that forms a focal point signals similarly
situated individuals with comparable prior dispositions to participate,
and pushes them to generate specific types of content.144 Encountering
resistance from other participants is less likely in a homogeneous
network. 145 Consequently, the likelihood to cross individual and
collective thresholds for spreading content increases.146 This context
134. See Scott L. Feld, The Focused Organization of Social Ties, 86 AM. J. SOC. 1015, 1016
(1981).
135. See id.
136. See id. at 1033; Kadushin, supra note 60, at 786.
137. See Judith Donath, Signals in Social Supernets, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM.
231, 235 (2008). This phenomenon is known in literature as a "halo effect." See The Halo Effect,
EcONOMIST (Oct. 14, 2009), https://www.economist.com/news/2009/10/14/the-halo-effect
[https://perma.ce/6H7V-R8UV].
138. See Donath, supra note 137, at 235.
139. See STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 128, at 44.; SUNSTEIN, supra note 104, at 75-79; CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, #REPUBLIC: DIVIDED DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 123 (2017)
(explaining that a prior disposition influences the likelihood of crossing the threshold); Glaeser &
Sunstein, supra note 88, at 66, 91.
140. See STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 128, at 43; Lavi, supra note 71, at 928-29.
141. See STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 128, at 44.
142. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 36. The influence of Focal Points on the
content created is a consequence of the framing effect created by the specific naming of the
platform. See id. (expanding on the "framing effect," whereby choices depend, in part, on the way
problems are stated).
143. See id. at 37. The focal point's exclusionary vibe and framing effect shape the market
of ideas in the specific platform. STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 128, at 44; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra
note 1, at 37.
144. See Donath, supra note 137, at 237.
145. See Lavi, supra note 71, at 928-29.
146. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 104, at 80; Noah P. Mark, Culture and Competition:
Homophily and Distancing Explanation for Cultural Niches, 68 AM. SOC. REV. 319, 335 (2003).
Individual behavior is extreme and polarized when clustered with like individuals. See SUNSTEIN,
supra note 139, at 123-24, 236, 243 (expanding on homogeneity and incitement for violence and
terror).
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engineers social norms1 4 7 and enhances dissemination of particular
types of ideas.148 Focal point nudges are unique since they influence
the decision to participate in a conversation on a given online
platform.149 This shapes the composition of participants, and the
influence on content is only a byproduct.
a. Nuances of Focal Points and Gravity of Harm
Focal points take multiple forms and shades. Intermediaries
can harm third parties by framing their platform in a manner that
explicitly invites harmful content; for example, a platform entitled
TheDirty.com150 or HarrassThem.com are exemplars of such framing.151
The business model employed by these intermediaries nudges tortious
defamatory speech.15 2
Likewise, gossip website intermediaries signal to participants to
do just that: gossip. For example, the now-defunct platform called
JuicyCampus15 3 pushed homogenous participants to spread rumors.
This platform signaled that gossip was legitimate-bringing
participants with similar preferences into the platform and removing
social constraints.154  As a result, the rate of false rumors and fake
147. See Michiru Nagatsu, Social Nudges: Their Mechanisms and Justification, 6 REV.
PHIL. & PSYCHOL. 481, 488-89 (2015).
148. See KADUSHIN, supra note 63, at 158; Granovetter, supra note 81, at 1423. The focal
point generates an exclusionary vibe and leads to clustering of individuals with low thresholds for
accepting and diffusing specific types of content. Thus, the focal point increases the likelihood for
the first adopter to cross the threshold and drive a sociological process of mass diffusion. See
STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 128, at 44; SUNSTEIN, supra note 139, at 123-24 (explaining the
phenomenon of "confirmation bias"-whereby similar people tend to confirm each other's speech
in the process of diffusion).
149. The influence of the composition of participant is due to the exclusionary vibe that
results from the focal point. On exclusionary vibes, see STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 128, at 44.
150. See THE DIRTY, supra note 9.
151. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 928 (9th Cir. 2007)
(describing a hypothetical website for nudging harassment: "Imagine, for example, www.
Harrassthem.com with the slogan "Don't Get Mad, Get Even." A visitor to this website would be
encouraged to provide private, sensitive and/or defamatory information about other[s] . . . . In
addition, the website would encourage the poster to provide dirt on the victim, with instructions
that the information need not be confirmed but could be based on rumors, conjecture or
fabrication").
152. See LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO You ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID: SOCIAL
NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 105-09 (2012); Skyler McDonald, Note, Defamation in the
Internet Age: Why Roommates.com Isn't Enough to Change the Rules for Anonymous Gossip
Websites, 62 FLA. L. REV. 259, 271 (2010).
153. Matt Ivester, a Duke University alumnus, founded JuicyCampus. The site encouraged
users to "Keep It Juicy" and vote on the "juiciest" posts. See Ali Grace Zieglowsky, Immoral
Immunity: Using a Totality of the Circumstances Approach to Narrow the Scope of Section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1307, 1320 (2010).
154. See id.
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stories had the potential to increase.155 Yet the focal point for gossip
does not explicitly nudge participants to spread falsehoods; innocent
gossip may also be welcome. These exchanges of personal information
may have benefits.15 6 However, a platform entitled JuicyCampus is
likely to contain more inaccuracies, defamation, and falsehoods than a
platform titled "Students" because requesting users to post "juicy"
stories is likely to cause users to present the information in an
inaccurate way. As a result, even a true story may be taken out of
context and turned into defamation.157
Intermediaries can also nudge negative speech. Platforms
designed for consumer complaints-such as BadBusiness.com,
RipoffReport.com, or PissedConsumer.com15 S-push individuals to post
negative reviews. These websites are focal points for negative reviews;
however, they do not specifically push participants to spread
defamatory content.159 These platforms can improve the marketplace
and prevent consumers' engagement in inefficient transactions.1 6 0
However, they only draw unsatisfied consumers and implicitly exclude
satisfied ones.161 This homogenous social composition increases the
likelihood for defamatory speech relative to websites that are "neutral"
to negative content.162
Focal points unite homogeneous individuals with similar prior
dispositions and push them to generate specific types of content.163
Even an explicit nudge that invites participants to gossip or generate
155. See Brian McNeill, Uva Student Council Unhappy with JuicyCampus.com, DAILY
PROGRESS (Mar. 26, 2008), http://www.dailyprogress.com/archives/uva-student-council-unhappy-
with-juicycampus-com/articledled4c24-61c3-5143-afe5-b6680f6cOa49.html
[https://perma.cc/M63Z-NZN8].
156. See Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 334 (1983) ("By providing people with a way to
learn about social groups to which they do not belong, gossip increases intimacy and a sense of
community among disparate individuals and groups.").
157. See Lavi, supra note 61, at 156.
158. See GW Equity LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, No. 3:07-CV-976-O, 2009 WL 62173,
at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009); Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, 418 F. Supp. 2d
1142, 1149 (D. Ariz. 2005); Vo Grp., LLC v. Opinion, Corp., No. 8758/11, at 11-12 (N.Y. App. Div.
May 22, 2012); discussion infra Section III.A.1.
159. See Zieglowsky, supra note 153, at 1326.
160. See Eric Goldman, Expert Report on the Value of Consumer Review Websites and 47
USC 230, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Nov. 20, 2012),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/11/expert report-o.htm [https://perma.cc/33SM-3MZZ]
(explaining that the mechanism of punishing bad producers depends on well-informed consumers).
161. See Kristine L. Gallardo, Note, Taming the Internet Pitchfork Mob: Online Public
Shaming, the Viral Media Age, and the Communications Decency Act, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 721, 723-24 (2017); Goldman, supra note 160.
162. See Gallardo, supra note 161, at 723. The starting point in this platform is composition
of people who intend to publish negative information as opposed to neutral starting point. See Feld,
supra note 133, at 1016.
163. See Feld, supra note 134, at 1016.
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negative content may be broadly interpreted-thus exacerbating the
severity of harm.164 The homogenous composition of users increases the
likelihood that participants cross the threshold for adopting and
sharing tortious, gossipy, and negative content.165 When a critical mass
of people adopt and disseminate this type of content, a tipping point is
created, and the content takes off and spreads like wildfire. 166 In
addition to increasing the proportion of negative speech, this
sociological dynamic leads to polarization and extremism, and enhances
the strength and influence of the offensive content.167
This dynamic undermines the likelihood for private ordering.168
First, the social context decreases the potential to counter falsehoods by
the victims. 16 9 Second, the homogenous composition of participants
increases the likelihood that they mutually validate the content.170 As
a result, speech-related harm is exacerbated. Therefore, the gravity of
the harm depends largely on the degree of the focal point of a nudge.
2. Channeling and Leading
* An online intermediary of a review website for rating hotels
requires participants to choose between two options in the
platform's menu as a title to their review: "reasonable hotel" or
"awful hotel. "171
* An online intermediary of a review website requires users to
categorize their reviews. Most of the categories offered are
164. See Lavi, supra note 61, at 156.
165. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 104, at 75; SUNSTEIN, supra note 139, at 123; Glaeser &
Sunstein, supra note 88, at 66, 91. The exclusionary vibe created by the focal point increases
confirmation bias among participants that enforce their beliefs and influences the content. See
STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 128, at 44; SUNSTEIN, supra note 139, at 123.
166. On informational and reputational cascades, see GLADWELL, supra note 63, at 12;
KADUSHIN, supra note 63, at 136-37; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: How MANY MINDS PRODUCE
KNOWLEDGE 92 (2006); SUNSTEIN, supra note 104, at 79.
167. See Marcial Losada & Emily Heaphy, The Role of Positivity and Connectivity in the
Performance of Business Teams: A Nonlinear Dynamics Model, 47 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 740, 761
(2004). The quantity of defamatory speech may affect the strength of each expression. See id.
168. See Lavi, supra note 71, at 928-29 (describing challenges to private ordering in
networks of homogenous participants). The context of the network created within negative focal
points is not neutral because the starting point is a composition of users that have negative prior
beliefs on business. Consequently, there is even less likelihood for private ordering.
169. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Robert D. Richards & Clay
Calvert, Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at the Old Remedy for "Bad" Speech, 2000 BYU L. REV.
553, 555 (2000) (explaining that in some cases, speech can be countered).
170. See Cohen, supra note 57, at 150 (explaining that homogenous groups can more easily
become polarized in their beliefs and perceptions of reality).
171. In this situation, the intermediary provides only unlawful titles. It can be argued that
this situation is similar to the case of Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921,
924, 926 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that the operator of the website forced user to provide
discriminatory answers to drop-down menu questions as a pre-condition for participation).
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negative, such as "rip off," "con artists," and "corrupt
companies."17 2
* An online intermediary of a review website installs filters on its
website. These filters allow users to view specific parts of the
information on the platform. The default option allows only
negative reviews and filters out the rest.173
Herbert Simon pointed out that a "wealth of information creates
a poverty of attention."174 This statement is of great relevance today. 175
One of the most important challenges of intermediaries in the digital
era is to direct user attention and assist with focusing on the most
relevant content.176 To meet this challenge, intermediaries design
mechanisms to assist users in navigating the growing sea of
information.77 At times, intermediaries use the cognitive biases of
users and channel them to support consumption and dissemination of
specific types of content to enhance their profits.178 Drop-down menus,
default rules, tagging options, and filtering mechanisms can channel
and lead to particular choices.179
A high rate of negative or defamatory options creates a "framing
effect"80 and a "priming effect,"181 which increase the likelihood that a
user will choose one of the negative or defamatory options.182 This may
increase the generation and dissemination of tortious and negative
content.83 Nudging choices through default options, which allow users
to see only negative reviews and filter out the rest, usually leads to a
172. See Glob. Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 930 (D. Ariz.
2008).
173. For a similar case, see Fair Hous. Council, 489 F.3d at 929.
174. Herbert A. Simon et al., Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World, in
COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40-41 (M. Greenberger ed., 1971).
175. See HOWARD RHEINGOLD, NET SMART: How TO THRIVE ONLINE 36 (2012).
176. See id. at 77; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 68, at 80 (referring to the attention economy
and the important function of managing and filtering information); Kreimer, supra note 56, at 17.
177. See Stuart W. Shulman, The Internet Still Might (But Probably Won't) Change
Everything, 1 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 111, 118 (2005) (explaining that user-friendly
technological and procedural innovations, such as automatic categorizing, mitigate the problem of
information overload).
178. See GREENFIELD, supra note 23, at 139 (explaining that information and design
advantages translate into systematic consumer vulnerability in digital markets); Calo, supra note
109, at 999.
179. See HARTZOG, supra note 13, at 26, 161-62 (explaining how design can result in a
myopia regarding items that are not included in the design of menus); see also id. (giving an
example of a design that channels users to consent to terms that were not necessarily received
under different design).
180. See Nagatsu, supra note 147, at 489-93.
181. See id.; KAHNEMAN, supra note 48, at 119-24; infra note 188 and accompanying text.
182. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 48, at 56, 58.
183. See id.
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"status quo bias." As a result, users are not likely to deviate from
them.184
Similar to focal points, channeling and leading nudges operate
on both micro and macro levels. They enhance negative, defamatory
content and increase the likelihood of extensive adoption and
dissemination of content within the social network.18 5 Nevertheless,
unlike focal points, channeling and leading nudges do not influence the
decision to use the platform.186  This category of nudges is less
transparent, and the intention of the intermediary to encourage specific
types of content is less obvious.
a. Nuances of Channeling and Leading and Gravity of Harm
Intermediaries channel and lead users to distribute defamatory
or negative content in various ways.187 Intermediaries may include
limited options-for example, providing two extreme options without
offering a third-which can prime tortious or negative content,188 and
influence users' content.189 Biased intermediary options that tilt closer
to the negative side of the scale can also increase a user's likelihood to
distribute negative content.190 Intermediaries can also frame specific
choices by focusing on their advantages and reminding participants of
what they turn down by opting for the nonpreferred alternative.191 In
the same manner, internal search engines and filtering mechanisms
can channel and lead users to generate, consume, and disseminate
specific types of content.192 Intermediaries can design dynamic menus
184. See HARTZOG, supra note 13, at 39 ("[F]rames that comport with the existing schemata
in a receiver's belief system can be particularly effective."); Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies:
The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 197-98 (1991)
(explaining that individuals have a strong tendency to remain at the status quo, because the
disadvantages of leaving it loom larger than the advantages).
185. See KADUSHIN, supra note 63, at 137.
186. See id. at 139-42.
187. On choice architecture and default rules, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPERSONAL
DEFAULT RULES VS. ACTIVE CHOICES VS. PERSONALIZED DEFAULT RULES: A TRIPTYCH 1, 3, 9 (2013).
188. For example, in Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, the court decided to impose
liability on an intermediary for designing a drop-down menu that channeled users to generate
discriminatory content. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1169 (9th
Cir. 2008).
189. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 48, at 119-24 (explaining that anchoring suggestions, as
in the case of menus and tagging options, result in a "priming effect").
190. Biased intermediary options are likely to create an anchoring effect with regard to the
middle option. Information processing that starts with a biased anchor is likely to lead users to
adjust in that direction. For expansion on anchoring, see THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 23.
191. See Punam Anand Keller et al., Enhanced Active Choice: A New Method to Motivate
Behavior Change, 21 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 376, 378 (2011).
192. Intermediaries of review websites can channel users to consume only popular or
negative reviews.
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in which the selections are dependent upon some other input, such as a
user's selection in a prior list, thus resulting in an even narrower scale
of options.193 Furthermore, technological tools allow intermediaries to
receive and analyze users' personal information.194 By using data
mining, big data, Al, and personalizing default rules,195 intermediaries
exhibit different choices to different users and channel them more
efficiently.196
Channeling and leading nudges influence the severity of harm
to varying degrees. They facilitate the generation of content that the
intermediary prefers on its platform.197 For example, an individual user
that intends to write a negative review may be primed to choose an
extreme title such as "rip off' or "con artists."198 This framing is likely
to influence a user to write a more extreme review than he had first
intended. By enhancing the distribution of negative or tortious content,
the intermediary increases the likelihood that more users will cross the
threshold for adopting and disseminating such content.
This strategy of nudges may also undermine the likelihood for
private ordering. In contrast to focal points, channeling and leading
nudges do not affect the composition of users; the population of users
can be either homogenous or heterogeneous.199 Nevertheless, the
magnitude of negative content undermines the likelihood for correction
by the victim or other users.200
3. Encouragement
* An online intermediary encourages users to publish rumors,
gossip, and defame by using slogans, such as "Don't let them
get away with it! Let the truth be known!" It also states
193. On dynamic drop-down menus, see Hattie Harman, Drop-Down Lists and the
Communications Decency Act: A Creation Conundrum, 43 IND. L. REV. 143, 172 (2009).
194. See id. at 150-51, 172.
195. See Ariel Porat & Lior Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with
Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1417 (2014); Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance
Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 75 (2015)
("[Surveillance capitalism] aims to predict and modify human behavior as a means to produce
revenue and market control.").
196. See ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING FROM YOU 70-
83 (2011); TUROW, supra note 60, at 110.
197. See TUROW, supra note 60, at 110.
198. See Glob. Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 930 (D. Ariz.
2008).
199. See Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, & Future, 106 AM. ECON.
REV. 1577, 1593-94 (2016). Channeling and leading nudges are elements within the platform and
have no influence on the decision to participate in the first place. See Harman, supra note 193, at
172.
200. See generally Muchnik et al., supra note 105.
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"Complaints[,] Reviews Scams[] Lawsuits[, and] Frauds
Reported."2 0 1
* An online intermediary encourages users to publish rumors,
gossip, and defamatory statements by using the slogan "Keep It
Juicy.'20 2 The encouragement is applied generally and
personally.203
* An online intermediary uses the slogan "Pure Evil" and
encourages users to ruin the reputation of third parties.204
Similarly, the owner of the website The Dirty encourages
readers to email him "dirt" on people they know.205
* An online intermediary harvests profiles from Facebook and
encourages users to make negative comments about social
media users.206
Intermediaries may explicitly or implicitly signal to users that
specific types of content are desired on their platform, push users to
publish that type of content, and intensify their distribution.207 They
use various strategies of encouragement to increase their influence.
201. See Vision Sec., LLC v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, No. 2:13-CV-00926, 2015 WL
12780892, at *2 (D. Utah Aug. 27, 2015); RIPOFF REPORT, https://www.ripoffreport.com
[https://perma.cc/38TX-LTGG] (last visited Sept. 29, 2018).
202. This was the slogan of the intermediary JuicyCampus.com. This intermediary
generated a focal point nudge from its name and encouragement udge by the slogan. See McNeill,
supra note 155. In this specific platform, the encouragement was general and applied equally to
all participants. See id. Yet, encouragements can be personalized.
203. See FRISCHMANN & SELINGER, supra note 66, at 150 ("If you bought books or music on
Amazon . . . or even typed a message, you've engaged with machines that are designed to figure
out how our minds work and steer our choices with personalized recommendations."). For
personalized suggestions using big data and Al in a related context, see Dyroff v. Ultimate Software
Group, Inc., No. 17-cv-05359-LB, 2017 WL 5665670, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017).
204. This was the slogan of the revenge porn platform IsAnyoneUp.com, which Hunter
Moore founded. See Emily Poole, Comment, Back Against Non-Consensual Pornography, 49 U.S.F.
L. REV. 181, 182 (2014).
205. See Caitlin Dewey, The Government Just Took a Huge Step in the Fight Against
Revenge Porn, WASH. POST (Jan. 30, 2015),
https://wapo.st/1BzHY7h?tid=ss-mail&utm-term=.16fce95c79f7 [https://perma.cclDMF3-LMFR];
Kashmir Hill, The Dirty Business: How Gossipmonger Nik Richie of TheDirty.com Stays Afloat,
FORBES (Nov. 11, 2010), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2010/11/11/the-dirty-business-
how-gossipmonger-nik-richie-of-thedirty-com-stays-afloat/#3 1afa6962f9b [https://perma.cclXF9B-
33QF].
206. See Fanning v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 821 F.3d 164, 169 (1st Cir. 2016). The
intermediary "jurk.com" took information from Facebook and encouraged users to label millions a
"Jerk" or "not a Jerk." Id.
207. See Jeffrey R. Doty, Inducement or Solicitation? Competing Interpretations of the
"Underlying Illegality" Test in the Wake of Roommates.com, 6 WASH. L. J. TECH. & ARTS 125, 130
(2010).
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In contrast to focal points, encouragement has no effect on the
choice of users to participate in the first place.208 A focal point can
function as encouragement,209 but the opposite is not true.
Intermediaries that encourage users to participate in a conversation
take a direct position regarding the types of content they welcome on
their platform.210 Thus, this type of nudge differs from the indirect,
nontransparent strategy of channeling and leading nudges, which push
users through aspects of the platform's design without their awareness.
Similar to the two previously discussed categories of nudges, an
intermediary uses encouragement o influence the dissemination of
content on both micro and macro levels. The intermediary encourages
individuals to generate and consume specific types of content.211 It also
motivates social dynamics and increases the likelihood for crossing the
threshold to dissemination.212 When an individual user sees in his
newsfeed that his friends adopted a specific type of content by liking
and sharing it, the likelihood for him to cross the threshold and act in
the same way increases.213 Utilizing the social network may lead to
"mass interpersonal persuasion."214  Consequently, the proportion of
content the intermediary aims to promote increases.215
208. Compare Dyroff, 2017 WL 5665670, at *2 (encouragement), and Vision Sec., LLC v.
Xcentric Ventures, LLC, No. 2:13-CV-00926, 2015 WL 12780892, at *2 (D. Utah Aug. 27, 2015)
(encouragement), and McNeill, supra note 155 (encouragement), with Terms of Service,
THEDIRTY.COM, https://thedirty.com/terms-of-service/ [https://perma.cc/9J4S-U7T6] (last visited
Aug. 27, 2018) (focal point).
209. A focal point such as "Dirty World" also constitutes an encouragement to speech tort.
However, a slogan that encourages tortious content such as "Keep it Juicy" is not a focal point
because it does not influence the preliminary decision to participate and does not influence the
social network's composition. See McNeill, supra note 155; Terms of Service, supra note 208.
210. See Terms of Service, supra note 208. The person who has been nudged by
encouragements to create specific types of content is usually aware of being nudged. See McNeill,
supra note 155.
211. See McNeill, supra note 155; Terms ofService, supra note 208.
212. See McNeill, supra note 155 ("The [w]eb site - a national message board that urges its
anonymous collegiate visitors to post salacious gossip about their classmates." (emphasis added)).
213. See Zittrain, supra note 69, at 336. It should be noted that in many cases,
intermediaries utilize algorithms to prioritize newsfeed content created by a user's close friends
and family, which reinforces existing biases and further encourages dissemination. See SUNSTEIN,
supra note 139, at 16.
214. See B.J. FOGG, MASS INTERPERSONAL PERSUASION: AN EARLY VIEW OF A NEW
PHENOMENON 23, 24 (2008), http://captology.stanford.edulwp-
content/uploads/2014/03/MIPFoggStanford.pdf [https://perma.cc/89PP-VJ26].
215. See id. at 33; KADUSHIN, supra note 63, at 146.
2018] EVIL NUDGES 31
a. Nuances of Encouragement and Gravity of Harm
Intermediaries may encourage defamatory216 or negative
content217 in explicit and implicit ways. They can address all
participants in general, and encourage them to generate specific types
of content through slogans and banners.218 They can also use more
innovative strategies of encouragement to influence users in more
profound ways.219 To do so, they use studies and experiments on
network structures and the flow of information.220 These studies allow
the identification of influential or susceptible hubs, which are central
to dissemination.2 2 1 Intermediaries personalize their encouragements
and contact these hubs directly.222 They can use smart chat-bots that
are active in many platforms,223 or send links to defamatory content or
petitions to boycott a business to specific users and encourage them to
sign on.2 2 4 Similarly, intermediaries can encourage an "influential"
user to comment on defamatory content and endorse it,225 leading to
216. See Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 928 (9th Cir. 2007)
(describing a hypothetical website, "[H] arrassthem.com," which contains the slogan "Don't Get
Mad, Get Even").
217. For an example of a website encouraging negative content, see RIPOFF REPORT, supra
note 201 ("Don't let them get away with it! Let the truth be known!"). See also McNeill, supra note
155.
218. See, e.g., Poole, supra note 204, at 181-82.
219. Banners and slogans have limited influence. In fact, many users consider them
nuisances. See ADAM L. PENENBERG, VIRAL LooP: FROM FACEBOOK TO TWFI'ER, How TODAY'S
SMARTEST BUSINESSES GROW THEMSELVES 218, 222 (2009).
220. Intermediaries can receive information on network structures by conducting studies.
See Aral & Walker, supra note 69, at 337; Grimmelmann, supra note 66, at 223; Zittrain, supra
note 69, at 336.
221. See KADUSHIN, supra note 63, at 143-45; Aral & Walker, supra note 69, at 337.
222. See Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-05359-LB, 2017 WL 5665670, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017) (finding that data mining and machine learning allowed
intermediaries to personalize recommendations to users on content and discussion groups on the
website); Whigham, supra note 58 (describing how Facebook can detect and influence susceptible
minors).
223. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
THAT WILL TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 29 (2014); HARTZOG, supra note 13, at
202 ("[P]recision advertising can be used to exploit biases and perpetuate falsehoods in
significantly corrosive ways . . . ."); TUROW, supra note 60, at 159. These strategies were used to
promote election campaigns in the United States. Compare sources cited supra note 69, with Philip
N. Howard et al., Algorithms, Bots, and Political Communication in the US 2016 Election: The
Challenge of Automated Political Communication for Election Law and Administration, 15 J. INFO.
TECH. & POL. 81, 83 (2018) (describing ways political actors can influence elections with bots).
224. See GREENFIELD, supra note 23, at 116; B.J. Fogg & Clifford Nass, Silicon Sycophants:
The Effects of Computers that Flatter, 46 INT'L J. HUMAN COMPUTER STUD. 551, 552 (1997).
Intermediaries and other stakeholders can influence election processes in a similar manner. See
Zittrain, supra note 69, at 336 (describing the election experiment that applied enhanced influence
to vote on specific users); see also Levi, supra note 19 (manuscript at 25-26).
225. NAHON & HEMSLEY, supra note 77, at 142. Influencing central hubs in a social network
to spread specific types of content shifts context. Consequently, the content disseminated is
perceived as socially authentic and more credible. Laura E. Bladow, Note, Worth the Click: Why
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mass "word of mouth" dissemination throughout the social network.226
Advanced technologies thus allow intermediaries to create efficient
encouragement nudges as they utilize user data to personalize
messages. This personalized targeting can result in deeper influence
on individuals, social dynamics, and flows of information throughout
the network-all of which are more effective than general slogans.22 7
Encouragement increases the likelihood of reaching individual
and collective thresholds.228 Consequently, the severity of harm, which
increases and the likelihood for private ordering may also be impaired.
Informational and reputational cascades will reduce the likelihood for
victims and other participants to counter speech and clear their names.
The extent of encouragement depends largely on the degree of a nudge.
E. Interim Summary
This Part demonstrates how intermediaries can influence social
contexts by using various strategies and technologies. Social
relationships influence the flow of information from the bottom up;
however, intermediaries also nudge social dynamics and influence
decision-making from the top down.2 2 9 Intermediaries use design to
generate focal points and consequently influence the context of their
platforms and the identity and composition of their users.230 They can
also influence the rate and strength of particular types of content in less
transparent ways by channeling and leading users to their desired
choices.231 In addition, they engage in encouragement strategies and
influence the flow of information in a clear and direct manner.232
Every choice of architecture is unavoidably context-based, and
there is no such thing as a completely "neutral" design.233 Thus, the
taxonomy set forth by this Article illustrates that intermediaries' choice
architecture is not arbitrary and can actively encourage tortious
Greater FTC Enforcement Is Needed to Curtail Deceptive Practices in Influence Marketing, 59 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1123, 1151 (2018).
226. On social spreading, see NAHON & HEMSLEY, supra note 77, at 142.
227. See Balkin, supra note 54, at 1184 (stating that advanced technologies of big data and
Al increased intermediaries' influences on users and third parties); Zuboff, supra note 194, at 85;
Balkin, supra note 19 ("[D]igital companies collect enormous amounts of data about their end-
users, and use this data to predict and control what end-users will do . . . .").
228. See Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-05359-LB, 2017 WL 5665670, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017); see also Zuboff, supra note 195, at 85.
229. See Aral & Walker, supra note 69, at 337; Grimmelmann, supra note 66, at 223;
Whigham, supra note 58.
230. See supra Section II.D. 1.
231. See supra Section II.D.2.
232. See supra Section II.D.3.
233. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 10-11.
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content. Digital intermediaries have the means to arrange decision-
making context. Their ability to influence the gravity of harm should
alert lawmakers and policy makers to rethink the scope of intermediary
liability.
Nudges are not uniform. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to
evaluate liability for evil nudges according to one set of standards.
Mapping and understanding central strategies of nudges and their
influence on social context takes the first step towards assisting courts
in accommodating just and efficient policy when determining an
intermediary's liability.
Table 1. Summary of Central Influences of Online Nudges
Focal Point Channeling and EncouragementLeading
The Nudge's * Framing the website Priming participants Direct influences on
Influence in a specific context step-by-step to social context. The
generates exclusive or generate and consume intermediary increases
inclusive mechanisms, specific types of the motivations of
which pushes specific content. Channeling users to generate
homogenous and leading nudges specific types of
individuals to influence the type of content. The
participate. This content participants intermediary can
influences the generate, consume, identify influential
composition of and disseminate, hubs and contact them
participants, their directly, thus
behavior, and the type *This nudge influences exacerbating word-of-
of content they decision-making mouth dissemination.
generate. contexts only after
users have decided to This nudge influences
*This nudge influences use the platform. the content users
context at the stage of generate, but has no
deciding to use the In contrast to focal effect on their choice to
website. point, this nudge is participate in the first





applies to users in
direct ways.
Examples Focal point for cDefaults. Banners and slogans
tortious content: such as: "Pure Evil,"
TheDirtycom. *Multiple-choice- "Keep it juicy," "Don't
menus that lead to let them get away with
Focal Point for gossip: extremism it Don't Get Mad-
JuicyCampuscom. (Roommates.com). Get Even."
* Focal points for u Tagging options that Decentralized
negative content: frame specific types of encouragement.
BadBu sinetss.cor a,
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Focal Point Channeling and Encouragement
Leading
Examples, Ripoff Report, and content (con artist, rip- * Detecting
continued PissedConsumer. off). "influential"
participants in the
Designing filters and social network by
search engines using using network
limited parameters to analysis, big data, A,
channel users to and contacting specific
generate specific types "influential" hubs













Influence on Focal points promote Channeling and Encouragement
consumption an inclusion/exclusion leading nudges nudges increase the
and mechanism. Thus, they influence choice by likelihood that users
generation of influence the generating priming generate and consume
specific types participants' and framing effects specific types of
of content composition and and thus enhance the content.
increase their distribution and
motivation to generate consumption of specific
specific types of types of content.
content at the
individual level.
Influences on * Focal point nudges Channeling and Encouragement
social lead to homogenous leading nudges nudges directly
dynamics composition of increase generation influence users and
participants. This and consumption of motivate sociological
affects the likelihood specific types of dynamics of adoption
for informational and content at the and dissemination.
reputational cascades, individual level. The Utilizing central hubs
It also leads to proliferation of such within networks
extremism and mass content increases the maximizes influence
adoption and likelihood to cross through the social
dissemination of the thresholds for graph, and increases
content that the focal disseminating content the repetition of
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Focal Point Channeling and EncouragementLeading
Nudges and High rate of tortious, Priming and framing Encouragement
the gravity of negative, extreme, or effects by channeling influences the
harm antisocial content. and leading nudges magnitude of tortious
influence the or negative content. It
Homogeneity and dissemination of influences individuals
similarity of "prior tortious or negative and leads to social
dispositions" decrease content to various dynamics of adoption
the likelihood of degrees, enhancing the and dissemination. It
private ordering by gravity of harm and decreases the




111. INTERMEDIARY LiABIIYJAND SPEECH Toma: THE LAW, NORMATIVE
ANALYSIS, AND A CALL FOR CHANGE
A. Comparative Perspective
How does the law deal with intermediaries and contributory
liability to defamatory content? This Part provides a comparative
overview of policy models governing contributory liability of online
intermediaries that nudge the harmful exchanges of tortious content.
The analysis focuses on the United States and Europe to demonstrate
that, due to the different extents of protection granted to freedom of




In the United States, lawsuits against online intermediaries are
usually blocked by section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act
(CDA). It provides that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.d
2 35 Under the
subsection entitled "Protection for 'Good Samaritan' blocking and
screening of offensive materialj" Congress declared that online
intermediaries should not be treated as publishers for material they did
234. See Oreste Pollicino & Marco Bassini, Free Speech, Defamation and the Limits to
FreedAm of Expression in the EU: A Comparative Analysis, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU
INTERNET LAW 508, 513 (Andrej Savin & Jan Trzaskowski eds., 2014).
235. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
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not develop.236  Thus, a defendant that provides a forum for
communicating materials is not likely to be held responsible as a
content provider.237 Courts have interpreted section 230 broadly-thus,
section 230 has repeatedly shielded web enterprises from lawsuits.238
Some courts, however, have criticized such vast immunity and have
tried to narrow the statute's scope.239 Courts have also tried to sidestep
the CDA's immunity by employing various legal doctrines, such as
promissory estoppel240 and failure to warn.241 Despite these attempts
to narrow the CDA's immunity, the overall immunity for online
intermediaries remains broad.242
This overall immunity regime applies to secondary liability;
however, if the intermediary is "responsible" in whole or in part for the
"creation or development" of content, courts may find the intermediary
liable as an information content provider.243 Section 230 does not define
"creation" or "development"; therefore, the line between the service
236. Id. Congress enacted Section 230(c)(2) to encourage intermediaries to screen harmful
content. It requires intermediaries who screen content to do so in good faith. Id. For an overview
concerning the fact that no intermediary has lost its immunity because it did not make a good faith
filtering decision, see Eric Goldman, Online User Account Termination and 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2),
2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 659, 665 (2012).
237. See § 230(b)(1)-(2); Gallardo, supra note 161, at 735-38. Congress thus sought to
promote self-regulation and free speech. While doing so, it allowed vibrant internet enterprises to
prosper.
238. See, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254 n.4
(4th Cir. 2009); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) ("By its plain language,
§ 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable
for information originating with a third-party user of the service." (emphasis added)); Giordano v.
Romeo, 76 So. 3d 1100, 1101-02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 167 F.
Supp. 3d 1056, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (holding that intermediaries are immune to liability as
distributers and not only as publishers-thus, immunity applies even when intermediaries have
knowledge of defamatory content and do not remove that content); Glob. Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric
Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (D. Ariz. 2008); Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon
Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 653 (2014).
239. For example, Justice Easterbrook provided an alternative interpretation to section
230-treating it as a definition clause rather than means for immunity. See Doe v. GTE Corp., 347
F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003).
240. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1108 (9th Cir. 2009). The court refused to
hold Yahoo! liable pursuant to section 230. However, it held Yahoo! liable for promissory estoppel-
a theory of recovery based on a breach of contract. See David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield
for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 373, 466-67 (2010).
241. For the Ninth Circuit's outline of the failure to warn exception to section 230
immunity, see Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2016); Beckman v.
Match.com, LLC, 668 F. App'x 759, 760 (9th Cir. 2016). Yet, it should be noted that this exception
is not widely adopted. See Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., No. 17-cv-05359-LB, 2017 WL
5665670, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017).
242. See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; Giordano, 76 So. 3d at 1101-02; Caraccioli, 167 F.
Supp. 3d at 1065.
243. See Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Free Speech, 100 IOWA L. REV. 501, 514 (2014);
Zak Franklin, Comment, Justice for Revenge Porn Victims: Legal Theories to Overcome Claims of
Civil Immunity by Operators of Revenge Porn Websites, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1303, 1316-17 (2014).
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itself and the creation of information is blurred and the scope of liability
is ambiguous.2 44
Arguably, many intermediaries do in fact "develop content"
through the nudges described above. Different intermediaries influence
the social network and the context of information flows in various ways.
They generate focal points, channel and lead users to specific choices,
and encourage the generation of particular types of content.2 45 These
activities form the basis of the claim that the intermediaries "develop
content."2 4 6 A body of case law has discussed intermediary liability for
these types of influences.2 4 7 At the outset, courts were reluctant to im-
pose liability for influencing context and applied immunity in nearly all
cases.248 However, a seminal case, Fair Housing Council v. Room-
mates.com, created confusion with respect to intermediary liability. 24 9
After this decision, courts raised doubts about whether it is appropriate
to continue to apply section 230 broadly.250 This confusion resulted in
conflicting decisions.2 5 1
a. The Roomates.com Case
Roommates.com is a website that enables users to find
roommates.2 5 2  The existing design of the Roommates.com required
users to fill out a personal profile and answer several questions-
including the user's sex, sexual orientation, and whether or not they
have children.2 5 3 It also required users to express their preferences
with respect to roommates on each of these issues.2 54 The answers were
chosen from drop-down menus.25 5 An internal search engine allowed
244. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012); Ken S. Myers,
Wikimmunity: Fitting the Communication Decency Act to Wikipedia, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 163,
187-201 (2006).
245. See supra Section II.D.
246. Generally, these plaintiffs base their legal suits on claims that intermediary
influences are content development. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489
F.3d 921, 925-29 (9th Cir. 2007). For a similar argument, see Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design
Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 203, 218 (2018).
247. The Article reviews seminal case law in the following Sections.
248. See Ardia, supra note 240, at 461-63.
249. See Seth Stern, Note, Fair Housing and Online Free Speech Collide in Fair Housing
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, 58 DE PAUL L. REV. 559, 577 (2009). See
generally Fair Hous. Council, 489 F.3d.
250. See Catherine Tremble, Note, Wild Westworld: Section 230 of the CDA and Social
Networks' Use of Machine-Learning Algorithms, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 825, 856 (2017).
251. See Catherine Gellis, 2012 State of the Law Regarding Internet Intermediary Liability
for User-Generated Content, 68 BUS. LAw. 289, 299-301 (2012).
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users to search roommates while filtering unfit matches according to
these criteria.256 The website also included an open section of user
comments.257 The intermediary sent users periodical emails, which
included only potential roommate matches.258
The Fair Housing Council (FHC) sued Roommates.com-
alleging that the questions included in the drop-down menus, the
internal search engine, the filtering service, and even the open
comment section violated the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and led
to discrimination.259 The case was originally dismissed due to section
230 immunity.260 In order to overcome section 230's immunity, the FHC
argued that by conditioning participation in the service on reporting
restricted information, Roommates.com was an information content
developer within the meaning of the statute-not a passive conduit.261
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision,
declining to grant Roommates.com immunity.262 The court held that
the intermediary provided a limited set of prepopulated discriminatory
answers and required users to choose one. Accordingly, the court found
that Roommates.com was an information content provider because of
the site's questionnaires and answer choices.263 This conduct made
Roommates.com a developer rather than a mere "passive transmitter"
of information.264 The court also declined to grant immunity for the
site's internal search engine and email mechanism because these
components did not use neutral tools, but rather channeled the
distribution of discriminatory content.265  The court upheld the





259. See Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c)
(2012)); Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, CV 03-09386PA(RZX), 2004 WL 3799488, at
*2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2004).
260. See Fair Housing Council, 2004 WL 3799488, at *6.
261. Fair Hous. Council, 489 F.3d at 926.
262. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008).
263. Id. at 1164-65.
264. Id. at 1166 ("By requiring subscribers to provide the information as a condition of
accessing its service, and by providing a limited set of pre-populated answers, Roommate becomes
much more than a passive transmitter of information provided by others; it becomes the developer,
at least in part, of that information.").
265. Id. at 1167; see also Fair Hous. Council, 489 F.3d at 929 ("By categorizing, channeling
and limiting the distribution of users' profiles, Roommate provides an additional layer of
information that it is 'responsible' at least 'in part' for creating or developing.").
266. Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1173-74.
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In its decision, the court referred to the material contribution of
the illegality test,2 6 7 where a defendant's own acts must materially
contribute to the illegality of the internet message for immunity to
fail.268 The court concluded that an intermediary that uses neutral tools
to carry out what may be unlawful or illicit searches does not amount
to "development" for purposes of determining section 230 immunity
and, thus, is not liable for said illegal content.269 In contrast, the drop-
down menus in this case led to development of illegal discriminatory
content and, for that reason, the majority found that Roommates.com
was responsible for the discriminatory content.2 70
In reaching this conclusion, the majority essentially recognized
that channeling and leading nudges, as well as encouragement nudges,
could expose the intermediary to liability. 27 1 The dissenting opinion
takes a narrower view of what it means to "develop" information
online.272 According to the dissent, providing a drop-down menu does
not alone constitute "creating" or "developing" information in itself.2
7 3
Rather, the dissent urged courts to examine whether the topics in drop-
down menus are directly unlawful-for example, if the inquiry is a
statutory violation or includes a defamatory statement.274
A few years later, the Ninth Circuit ruled in another case and
adopted a narrower construction that excludes roommate selection from
the reach of the FHA. 2 75  Thus, the rationale for denying
Roommates.com immunity may not apply anymore because
discriminatory statements can be lawful in this context.276 It remains
unclear whether the previous decision barred Roommates.com from
267. Id. at 1167-68.
268. Id. ("[W]e interpret the term 'development' as referring not merely to augmenting the
content generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness. In other words, a
website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to section 230, if it
contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct.").
269. Id. at 1169-72. (distinguishing between the facts of Roommates.com and other cases
where intermediaries designed drop-down menus and used neutral tools). See also Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003); Lindsey A. Datte, Note, Chaperoning
Love Online: Dating Liability and the Wavering Application of CDA § 230, 20 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 769, 781 (2014); Mark D. Quist, Comment, "Plumbing the Depths" of the CDA: Weighing
the Competing Fourth and Seventh Circuit Standards of ISP Immunity Under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 275, 297 (2012).
270. See Fair Hous. Council, 521 F.3d at 1172.
271. Id. at 1165-67.
272. Id. at 1176-1182 (McKeown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ('The
majority's unprecedented expansion of liability for Internet service providers threatens to chill the
robust development of the Internet that Congress envisioned.").
273. Id. at 1182.
274. See id. at 1189.
275. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 1216, 1223 (9th Cir. 2012).
276. See id. at 1222 ("Because we find that the FHA doesn't apply to the sharing of living
units, it follows that it's not unlawful to discriminate in selecting a roommate.").
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enjoying section 230 immunity due to general contribution to the
creation of discriminatory content or because of the nature of the
questions and filtering criteria themselves.277  This case left four
questions unanswered: (1) What are "neutral tools"?, (2) What is
"development" of content?, (3) What is "material contribution" to
illegality"?, and (4) Would a wider range of choices in drop-down menus
lead courts to a different conclusion regarding the intermediary's
contribution to discriminatory content?278
Legal scholars have debated this case and its implications. Some
researchers advocated for the Ninth Circuit outcome-suggesting that
courts should apply it to intermediaries that design platforms aimed at
enhancing harmful content.279 Recent scholarship advocating for this
result suggests that this case allows victims of online torts to overcome
the barrier of section 230 immunity when intermediaries structure,
sort, and sometimes sell user data.280 Other scholars contend that the
outcome was desirable, but note that it was inconsistent with section
230 and previous case law.2 8 1 Be that as it may, most scholars criticized
the ambiguity that the decision created, which may chill interactive
innovation.282
277. See JACQUELINE LIPTON, RETHINKING CYBERLAW: A NEW VISION FOR INTERNET LAW
136 (2015); Sylvain, supra note 246, at 262 ("We might understand the Roommates opinion to
suggest that a provider cannot be immune when it has knowingly designed its service or
application in order to elicit illegal third-party content. . . . As with most website developers, the
company was probably very attentive to the substantive preference options from which it allowed
users to choose, as well as the way it presented the choices for selection (i.e., choice architecture).
But the Roommates court did not frame its opinion in this way.").
278. See Harman, supra note 193, at 160; Christian Kaiser, Paying for Nude Celebrities:
Testing the Outer Limits of Roommates.com, Accusearch, and Section 230 Immunity, 11 WASH. J.L.
TECH. & ARTS 125, 133 (2015); Lynn C. Percival, Public Policy Favoritism in the Online World:
Contract Voidability Meets the Communications Decency Act, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 165, 173
(2010).
279. See, e.g., CITRON, supra note 76, at 177; Michael Burke, Note, Cracks in the Armor?:
The Future of the Communications Decency Act and Potential Challenges to the Protections of
Section 230 to Gossip Web Sites, 17 B.U. J. Sol. & TECH. L. 232, 256 (2011); Zieglowsky, supra note
153, at 1320.
280. See Sylvain, supra note 246, at 271-72; Tremble, supra note 250, at 868.
281. See Molly Sachson, The Big Bad Internet: Reassessing Service Provider Immunity
Under §230 to Protect the Private Individual from Unrestrained Internet Communication, 25 J.C.R.
& ECON. DEV. 353, 376 (2011); Bradley M. Smyer, Note, Interactive Computer Service Liability for
User-Generated Content after Roommates.com, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 811,835-38 (2010); Stern,
supra note 249, at 586.
282. See, e.g., Varty Defterderian, Note, "Fair Housing Council v. Room mates.com"- A New
Path for Section 230 Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 563, 592 (2009); Jeff Kosseff, The Gradual
Erosion of the Law that Shaped the Internet: Section 230's Evolution Over Two Decades, 18 COLUM.




After the Roommates.com decision, courts expressed doubts
regarding the scope of section 230 immunity.2 83 This question has been
the subject of many contradictory judicial decisions.284 In general,
courts have been inclined to find that a defendant is not an information
content provider-thus choosing to err on the side of immunity.
However, some courts have challenged traditional interpretations of
section 230.285 Thus, the standards for excluding intermediaries from
immunity remain unclear.
As the following Sections show, a body of case law has developed
in respect to the design of platforms and encouragement of harmful
content. Many lawsuits have been filed against customer review
services and rating websites, general rating platforms (e.g.,
ConsumerAffairs.com), and platforms for complaints (e.g.,
RipoffReport.com, and BadBusiness.com).286
In Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc.,287
internet users posted false negative reviews of Nemet's business (an
automotive marketing organization for selling and serving automobiles)
on ConsumerAffairs.com.288 Nemet filed an action and alleged that
ConsumerAffairs.com solicited posts from users, put them in particular
categories, and edited them.28 9  The court held that
ConsumerAffairs.com's behavior did not exclude it from section 230
immunity because, in contrast to the Roommates.com case, the
intermediary did not develop or encourage illegal content.290
283. See Kosseff, supra note 282, at 22 ("My analysis demonstrates that the erosion that
began with the 2008 Roommates.com decision has accelerated, to a point where platforms have
little certainty that they will be immune from claims arising from user content.").
284. See Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., No. 17-CV-05359-LB, 2017 WL 5665670,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017); Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 913 N.W.2d 211, 224 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018).
285. See Amanda L. Cecil, Note, Taking Back the Internet: Imposing Civil Liability on
Interactive Computer Services in an Attempt to Provide an Adequate Remedy to Victims of
Nonconsensual Pornography, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2513, 2546 (2014).
286. See, e.g., Jeff Kosseff, Defending Section 230: The Value of Intermediary Immunity, 15
J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 123, 124, 143 (2010) (describing how RipoffReport.com and
ConsumerAffairs.com allow consumers to post reviews, most of which are negative and accuse the
businesses of perpetrating frauds).
287. See generally Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250 (4th
Cir. 2009).
288. Id. at 252.
289. Id. at 256-58.
290. Id. at 257-58 (rejecting intermediary liability for channeling and leading, as well as
encouragement nudges, by emphasizing that "a website operator who does not 'encourage illegal
content' or 'design' its 'website to require users to input illegal content' is 'immune' under § 230 of
the CDA."); see also Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 2016).
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Courts have also discussed intermediary liability in creating
platforms for negative reviews.291 In most of these cases, courts applied
section 230 immunity, despite criticizing the intermediaries' business
model.2 92 Thus, various courts concluded that RipoffReport.com, an
intermediary that generated a focal point for negative and defamatory
consumer reviews, was immune from liability because it neither
generated the content nor adopted it.293
Another case, Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC,
discussed the liability of RipoffReport.com for allowing users to label
their reviews with defamatory titles and thus channel and lead users to
publish defamatory reviews.294 Likewise, the court applied immunity,
concluding that allowing users to label their reviews with defamatory
titles does not make the intermediary responsible-in whole or in
part-for the "creation or development" of content, as long as users have
the autonomy to choose among proposed options and add titles
according to their discretion.2 95
In Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc., another court went
one step further in upholding an intermediary's immunity. Here, the
intermediary used data mining, machine learning, and algorithms that
allowed it to analyze users' data. Moreover, it used this information to
personally channel users to participate in particular groups and
291. See, e.g., Glob. Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 931 (D.
Ariz. 2008); MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, No. CIV.A.3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004 WL
833595, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004) (discussing potential liability for the intermediaries
RipoffReport.com and BadBusiness.com).
292. See, e.g., Seldon v. Magedson, No. CV-13-00072-PHX-DGC, 2014 WL 1456316, at *6
(D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2014); Glob. Royalties, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 933.
293. See Seldon, 2014 WL 1456316, at *6; Torati v. Hodak, No. 155979/12, 2014 WL
2620345, at *3 (N.Y. App. Div. June 11, 2014) (concluding that the name "Ripoff Report" and the
website's slogan "Don't let them get away with it! Let the truth be known!" do not constitute
liability).
294. See Glob. Royalties, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 930.
295. Id. at 932 ("Defendants provided a list of categories from which Sullivan selected the
title 'Con Artists' for his post. As in our order dismissing the original complaint, we conclude that
this participation is insufficient as a matter of law to make defendants information content
providers with respect to the postings."); see also GW Equity LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, No.
3:07-CV-976-O, 2009 WL 62173, at *17-18 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009); Whitney Info. Network, Inc.
v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, No. 204-CV-47-FTM-34SPC, 2008 WL 450095, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Feb.
15, 2008).
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consume particular types of content.296 Other courts have even found
intermediaries immune when they encouraged defamation.2 9 7
However, exceptional cases exist. In Daniel v. Armslist, the
website Armslist.com allowed potential buyers and sellers of firearms
and ammunition to contact one another, either by clicking on a link
within the website or by using the contact information provided by the
other party through the website.298 This design facilitated illegal
firearms purchases, one of which was a firearm used in a lethal
shooting.299 The plaintiff alleged that the design and operational
features of Armslist.com affirmatively "encouraged" transactions
through which prohibited purchasers acquired firearms.30 0 The court
interpreted Roommates.com broadly and did not apply immunity to
website design features that facilitated illegal firearms purchases, even
though only some of the transactions' sales ended up being illegal on
the buyer's side.30 1
296. See Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., No. 17-CV-05359-LB, 2017 WL 5665670,
at *1, *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017). Dyroff considers how data mining and machine learning
allowed the intermediary to personalize recommendations to users on content and discussion
groups on the website, sometimes channeling and leading users to unlawful content. See id. at *8.
Because the intermediary steered one of the users to a discussion group dedicated to the sale of
narcotics, the user was able to buy heroin and died because he consumed it. See id. at *3-5. The
court dismissed the case, ruling that recommendations to website users is an ordinary, neutral
function of social networking websites. See id. at *1. The intermediary used neutral tools that
merely provide a framework that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes. See id. at *1.
As such, it did not "create" or "develop" the information even in part. See id.; cf. Tremble, supra
note 250, at 866 (implying that cases like Dyroff could be compared to the email service in
Roommates.com because both platforms gleaned new information from user content and behavior
to create a site architecture that affected both mood and behavior).
297. See Glob. Royalties, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 933 ("It is obvious that a website entitled Ripoff
Report encourages the publication of defamatory content. However, there is no authority for the
proposition that this makes the website operator responsible, in whole or in part, for the 'creation
or development' of every post on the site. Essentially, that is plaintiffs' position."); MCW, Inc. v.
Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, No. CIV.A.3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004 WL 833595, at *10 (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 19, 2004) ("MCW alleges that the defendants actively encourage, instruct, and participate in
the consumer complaints posted on the websites. Specifically, MCW contends, the defendants, in
an e-mail signed by Magedson, encouraged a consumer to take photos of (1) the owner, (2) the
owner's car with license plate, (3) the owner handing out Ripoff Reports in front of Haldane's
offices, and (4) the Bernard Haldane sign in the background with the Ripoff Reports in hand, all
so that the defendants could include these photos on the websites.").
298. Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 913 N.W.2d 211, 215 (Wis. Ct. App. 2018).
299. Id. at 217.
300. Id. at 215-16 (summarizing Armslist's alleged misconduct as (1) facilitating private
sales by allowing users to limit searches to private sellers; (2) failing to flag "criminal" or "illegal"
content; (3) warning against illegality but failing to offer specific legal guidance; (4) encouraging
user anonymity; and (5) enabling buyers to evade a state waiting period that required federally-
licensed firearms dealers to wait 48 hours after receiving a response from the background check
system before transferring the firearm).
301.Id. at 222; see also Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, No. 2017AP344 (Wis. filed Aug. 15, 2018) (notifi-
cation of court order) (informing petitioners that the Wisconsin Supreme Court will review Daniel
v. Armslist, LLC); Eric Goldman, Wisconsin Appeals Court Blows Open Big Holes in Section 230-
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Jones v. Dirty World was a major legal battle with many
revolutions before the Sixth Circuit granted immunity.3 0 2 TheDirty.com
is a focal point for defamatory content. The name of the site in and of
itself invites postings of "dirt." 303 In addition, the site included a
"submit dirt" button that encouraged gossip. It also added brief, nasty
remarks and tags to users' posts and published the selected
submissions.304 These posts offended many individuals-including
Sara Jones, who brought an action against TheDirty.com-alleging
state tort claims of defamation, false light, and intentional inflection of
emotional distress.305 The lower courts did not grant the intermediary
immunity because it developed, invited, and encouraged defamatory
content.306 However, on the appeal, the Sixth Circuit applied a different
interpretation of section 230, and held that the district court erred in
finding that the website operators were the "creators" or "developers" of
the content at issue.307 In doing so, the Sixth Circuit rejected the
encouragement est308 and adopted the "material contribution" test for
determining whether a website operator is "responsible, in whole or in
Daniel v. Armslist, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Apr. 25, 2018), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/ar-
chives/2018/04/wisconsin-appeals-court-blows-open-big-holes-in-section-230-daniel-v-arm-
slist.htm [https://perma.cclRH58-G95H] (noting that the Armslist opinion does not detail the exact
circumstances when its statutory reading would support a Section 230 defense). Design features
may thus allow plaintiffs to bypass section 230 and result in judicial denial of motions to dismiss,
even if the design is neutral to illegality. Cf. Harrington v. Airbnb, Inc., 3:17-cv-00558-YY, 2018
WL 5619329, at *5 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2018) (requiring users to display their picture in their profile
may violate discrimination law); Eric Goldman, Racial Discrimination Lawsuit Against Airbab
Has the Potential to Change Online Marketplaces-Harrington v. Airbnb, TECH. & MARKETING L.
BLOG (Nov. 2, 2018), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/11/racial-discrimination-lawsuit-
against- airbnb-has-the-potential-to-change-online- marketplaces-harrington-v- airbnb.htm
[https://perma.cclLW2X-AJHE].
302. Jones v. Dirty World Entm't Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 402 (6th Cir. 2014); see
Elizabeth M. Jaffe, Imposing a Duty in an Online World: Holding the Web Host Liable for
Cyberbullying, 35 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 277, 287 (2013).
303. Jones, 755 F.3d at 402; see also THE DIRTY, supra note 9.
304. Jones, 755 F.3d at 403, 416 (describing how Richie, the website's manager, responded
to posts and published his own comments on the discussion subjects, such as "[w]hy are all high
school teachers freaks in the sack?" in response to a user's post about Jones).
305. Id. at 405.
306. See Jones v. Dirty World Entm't Recordings, LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 818, 822 (E.D. Ky.
2013); Jones v. Dirty World Entm't Recordings, LLC, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1012-13 (E.D. Ky.
2012); see also Eric Goldman, Should TheDirty Website Be Liable For Encouraging Users to
Gossip?, FORBES (Nov. 25, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/11/25/should-
thedirty-website-be-liable-for-encouraging-users-to-gossip/#1a2ffcbdb966 [https://perma.cc/36PZ-
8GNL] ("TheDirty lost Section 230 protection because it 'invited and encouraged' defamatory
content, as evidenced by its name ('TheDirty'), Richie's screening of user submissions, and Richie's
snarky comments appended to the user submissions.").
307. Jones, 755 F.3d at 415.
308. Id. at 414-15 ("More importantly, an encouragement est would inflate the meaning
of 'development' to the point of eclipsing the immunity from publisher-liability that Congress
established.").
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part, for the creation or development of tortious information."3 0 9 This
interpretation led the court to grant immunity.31 0
In a similar case, the District Court for the Western District of
Missouri granted immunity to the defendant, noting that section 230
governs how user-generated content is handled. As such, the court held
that the CDA should not interfere with a website's name.311 The court
also held that merely encouraging defamatory posts is insufficient to
overcome section 230 immunity.312 In the court's view, intermediaries
are not liable for focal points and encouragement.3 13 Although scholars
criticized these cases as granting too much defense protection for bad
faith moderation, immunity is usually applied in these situations.
314
An exception to the broad applicability of section 230 immunity
are the corporate advocacy programs that purport to provide assistance
to businesses with negative complaints by investigating and resolving
the posted complaints for large fees.3 15 Although some courts granted
immunity to an intermediary that encouraged users to post negative
reviews and directly profited from removing defamatory content, many
other cases 16 that involved these programs were not rejected in
preliminary stages.317
309. Id. at 413, 415 ("An adoption or ratification theory, however, is not only inconsistent
with the material contribution standard of 'development' but also abuses the concept of
responsibility. A website operator cannot be responsible for what makes another party's statement
actionable by commenting on that statement post hoc. To be sure, a website operator's previous
comments on prior postings could encourage subsequent invidious postings, but that loose
understanding of responsibility collapses into the encouragement measure of 'development,' which
we reject.").
310. See id. at 414-15, 417. The court applied a narrow interpretation of the material
contribution test and concluded that a website owner who intentionally encourages illegal third-
party postings to which he adds his own comments is not a "creator" or "developer" of that content.
Id.
311. See S.C. v. Dirty World, LLC, No. 11-CV-00392-DW, 2012 WL 3335284, at *5 (W.D.
Mo. Mar. 12, 2012).
312. See id. at *4.
313. See id.
314. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn't Just Backpage:
Revisiting Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453, 468-70 (2018); Laura Cannon,
Comment, Indecent Communications: Revenge Porn and Congressional Intent of § 230(c), 90 TUL.
L. REV. 471, 483-84 (2015); James Grimmelmann, The Virtues ofModeration, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH.
42, 105 (2015).
315. See Why Corporate Advocacy, RIPOFF REPORT,
https://www.ripoffreport.com/corporate-advocacy-program/why-corporate-advocacy
[https://perma.cc/NA9Q-DH5S] (last visited Sept. 9, 2018).
316. See Glob. Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (D. Ariz.
2008) ("It is obvious that a website entitled Ripoff Report encourages the publication of defamatory
content. However, there is no authority for the proposition that this makes the website operator
responsible, in whole or in part, for the "creation or development" of every post on the site.
Essentially, that is plaintiffs' position".).
317. See, e.g., Icon Health & Fitness v. Consumer Affairs.com, No. 1:16-cv-00168-DBP,
2017 WL 2728413, at *12 (D. Utah June 23, 2017); Vision Sec., LLC v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC,
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In the United States, the scope of intermediary liability for
nudging offensive content remains unclear. The Roommates.com
decision recognized these influences as "content development" and
revoked the immunity of intermediaries that had been protected by
section 230 up to that point.318 This case took the first step towards
imposing liability for evil nudges. After Roommates.com, judicial
decisions are inconsistent.319 Yet, most courts still choose to err on the
side of granting immunity.320
2. Europe
In Europe, intermediary liability is governed by the European
Parliament's E-Commerce Directive.321 The Directive does not impose
a general duty of care on intermediaries to monitor content on their
websites and also insulates intermediaries from liability-provided
they remain passive facilitators of content and react upon actual
knowledge of specific illegal content.322 This knowledge-based safe
haven protects intermediaries whose role is "merely technical,
automatic and passive," but does not shield intermediaries that play an
active role in hosting the content.323 The Directive is somewhat
dated,324 and its classification may no longer be comprehensive. Many
No. 2:13-cv-00926-CW-BCW, 2015 WL 12780892, at *3 (D. Utah Aug. 27, 2015); Vo Grp., LLC v.
Opinion, Corp., No. 8758/11, at 10 (N.Y. App. Div. May 22, 2012) (Court did not preclude liability
for conditioning removal of tortious content on paying fees).
318. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 928 (9th Cir. 2007).
319. See Cecil, supra note 285, at 2546.
320. See id.
321. See Council Directive 2000/31/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 178) (EC) 8; Joris van Hoboken, The
Legal Space for Innovative Ordering: On the Need to Update Selection Intermediary Liability in
the EU, 13 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 1, 6 (2009); Broder Kleinschmidt, An International
Comparison of ISP's Liabilities for Unlawful Third Party Content, 18 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 332,
345-48 (2010); Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon, Sometimes One is Not Enough! Securing Freedom of
Expression, Encouraging Private Regulation or Subsidizing Internet Intermediaries or All Three at
the Same Time: The Dilemma of Internet Intermediaries' Liability, 7 J. INT'L COM. L. TECH. 154,
155 (2012).
322. Article 14 provides that intermediaries engaged in "hosting" are not liable unless they
have actual knowledge of illegal statements or refuse to remove them upon knowledge. See Ronen
Perry & Tal Zarsky, Liability for Online Anonymous Speech: Comparative and Economic Analyses,
5 J. EUR. TORT L. 205, 220 (2014).
323. See Joined Cases C-236 & C-238/08, Google France, S.A.R.L. & Google Inc. v. Louis
Vuitton Malletier SA et al., 2010 E.C.R. 1-2417 ("[I1n order to establish whether the liability of a
referencing service provider may be limited under Article 14 of Directive 2000/3 1, it is necessary
to examine whether the role played by that service provider is neutral, in the sense that its conduct
is merely technical, automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of the data
which it stores."); Corey Omer, Intermediary Liability for Harmful Speech: Lessons from Abroad,
28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 289, 313 (2014); Stalla-Bourdillon, supra note 320, at 158.
324. See Perry & Zarsky, supra note 322, at 220.
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content providers may not be "hosts" at all.3 2 5 In such cases, the
Directive does not apply at all.32 6
It remains unclear when courts consider an intermediary to be
passive. Different courts have ruled that the Directive shields only
"neutral" intermediaries.327 Outside the scope of the E-Commerce
Directive safe haven, the potential liability of intermediaries is
extensive.328 Thus, in the case of Delfi,3 29 the Estonian Supreme Court
interpreted the Directive narrowly and found the site liable for
defamatory comments posted about a famous Estonian business
executive-even though it followed the "notice-and-takedown"
practice.330 The court held that Delfi could not benefit from the
Directive's safe haven because it allowed anonymous comments and did
not apply sufficient measurements to prevent harm to third parties.331
Therefore, in the court's view, the site should be held liable like any
other publisher.332 Delfi filed a complaint against the decision to the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), claiming that its right to
freedom of expression was violated.333 The first section of the ECHR
upheld the Estonian Court's ruling and did not find a proportional
interference with freedom of expression according to Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights.334 The Grand Chamber
confirmed this decision.335
The court acknowledged that Delfi's anonymous comment
section was notorious for its defamatory content, a fact which may have
contributed to the court's final decision.336 This judgment raises serious
questions about intermediary liability. Moreover, it generates
325. See id. at 222; Peggy Valcke & Marieke Lenaerts, Who's Author, Editor and Publisher
in User-Generated Content? Applying Traditional Media Concepts to UGC Providers, 24 INT'L REV.
L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 119, 126 (2010).
326. See Perry & Zarsky, supra note 322, at 221.
327. See Tamiz v. Google Inc. [2013] EWCA (Civ) 68 [16], [20121 QB 449 (Eng.); Joined
Cases C-236 & C-238/08, Google France, S.A.R.L. & Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA et
al., 2010 E.C.R. I-2417.
328. See Valcke & Lenaerts, supra note 325, at 126.
329. See generally Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2015).
330. See id. at 70-71; Perry & Zarsky, supra note 322, at 221.
331. See Perry & Zarsky, supra note 322, at 221.
332. See id. ("The court acknowledged that Delfi's comment section was notorious for its
defaming content, a fact which might have contributed to the court's final decision. Most
importantly, Delfi was found liable even though it applied a 'notice and takedown' process and
thus complied with the abovementioned requirements of the EU Directive.").
333. See id.
334. See Delfi AS, No. 64569/09 at 62. The court applied a narrow interpretation for
intermediaries' technical functions. Martin Husovec, ECtHR Rules on Liability of ISPs as a
Restriction of Freedom of Speech, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 108, 109 (2014).
335. See Delfi AS, No. 64569/09 at 62.
336. See Perry & Zarsky, supra note 322, at 221-22.
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confusion regarding the distinctions between online "publishers" and
mere intermediaries.337 Post Delfi, in Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, the
ECHR reached a different conclusion-holding that imposing liability
on the website was a violation of Article 10. 338 Yet, the court did not
retreat from its previous conclusions in Delfi.339  Rather, it
differentiated the nature of the published comments from the comments
in Delfi.340 The court held that Hungarian courts precluded a proper
balancing between the right to freedom of expression and the right to
reputation.341 However, this ruling is confined to the individual
circumstances of this particular case.34 2 In Pihl v. Sweden, the ECHR
continued the line of reasoning from Index.hu Zrt-while also
considering the balance between human rights, the type of speech
posted by the user, and the type of intermediary.343
Courts apply the Directive on a case-by-case basis,344 which
creates legal uncertainty regarding the scope of liability. 3 45 In Delfi, the
court imposed liability because of the design of the platform and lack of
sufficient measurements of precautions.346 In the same manner, nudges
are arguably aspects of choice architecture that extend beyond mere
hosting. Therefore, it is likely that the Directive will not shield an
intermediary who nudges specific types of speech, even if it did not have
actual knowledge of the offending speech on its platform.347
337. See id. at 222 ("It should come as no surprise that the Delfi decision generated
substantial confusion as to the distinction between online 'publishers' and mere 'intermediaries'
and the extent of legal protection that adherence to a 'notice and takedown' process provides.").
338. See Magyar Tartalomszolgaltat6k Egyesilete & Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, No.
22947/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (4th Sec.) 21 (2016).
339. Id.
340. Id. at 15, 17. The ECHR differentiated the nature of the comments that were published
from the comments in Delfi and noted that the article in Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary was a matter of
public interest and did not provoke offensive comments. Id.
341. Id. at 17.
342. Id. at 25 (Kuris, J., concurring).
343. See Pih1 v. Sweden, No. 74742/14, Eur. Ct. H.R. (3d Sec.) 7 (2017) (considering the type
of speech that did not amount to hate speech and the type of the intermediary-a nonprofit blogger
that removed the comment upon notice and held the application inadmissible).
344. See Valcke & Lenaerts, supra note 325, at 125, 129 (stating that a lack of clear
standards of liability leads to inconsistency).
345. See id. Post Delfi, it is unclear whether intermediaries can benefit from the safe haven
and, if not, what is the standard of liability (e.g., negligence, publishers' strict liability).
346. See Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. 81 (2015).
347. See Matthias Leistner, Structural Aspects of Secondary (Provider) Liability in Europe,
9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 75, 77 (2014); Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon, Making Intermediary
Internet Service Providers Participate in the Regulatory Process Through Tort Law, 23 INTELL.
REV. L. COMP. & TECH. 153, 161 (2009).
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B. Normative Considerations for Liability
Intermediary liability rests on the junction of a few areas of law.
It balances constitutional rights and tort considerations. In addition,
the technological context of intermediary liability involves considering
the influence of liability on the path of innovation. Finding the right
balance between these interests is a difficult judgment call-albeit a
crucial one.
1. Constitutional Balance and the Base of Speech Torts
The civil rights at stake in defamation law involve human
dignity, reputational interests, and freedom of speech.348 The law must
balance between the victim's reputation, the offender's right to free
speech, and also the intermediary's rights. On the one hand, liability
for defamation protects the basic elements of a person's status, dignity,
and reputation as a member of society.349 On the other hand, the law
must also consider the right of free speech as a guard against
government censorship.350  The United States provides stronger
protection for freedom of- speech than other Western democracies,351
both in political and commercial speech contexts.352
Several courts and scholars have contemplated why free speech
should receive special protection.353 The first rationale supporting the
importance of free speech is that it promotes individual autonomy.354 It
enables the self-determination of an individual to express himself by
348. See Daniel C. Taylor, Libel Tourism: Protecting Authors and Preserving Comity, 99
GEO. L.J. 189, 196 (2010) ("Free societies must strike a balance between the rights of uninhibited
speech and the interests of individuals in their reputations.").
349. See Peter G. Danchin, Defaming Muhammad: Dignity, Harm, and Incitement to
Religious Hatred, 2 DUKE F.L. & Soc. CHANGE 5, 17 (2010).
350. See NErL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 10 (2015) ("Courts have interpreted the First Amendment broadly to prevent the
government from censoring our speech, pushing us directly for its content, or creating legal rules
that allow us to be sued for speaking the truth.").
351. See Pollicino & Bassini, supra note 234, at 514 (demonstrating that in the United
States, the freedom of speech is protected more than in the EU). The different balance between
free speech and reputation is even more prominent in the digital context. See id.
352. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 583 (2011) (striking down a Vermont law
prohibiting the sale for marketing purposes of physicians' prescription records without their
permission on the grounds that the law was not "content neutral"); Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E.
Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CAL. L. REV. 335, 338 (2017); Tamara R. Piety, 'A
Necessary Cost of Freedom'? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) ("Sorrell
may mean that henceforth, in practice, if not formally, commercial speech will be treated as fully
protected.").
353. See, e.g., RICHARDS, supra note 350, at 10 (reviewing influential theories which lay out
justifications for the right to free speech).
354. See Joseph Raz, Free Expression and Personal Identification, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
303, 311-16 (1991).
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familiarizing the public at large with his ways of life, allowing his
preferences to gain public recognition and acceptability, and letting him
know that he is not alone because his experiences are known to
others.355 A second rationale for protecting free speech is the search for
truth.356 Free speech assures that every expression can enter the
marketplace of ideas.3 5 7 A third rationale is based on the understanding
that free speech is crucial for maintaining democracy.358 Freedom of
speech is required to assure the effectiveness of the democratic process
by informing the governed of the acts of government and guaranteeing
that policy is reached intelligently.359  Contemporary theories on
democracy focus on protecting and promoting a democratic,
participatory culture.360 Freedom of speech is required to assure an
individual's ability to participate in the production and distribution of
culture.361 This theory stresses both individual liberty and collective
self-governance.362
The digital age has pushed freedom of expression to the
forefront of debate, raising old policy concerns regarding expression.363
In the digital age, intermediaries can easily influence social contexts,
lead to harmful dynamics, and affect mass attacks by many individuals
against a single victim. 3 6 4 Consequently, they exacerbate reputational
harm-especially when intermediaries function as crowd leaders-by
encouraging and influencing mob destructiveness,365 or they design
specific focal points that facilitate low-value, harmful speech.366 One
355. See id.
356. See JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED
PRINTING TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND T 2 (1644).
357. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) ("[T]he best test for truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.").
358. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
xii (Oxford Univ. Press 1965) (1948).
359. See id. at 8.
360. See Michael D. Birnhack, More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain, in THE FUTURE
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: IDENTIFYING THE COMMONS IN INFORMATION LAW 59, 71-72 (2006) ("This
is the view that self-government in a democracy is composed not only of the momentary act of
voting, but also of what happens in between elections."); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1548-49, 1570 (1988).
361. See Birnhack, supra note 360, at 71.
362. See id. at 72.
363. See id. at 86.
364. See Brian Leiter, Cleaning Cyber-Cesspools: Google and Free Speech, in THE
OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 155, 163 (Saul Levmore & Martha
Nussbaum eds., 2010).
365. See Danielle Keats Citron, Civil Rights in Our Information, in THE OFFENSIVE
INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 31, 48 (2010); CASS SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE,
WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK TO MAKE GROUPS SMARTER 22-24 (2014).
366. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Privacy, the First Amendment and the Internet, in THE
OFFENSIVE INTERNET: SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION, supra note 364, at 174, 175.
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may argue that the law should impose liability on intermediaries for
influencing context. Accordingly, liability can be the key to mitigating
harm and protecting civil rights of victims.
The liability regime governing cyberspace affects free speech.367
Imposing liability on intermediaries for nudges may lead to less
nudging and in turn result in a chilling effect on specific types of
platforms and on the speech of some speakers who would hesitate before
expressing themselves. The chill may extend to a lesser degree than
the potential chill of host liability because the intermediary decides how
to design the platforms.368  Nevertheless, the concern remains.
Imposing liability on influencers may chill the incentives to design
online platforms devoted to nonconsensual topics and discussions. Such
discussions could involve the criticizing of subjects that are not
mainstream and platforms devoted for marginalized groups.369 Such
liability may chill gossip, which promotes intimacy in social relations
and provides a bridge between communities, among other benefits.370
However, it may also discourage complaints and negative speech that
are important for democracy.
Liability for nudging may harm minority groups who are
underrepresented in mainstream discussions. Nudges-particularly
focal point nudges-may enhance minority legitimacy and encourage
minorities to spread ideas that would have been suppressed otherwise
due to fear of social objection.371 Some nudges provide a signal to
minorities that their nonconsensual speech is acceptable, allowing them
to trust their audiences with possibly controversial ideas and enhance
their involvement in the democratic process.372 Nudges can enrich the
market of ideas and enhance their autonomy.373 Imposing liability on
intermediaries for nudges may hinder these benefits.
367. See Chander & Le, supra note 243, at 506.
368. See Lavi, supra note 71, at 930. Chilling will result in different choice architecture and
not on direct censorship of user speech from the platform. See id. at 878. On host liability for
harmful user expressions, see id. In contrast to host liability, an intermediary controls a platform's
design and can reduce its exposure to liability by avoiding actions that create a basis for
inducement. See Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 293, 344-45 (2011).
369. See Lavi, supra note 71, at 883.
370. On the benefits of gossip, see Zimmerman, supra note 156, at 333-34.
371. See Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering
Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1445 (2011).
372. See Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Ideological Segregation Online and
Offline, 126 Q.J. EcON. 1799, 1799 (2011). Intermediary influence on context promotes speech that
might not be expressed otherwise. This is especially relevant with regard to focal points, which
allow ideological segregation. See Citron & Norton, supra note 371, at 1445.
373. See Shlomo Cohen, Nudging and Informed Consent, 13 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 9 (2013).
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One may argue that some chilling that will be caused by
exposing intermediaries that nudge speech torts to liability is
desirable.3 74 Blanket immunity would allow intermediaries to freely
influence social contexts, enhance flows of offensive speech, and inflict
severe reputational harm on unsuspecting users.375 Immunity may also
undermine the right to free speech itself. First, nudges may flame social
dynamics and bring users to a "hot" state of mind.376 Consequently,
users may not think carefully about their choices, which could lead to
the automatic spreading of offensive speech that they would not have
spread otherwise.377 They might regret publishing these expressions
later.3 78 Thus, nudges can undermine the autonomy of users. Second,
an exemption from liability for evil nudges may push users to publish
more falsehoods without accountability-accordingly intensifying their
flow. 3 7 9 Thus, more weight would be ascribed to these falsehoods in
respect to other expressions.380 This may hinder the free competition of
expression in the market of ideas and may undermine the search for the
truth.381 Third, nudges may impair democracy. They may encourage
users to spread falsehoods and fake news about state officials, hinder
the ability to reach an informed decision,382 and even manipulate
political expression.383 Therefore, a degree of chill may be desirable and
could strike the right balance between the benefits of free expression
and the costs of its potential harm.
Another balance that must be struck is between speakers of
harmful speech and the freedom of speech of their victims, considering
the right to speak on both sides. Exempting intermediaries from
374. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 71.
375. See Lavi, supra note 61, at 166.
376. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 41.
377. Individuals in a hot state are generated by the intuitive system of thinking (system
1), in contrast to the analytic system (system 2). See KAHNEMAN, supra note 48, at 20.
378. See ALESSANDRO ACQUISTI ET AL., "I REGRETTED THE MINUTE I PRESSED SHARE": A
QUALITATIVE STUDY OF REGRETS ON FACEBOOK 1 (2011); Yang Wang et al., From Facebook Regrets
to Facebook Privacy Nudges, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1307, 1308 (2013) (explaining that individuals in a
"hot" state regretted spreading offensive content in social networks in retrospect). On nudges that
infringe autonomy, see T. M. Wilkinson, Nudging and Manipulation, 61 POL. STUD. 341, 344
(2013).
379. See CASS SUNSTEIN, CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND OTHER DANGEROUS IDEAS 26 (2014).
380. See id. (arguing that the more times individuals are exposed to a rumor, the more they
tend to believe it); Pennycook et al., supra note 124, (manuscript at 2).
381. See SAUL LEVMORE & MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: PRIVACY,
SPEECH, AND REPUTATION 102 (2010).
382. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 9-11; VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 68, at 171.
383. See Zittrain, supra note 69, at 335 (describing how the graphic sign of the friends that
voted functioned as a nudge that encouraged people to vote). It should be noted that new
technologies, and big data in particular, allow to target nudges more efficiently. See, e.g., Levi,
supra note 19 (manuscript at 26).
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liability allows them to nudge with impunity.384 This can encourage
mass attacks directed at specific individuals.385 These attacks may
deny victims their ability to engage with others as equals, which might
suppress a free public debate.386  Exempting intermediaries from
liability would not only impair the autonomy of victims, but also the
free market of ideas and public participation.387 The balancing act of
this tort must therefore include the victim's freedom of expression and
the constitutional rights related to both parties.388
The final balance that must be struck is between the
intermediary rights to free speech and the rights of users and third
parties. One may argue that imposing liability on intermediaries for
nudging undermines their freedom to design platforms as they see fit-
thus undermining their freedom of expression.389 However, it might
also be argued that nudges are not speech.390 This is especially true in
cases of channeling and leading nudges, which aim to aid user
navigation within the platform.391 Yet, one might still argue that the
role of channeling and leading extends beyond a tool for navigation and
expression of ideas.392 As for focal points, the intermediary influences
384. See Jeremy K. Kessler and David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First
Amendment, 118 COLUM. L REV. 1953, 1994 (2018) ("[A]rguments involving speech on both sides
focus on the degree to which one party's expressive activity compromises the ability of other private
parties to exercise their own First Amendment rights." (emphasis in original)); Lavi, supra note
61, at 182.
385. See id. at 184.
386. See CITRON, supra note 76, at 5; SILVERMAN, supra note 15, at 80; TUFEKCI, supra note
124, at 179 (explaining that saying that a person's political view is stupid is free speech; yet, when
a mass mob attack a political view, this may create fear and block free speech); Danielle Keats
Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans § 230 Immunity,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 420 (2017) ("Individuals have difficulty expressing themselves in the
face of online assaults.").
387. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 86, at 10-11.
388. See Andrew M. Koppelman, Revenge Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions,
65 EMORY L.J. 661, 675 (2016).
389. See Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2013). For related context
that applies to sophisticated Al nudges, see Tony M. Massaro et al., SIRI-OUSLY 2.0. What
Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2481, 2483 (2017)
(suggesting ways in which the rise of Al may inspire critical engagement with free speech theory
and doctrine).
390. See Wu, supra note 389, at 1517.
391. See id. at 1525. On the functionality doctrine, see generally id.
392. See id. at 1525-26 (referring to software navigation and map programs as harder cases
of differentiation between communication of ideas and functionality, yet tending to believe that
they are functional tools). Other scholars adopt a broad approach to free speech and argue that
platforms direct users to material created by other and report it. See Eugene Volokh & Donald M.
Falk, First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Results 3 (UCLA School of Law, Research
Paper No. 12-22, 2012). Another approach is that algorithms represent the message of their
developers and is tied to human editorial judgement. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and
Speech, 161 U. PENN L REV. 1445, 1479 (2013); DAVID M. SKOVER AND RONALD K. L. COLLINS,
ROBOTICA: SPEECH RIGHTS AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 35-37, 42 (2018) (explaining that for
constitutional purposes, what really matters is that the receiver experiences speech-including
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the content of conversation, and the choice architecture is not merely
functional, but rather expressional.393  The same goes with
encouragement nudges, which are definitely understood as speech.394
Assuming nudges are speech, intermediaries cannot have it both
ways.3 9 5 They cannot claim to be active speakers when seeking First
Amendment protection, and only navigational tools when facing tort
liability. 39 6 By enjoying the right of free speech, they undermine their
immunity claims from civil liability. 397
2. Theories of Traditional Tort Law
a. Corrective Justice
A central justification for imposing liability is corrective justice.
Aristotelian philosophy defines corrective justice as a rectification of
harm-specifically, harm that was wrongfully caused by one person to
another-by means of a direct transfer of resources from the injurer to
the victim. 398  Accordingly, every particular interaction embodies
correlative rights and duties that are imposed on both parties. This
deontological, nonconsequentialist concept focuses on bilateral
interactions, which are not reliant on external values.3 9 9
Corrective justice theorists offer different reasons and
requirements for imposing the duty of rectification-including concepts
robotic speech-as meaningful and potentially useful and valuable); Part III of , ROBOTICA
explains that the First Amendment should protect communications in all forms relevant to human
utility.
393. See Wu, supra note 389, at 1519-21 (differentiating between communication of
functional information and communication of ideas).
394. See id. at 1511-12. Based on the analysis of Tim Wu, there is no doubt that
encouragements are acts of speech. See id.
395. See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness,
and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1193 (2008). However, the
courts reached different conclusions regarding search engines-recognizing intermediaries right
of free speech for page-rank and rejecting their liability for optimization. See Langdon v. Google,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-
1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568, at *3 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003). These rulings have been criticized
in literature. See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOx SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 164 (2015); Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law ofReputation,
47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 515, 525 (2015); Wu, supra note 389, at 1498 (describing potential harms of
computer-generated speech that invite regulation).
396. See Pasquale, supra note 395, at 524.
397. See RICHARDS, supra note 350, at 86.
398. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 77 (W. D. Ross trans., 1999).
399. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on
Corrective Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 107, 110 (2001).
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of faults and rights,4oo responsibility,401 and non-reciprocal risk.40 2 Most
theorists explain that causation is insufficient for imposing liability. 403
As a result, negligence or moral fault must exist to justify compensation
for the harm caused.404
The theory of nonreciprocal risks can explain why harm alone is
insufficient for justifying liability.405 Liability exists when a respondent
generates a disproportionately excessive risk of harm, relative to the
victim's risk-creating activity.4 0 6 The entitlement to recover a loss is
handed to all injured parties to the extent the risks imposed on them
were nonreciprocal.407 The goal is to distinguish between risks that
violate individual interests and background risks that must be borne by
society.408
In light of the bilateral correlative nature of torts, the literature
on corrective justice tends to focus on "first order" liability of those who
most directly and wrongfully caused an injury, and not on "second
order" liability of third parties who are not direct tortfeasors.409
However, intermediaries arguably create the framework for risks by
allowing the activity and assisting it.410 Therefore, they can be liable
for the consequences alongside the direct wrongdoer, because the
corrective justice concept is also feasible when several wrongdoers
caused the harm.411
Thus, it is arguable that intermediaries who influence context
by nudging speech torts actually cause harm. Their actions are more
400. See JULES L. COLMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 645 (1992); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil
Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 718 (2003).
401. See Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 449
(1992). Weinrib points out that tort doctrine constructs the tort relationship, because liability
treats the parties as doers and sufferers of the same injustice. See Ariel Porat, Questioning the
Idea of Correlativity in Weinrib's Theory of Corrective Justice, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 161,
169 (2001); Weinrib, supra note 399, at 110.
402. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 537
(1972).
403. See id. at 562. But see Richard Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
151, 157 (1973) (arguing that harm is sufficient to justify compensation). However, this theory of
strict liability, which focuses on factual causality, has come under criticism. See, e.g., Izhak
Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modern American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 27, 62 (1980).
404. See Englard, supra note 403, at 65.
405. See Fletcher, supra note 402, at 542.
406. See id.
407. See id.
408. See id. at 543.
409. See, e.g., Englard, supra note 403, at 27.
410. See Ardia, supra note 240, at 393.
411. See Richard W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A
Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk Exposure, 21 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1160 (1988). In that case, every wrongdoer is liable to the plaintiffs damages
and can claim subrogation from other wrongdoers. See id.
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than a background risk and the reputational harm of the victim is their
fault. Yet, a counter argument might suggest that nudging specific
types of content differs from generating it. The users can choose
whether to participate and publish defamatory content or to avoid
publishing it altogether. It is difficult to determine whether, in the
absence of nudges, users would avoid publishing offensive speech.
Moreover, the intermediary's fault should not be taken for granted.
Justifying liability under the corrective justice theory depends
on the extent of the nudge's influence on users' content.41 2 Strong,
explicit nudges are not merely a routine background risk and are not
an inherent part of operating platforms-thus, intermediaries that
generate them create a nonreciprocal risk and should bear liability as
if they committed the speech tort themselves. In contrast, weak nudges
do not maintain a causal link between the intermediary and the harm
and, therefore, may not indicate fault. Thus, it is neither fair nor just
to impose liability on intermediaries that generate weak nudges. In
these cases, the user alone should be liable.
b. Efficiency
Efficiency is one of the central tenets of tort law-focusing on the
maximization of wealth and the efficient allocation of risks.4 13 In
general, it does not account for deontological considerations.4 14
According to this perspective, legal rules aim to incentivize efficient
conduct ex ante and promote welfare maximization ex post.4 15 In this
regard, courts should not consider the harm to victims in isolation.
Instead, courts should consider the costs and benefits of the activity, as
well as the value that third parties gain when the activity is
undertaken. Benefits in this analysis may include social values such as
freedom of expression and innovation.
Scholarly literature usually deals with the economic analysis of
direct liability, but shies away from discussing third-party liability. 4 16
However, expanding liability to third parties is required in the following
cases: (1) when the enforcement of liability on the direct tortfeasor
fails;417 (2) when the third party can monitor and control the direct
412. See Lavi, supra note 61, at 184.
413. See Richard A. Posner & William M. Landes, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort
Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 851 (1980).
414. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 492 (1980).
415. See John R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696, 708 (1939).
416. See, e.g., Hamdani, supra note 21, at 56. ,
417. See Perry & Zarsky, supra note 322, at 207 (discussing the example of when the direct
tortfeasor cannot be detected and unmasked).
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wrongdoers;418 (3) when sufficient incentives do not exist for private
ordering;419 and (4) when a legal rule can be applied at a reasonable
cost.4 20 While third-party liability is well established, legal scholarship
has little to say about the standard by which this liability should attach
to the third-party tortfeasor.421
In the case of online speech torts, enforcement failures might
occur4 22 because the direct offender might be anonymous and, even if he
is identified, he might not have deep enough pockets to adequately
compensate victims. 4 2 3 In addition, the intermediary's influence on the
decision of the direct offenders to publish speech torts can hinder social
ordering on the platform. Under such a circumstance, to whom should
liability be allocated? Who is the cheapest cost avoider? This
Subsection examines whether efficiency considerations support
imposing liability on intermediaries, while considering the alternative
of letting victims bear the damage. The analysis refers to three types
of traditional costs associated with assigning liability: (1) primary cost
of deterrence;424 (2) secondary cost of loss spreading;425 and (3)
administrative litigation costs.4 2 6
In order to achieve maximum efficiency, liability should be
allocated to the cheapest cost avoider. One may argue that imposing
liability on intermediaries who push users to publish offensive content
is efficient. Intermediaries who influence social context facilitate
speech torts.427  Some of them strongly push users to commit speech
torts and even construct illicit markets for offensive speech and profit
418. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 56 (1986); Lavi, supra note 71, at 882; Douglas G. Lichtman &
Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 224
(2006).
419. See Kraakman, supra note 418, at 56; Lavi, supra note 71, at 882; Lichtman & Posner,
supra note 418, at 224.
420. See Kraakman, supra note 418, at 56; Lavi, supra note 71, at 882; Lichtman & Posner,
supra note 418, at 224.
421. See Hamdani, supra note 21, at 57 ("[L]ittle is known about the appropriate scope of
third-party liability. Specifically, legal scholarship has little to say about the standard of liability
that should apply to third parties.").
422. See Matthew Schruers, The History and Economics of ISP Liability for Third Party
Content, 88 VA. L. REV. 205, 233 (2002).
423. See Perry & Zarsky, supra note 322, at 238.
424. See GuiDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND EcONOMIC ANALYSIS
68 (1970).
425. See id. at 39. Secondary costs are the costs associated with bearing primary costs.
Significant losses borne by one person are more likely to result in secondary losses (arising from
the initial damage) than allocating a series of small losses to many people, or large sum of losses
to deep-pocketed entities. See id.
426. See id. at 24.
427. See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Saving Governance-By-Design, 106
CAL. L. REV. 697, 701 (2018).
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from them.4 28  Consequently, intermediaries have few market
incentives to prevent defamation.4 29 The intermediaries who nudge and
influence users are the cheapest cost avoiders.430 They control the
nudges they create by design,43 1 even when they nudge automatically
by using algorithms.432 Indeed, some technologies can lead to results
that the intermediary cannot foresee ex ante.4 3 3 Yet, the intermediary
can choose the technology it implements.434 Imposing liability on
intermediaries will disincentivize them from utilizing evil nudges ex
ante and will promote efficient deterrence.
Imposing liability could also incentivize intermediaries to
mitigate harm caused by tortious speech.435 Waiving intermediary
liability from intermediaries, in fact, incentivizes them to nudge
428. On illicit markets, see Kraakman, supra note 418, at 66.
429. See Jaffe, supra note 302, at 281.
430. See id. at 283-84. This is because the intermediary is in control of the design of its
platform, which tends to be nonneutral. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Taming the Golem:
Challenges of Ethical Algorithmic Decision-Making, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 125, 136-37 (2017). In
contrast to failing to remove harmful content, influencing context is not an omission. Thus, the
exposure to liability depends on the intermediary's discretion and actions. See id. at 136.
Consequently, the intermediary is the cheapest cost avoider relatively to the victim. See Jaffe,
supra note 302, at 283-84.
431. See Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 427, at 701 ("[D]esigning technology to 'bake
in' values offers a seductively elegant and effective means of control."). See also in a related context
of promoting privacy-by-design, Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy's Law ofDesign, U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 5) ("[D]esign's awesome yet invisible capacity to manipulate
those who exist inside its ecosystem requires us to consider the values we want design to
promote.").
432. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 430, at 136. Intermediaries can control the
parameters at the base of the algorithms ex ante. See id. at 138. On "policy neutral" vs. "policy
directed" algorithms, see id. at 137-42; Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of
Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1224 (2017) ("When we criticize algorithms, we are really
criticizing the programming, or the data, or their interaction. But equally important, we are also
criticizing the use to which they are being put by the humans who programmed the algorithms,
collected the data, or employed the algorithms and the data to perform particular tasks."). On
government by design, see SKOVER & COLLINS supra note 392 at 27 (referring Apple's Siri that has
her limitations by design: "[Sihe sidesteps medical, legal, or spiritual counsel; she eschews criminal
advice; and she prefers the precise and factual to the ambiguous and evaluative."); Mulligan &
Bamberger, supra note 427, at 697.
433. See THIERER ET AL., supra note 115, at 31. For example, the intermediary does not
always foresee the exact results of the use of Artificial intelligence and machine learning. See, e.g.,
THIERER ET AL., supra note 115, at 31 ("[E]ven if the public could review them, the nature of
machine-learning techniques can obviate the usefulness of review because the program is teaching
itself."); Madeline Lamo & Ryan Calo, Regulating Bot Speech, 66 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019)
("Bots can also display emergent behavior, meaning behavior neither the programmer nor the user
of the bot anticipated in advance.").
434. See Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 430, at 136; Matthew U. Scherer, Of Wild Beasts
and Digital Analogs: The Legal Status of Autonomous Systems, 20 NEV. L. J. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 36) (explaining that designers can impose limitations on the systems' culpabilities).
435. On this point, in a related context of copyright infringement, see Douglas Lichtman &
William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 395, 398 (2003).
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irresponsibly and externalize the damage caused.436 In addition,
intermediaries normally have deeper pockets than individual victims,
and are better suited to reduce secondary costs by bearing the loss
themselves or by spreading it to all their users.437 An increase in
litigation costs is expected, but imposing liability on intermediaries is
better than the alternative of leaving the victim without a remedy. This
alternative will not bring about efficient deterrence and may impose
heavy secondary costs on victims. 4 38 Even though defamation law
protects reputations without requiring proof of financial or physical
suffering,439 the conclusion is still valid. This is because defamation
harm may have economic consequences and can lead to costly
psychological harm.440 Therefore, the victim is not the best potential
bearer of intangible harm.44 1
An in-depth examination reveals that efficiency considerations
fail to provide answers regarding the allocation of liability when
considering overall market characteristics. In this context, there are
important costs in the market to be considered. Imposing liability on.
intermediaries might not be desirable because the utility achieved by
improving deterrence in the relevant market may be lower than its
costs.4 4 2 Requiring intermediaries to compensate defamation victims
may distort access to digital markets and hinder positive externalities
generated by intermediaries.443  Liability for focal point and
encouragement nudges will probably discourage legitimate speech such
as complaints and criticism. Holding intermediaries responsible may
also deter channeling and leading nudges-thus tifling innovation and
development of efficient web-navigation tools.44 4
Allocating liability to intermediaries may also increase
secondary costs of loss spreading. Erroneous assessment of risks
caused by nudges may lead intermediaries to disproportionately
increase their service prices.445 Not all intermediaries are born equal,
436. See Jaffe, supra note 302, at 288-89.
437. See Perry & Zarsky, supra note 322, at 239.
438. See id. at 231-32.
439. See Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-
Breach Harms, 96 TEx. L. REV. 737, 768 (2018).
440. On anxiety as a cognizable harm in a related context, see id.
441. See Perry & Zarsky, supra note 322, at 239 (explaining that intermediaries can better
spread costs through pricing and insurance than ordinary users).
442. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 56, at 58; Jaffe, supra note 302, at 283-84.
443. See Kreimer, supra note 56, at 58.
444. See Stern, supra note 249, at 589-90 ("If all websites strictly followed the Ninth
Circuit's guidance, the Internet will eventually resemble a gigantic library with no cataloging
system.").
445. See Lichtman & Landes, supra note 435, at 398 (discussing the spreading of costs to
copyright holders if equipment manufacturers were liable). When an intermediary has full
592018]
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
and not all have deep pockets. For example, it might be inefficient to
impose liability on desirable, noncommercial intermediaries, especially
if the liability for users' content that is a result of the nudge is not
knowledge based. Such liability may cause these desirable
intermediaries to turn away from the market or to refrain from
investing in online platforms altogether.446 Consequently, only large
commercial intermediaries would prevail-thus limiting the choice
between platforms and diversity of online markets and resulting in less
competition.447
Furthermore, allocating liability to intermediaries would cause
an increase in legal action and administrative costs. Deciding the
question of liability is complex and involves interpretation.448 Courts
have to interpret whether the intermediary "created" or "developed" the
offensive content, and in such cases, inquire into the question of the
intermediary's fault.449 Litigating such questions is costly and time
consuming.450 A case may undergo a number of procedural hurdles and
take years to resolve.451 The costs of running complex litigation may
lead intermediaries to limit their activities to sub-optimal levels in
order to reduce their exposure to liability. 452  The different
considerations outlined in this Section make it difficult to assess the
most efficient allocation of liability. Cost-benefit analysis leads to
information on the level of risks, he can efficiently spread the loss in a way that reflects the costs
of liability. See id. at 404. By contrast, uncertainty regarding the risk would result in inefficient
loss spreading that would in turn result in disproportional burden on users. See KENNETH A.
BAMBERGER & DEIRDRE K. MULLIGAN, PRIVACY ON THE GROUND: DRIVING CORPORATE BEHAVIOR
IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 244 (2015) (explaining that ambiguity regarding the exposure
to liability leads business to adopt higher standards relatively to the standards that would have
been adopted under clear rules).
446. Lavi, supra note 61, at 186.
447. See id.
448. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 386, at 423.
449. See Ardia, supra note 240, at 460.
450. See Matt C. Sanchez, Note, The Web Difference: A Legal and Normative Rationale
Against Liability for Online Reproduction of Third-Party Defamatory Content, 22 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 301, 318 (2008).
451. For a related example, see Viacom International, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19,
28 (2d Cir. 2012); Fiona Finlay-Hunt, Note, Who's Leading the Blind? Aimster, Grokster, and
Viacom's Vision of Knowledge in the New Digital Millennium, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 906, 924-
33 (2013); Jonathan Stempel, Google, Viacom Settle Landmark YouTube Lawsuit, REUTERS (Mar.
18, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-viacom-lawsuit/google-viacom-settle-
landmark-youtube-lawsuit-idUSBREA2H11220140318 [https://perma.cc/7SJQ-KRA6]. In the
context of speech torts, the immunity of section 230 of the CDA does not allow lawsuits to advance
beyond preliminary stages. See Note, Section 230 as First Amendment Rule, 131 HARV. L. REV.
2027, 2027 (2018). However, when plaintiffs bypass immunity by raising direct and contributory
claims, complex litigation is prolonged. See the major law battle in Jones V. Dirty World
Entertainment Recordings, LLC, 766 F. Supp. 2d 828, 831-36 (E.D. Ky. 2011).
452. See Lital Helman, Pull Too Hard and the Rope May Break: On the Secondary Liability
of Technology Providers for Copyright Infringement, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 111, 155 (2010).
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different conclusions regarding the optimal liability standard and
depends on the degree of influence on the social context.4 53 The stronger
the evil nudge is, the more benefits are gained by imposing liability. 454
c. Efficiency and Technological Innovation
In the digital age, one cannot discuss the allocation of liability
without considering technological innovation. Technology influences
the flow of information by allowing for the development of filtering
mechanisms, search engines, drop-down menus, and innovative
applications. These applications facilitate access to information.
Consequently, they enrich social life, the market of ideas, and
democratic culture.455 The liability regime stifles innovation and
impacts its course.456  The expected liability outcome influences
investments in certain types of technologies and the adoption of
business models.457
One may argue that an exemption from liability for nudging will
enable freedom and openness, thereby incentivizing entrepreneurs to
invest in technological ventures and digital markets. Consequently,
they will develop many innovative platforms and applications, such as
drop-down menus and filters that promote efficiency. Stricter liability,
however, might stifle innovation.458 It might impede the significant
technological progress witnessed in recent years,459 including increases
453. See id.
454. See Schruers, supra note 422, at 237-38. Strong nudges are clear and intermediaries
may easily avoid them. See Alex Kozinski & Josh Goldfoot, A Declaration of the Dependence of
Cyberspace, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 365, 367-68 (2009). The gravity of their harm is major. See id.
In contrast, when the nudge is less powerful, the costs of allocating liability to the intermediary
may exceed its benefits. See id. at 370.
455. See RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 51, at 256-63; RHEINGOLD, supra note 175, at 77-
109.
456. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285,
314 (2008). Evidence suggests that innovation thrives under liberal liability regimes. See Kyle
Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and its Assimilation of
Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1270 (2012); Parchomovsky & Stein, supra, at 314;
Guy Pessach, Deconstructing Disintermediation: A Skeptical Copyright Perspective, 31 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 833, 864 (2013); Tal Zarsky, The Privacy-Innovation Conundrum, 19 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 115, 125-26 (2015).
457. See Dotan Oliar, The Copyright-Innovation Tradeoff: Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Intentional Infliction of Harm, 64 STAN. L. REV. 951, 1001 (2012); Pessach, supra note 456, at
864-65 (noting that YouTube's success was due to the copyright liability regime (notice-and-
takedown)). Such a regime alone does not prevent the variety of popular copyrighted content that
the intermediary hosted on the site. See id. at 864.
458. See THIERER ET AL., supra note 115, at 4 n.5. A similar argument arose in a related
context of copyright infringement by concurring Judge Breyer in MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 965-66 (2005) [hereinafter Grokster].
459. See Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, If Search Neutrality Is the Answer, What's
the Question, 2012 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 151, 186 (2012); Stern, supra note 249, at 586-87, 590
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in productivity and personal satisfaction.4 60 Due to the ambiguity
regarding the scope of liability, innovation could become too risky or
expensive.46 1
Yet, liability likely would have a limited effect on innovation as
long as it remains neutral to technologies and does not depend on the
adoption of specific technologies.462 Certainly some innovators will shy
away from legally murky areas. Nevertheless, promoting innovation
cannot be the sole justification for exempting intermediaries from the
law.4 6 3 There exists an even more fundamental reason why exemption
from liability would be unwise. An overall immunity for all types of
architecture designs will yield a generation of technology that
facilitates behavior that our society has decided to prohibit.46 4
Futhermore, it may disincentivize intermediaries from developing safer
and more efficient technologies.465 Likewise, anyone who conducts
business of any complexity must discuss liability risks with legal
counsel.466  In many cases, innovation continues despite formidable
legal regulations and ambiguity regarding the scope of liability. 4 6 7
Thus, the concern of impeding innovation might be over-stated.468 In
sum, imposing liability on nudges that online intermediaries form
should not be ruled out. However, since there are different types of
(noting that imposing liability on intermediaries for the design will eventually bring the internet
to resemble a library with no cataloging system).
460. See ANuPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD: How THE WEB BINDS THE WORLD
TOGETHER IN COMMERCE 84 (2013); Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold
Story, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 891, 941-42 (2012); Chander, supra note 238, at 690; Kozinski & Goldfoot,
supra note 454, at 367.
461. See, e.g., Kozinski & Goldfoot, supra note 454, at 367. For example, the use of machine
learning makes it difficult for the intermediary to foresee the scope and degree of their nudges in
advance. See THIERER ET AL., supra note 115, at 31. On learning algorithms, see VIKTOR MAYER-
SCHONBERGER & THOMAS RAMGE, REINVENTING CAPITALISM IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA 98 (2018).
462. See Kim, supra note 11, at 394.
463.See HARTZOG, supra note 13, at 121 ("Companies should generally have the freedom to design
technologies as they please, so long as they stay within particular thresholds, satisfy certain basic
requirements like security and accuracy, and remain accountable for deceptive, abusive and dan-
gerous design decisions."); Walman, supra note 431 (manuscript at 62) ("I am unwilling to surren-
der to the intellectual hegemony of innovation"); Kozinski & Goldfoot, supra note 454, at 371.
464. See Kozinski & Goldfoot, supra note 454, at 371. Judge Kozinski wrote this article
following his decision on the Roommates.com case. See id. See generally Fair Hous. Council v.
Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007).
465. See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49
WAKE FORESTL. REV. 345, 390 (2014); Alanna Petroff, Google, Microsoft Move to Block Child Porn,
CNN (Nov. 18, 2013, 9:10 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/11/18/technology/google-microsoft-
child-porn/ [https://perma.cc/6UTPD-EP5E] (referring to Google and Microsoft's recent efforts with
regard to child pornography).




nudges, a one-size-fits-all approach to intermediary liability is
inappropriate.
C. Rethinking Intermediary Liability for Nudges
Intermediaries are not mere conduits.469 As Section II.D
demonstrates, intermediaries nudge users and influence speech.470 The
internet revolution allows nudges to influence context and information
in many ways.4 71 Consequently, the likelihood of causing severe harm
increases significantly. How should the law respond to this harm?
Should online intermediaries be liable for nudges? What is the
appropriate standard of liability? Current laws do not provide clear
answers to these questions.472 This extensive ambiguity results in
uncertainty and confusion. Moreover, it may strike an inappropriate
balance between constitutional rights, lead to unjust and inefficient
outcomes, and deter innovation. Intermediary liability attracts a great
deal of scholarly attention.473 Different scholars suggest guidelines
regarding the scope of liability. 474 However, some of these suggestions
are either over or underinclusive, while others are too ambiguous.
4 75
1. Intermediary Liability: Scholarly Suggestions and Limitations
a. Active/Passive Test and the Level of Interaction with Content
An empirical study of section 230 case law identifies areas of
judicial inquiry and justifications for excluding intermediaries from the
immunity.4 76 Judicial inquiry focuses on the role the intermediary
plays in the creation of the content and seeks to assess whether the
defendant was "responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
469. See Sylvain, supra note 246, at 218 (describing the design of platforms that collect,
analyze, and sort user data for their own commercial reasons and arguing that these functions
belie any suggestion that online intermediaries are merely passive conduits of user information).
470. See supra Section II.D.
471. See id.
472. See the contradicting results in courts' decisions, supra Section III.A.
473. See JOEL R. REIDENBERG ET AL., CTR. ON LAW & INFO. POLICY, FORDHAM LAw SCH.,
SECTION 230 OF THE COvM1UNICATIONS DECENCY ACT: A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL LITERATURE AND
REFORM PROPOSALS 8 (2012),
https://www.fordham.edu/download/downloads/id/1825/clip-section 230_of-the-communications_
decency-act report.pdf [https://perma.cc/JHJ9-2FKD].
474. See, e.g., Citron & Wittes, supra note 386, at 423; Sylvain, supra note 246, at 277.
475. See Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. 23 (2015) (comparing
intermediary liability to traditional gatekeepers and tending to hold them responsible for
disseminations); Sanchez, supra note 450, at 317 (suggesting an overall immunity regime for all
types of dissemination).
476. See Ardia, supra note 240, at 457-59.
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development" of the harmful speech.4 7 7 Courts tend to focus on several
factors, including the degree to which the intermediary exercises
editorial control over content, encourages the submission of illegal
content, or facilitates the creation or publication of it.478 Intermediaries
interact with user-generated content in a wide spectrum from passive
hosting to providing content.4 79 The more significant the intermediary's
interaction is, the greater the likelihood that courts will deny motions
to dismiss against them.480 The distinction between active and passive
hosting481 is reflected in the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Roommates.com,48 2 as well as in recent scholarly work.4 83 However, this
distinction is inconsistent with section 230, which does not differentiate
active and passive intermediaries. Instead, section 230 shields both
active and passive intermediaries.484 It is also problematic because it
incentivizes intermediaries to remain as passive as possible.485 As a
result of incentivizing passivity, intermediaries may refrain from
designing beneficial, innovative systems.486  Avoiding actively
influencing content might allow spammers and scammers to take over
the platform, which may significantly disrupt its use.487
b. Technological Architecture: Drop-Down Menus and Navigation
Tools
Following the Roommates.com case, some commentators
suggested a regulatory policy for intermediaries who prepopulate their
platforms with drop-down menus and navigation tools.4 8 8 Specifically,
477. Id. at 460 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012)).
478. See id. at 461.
479. See id. (listing types of interactions with content such as passive host, linking to
content, editing content, republication, manipulation, drop-down menus, and providing content).
480. See id. at 505-06.
481. See id.
482. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1161-76 (9th Cir.
2008).
483. See, e.g., Sylvain, supra note 246, at 214 (suggesting that courts should shield
providers from liability for third-party user online conduct only to the extent that such providers
operate as true passive conduits, or actually take good faith steps to remove or block illegal
content).
484. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012); Varty Defterderian, Fair
Housing Council v. Roommates.com: A New Path for Section 230 Immunity, 24 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 563, 573 (2009). Section 230 protects the "Good Samaritan" and immunizes from liability
intermediaries that actively regulate their platforms (for example by screening content).
Defterderian, supra, at 567.
485. See Ardia, supra note 240, at 505-06 (showing that judicial decisions reflect this
distinction, and the more interactive an intermediary is, the more likely they are to be held liable).
486. See Lavi, supra note 61, at 211.
487. See Grimmelmann, supra note 314, at 62.
488. See, e.g., Harman, supra note 193, at 171-74.
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these commentators recommended the application of a conditional
"notice-and-take-down" regime489 to intermediaries that utilize the
aforementioned design of platforms.490
This direct focus on navigation tools is also problematic and can
discourage development of beneficial technologies and navigation tools
that make it easier to find information. In addition, liability directed
at particular technological design disincentives only channeling and
leading nudges and leaves other nudges that are unrelated to
navigation tools exempt from liability.
c. "Bad Faith" Intermediation
Many scholars suggest that the courts should impose liability on
intermediaries who act in bad faith.491 A determination of bad faith
could involve an actor's level of intent when committing a given action.
Danielle Keats Citron and others suggest that the "worst actors," such
as extortion intermediaries,492 revenge porn websites,493 and
intermediaries devoted to abuse, should be excluded from section 230
immunity.494 Similarly, Nancy Kim suggests that courts should impose
489. See id. at 170. According to this regime, the intermediary benefits from a safe haven
if he removes user generated content when notified that this content is suspected of being
defamatory. Id. Namely, "[o]nly in the event that the content provider does not respond can it be
found liable." See Perry & Zarsky, supra note 322, at 241.
490. See Perry & Zarsky, supra note 322, at 241.
491. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 386, at 416 ("Extending immunity to Bad Samaritans
undermines § 230's mission by eliminating incentives for better behavior by those in the best
position to minimize harm."); Citron & Wittes, supra note 314, at 468-70; Grimmelmann, supra
note 314, at 105-06 (noting that allowing immunity to websites like The Dirty gives "too much
deference for bad-faith moderation").
492. See, e.g., CITRON, supra note 76, at 6. These intermediaries encourage users to submit
gossip, defamation, mug shots, or nude photos and charge fees for their removal. See Vo Grp., LLC
v. Opinion, Corp., No. 8758/11, at 1-2, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. May 22, 2012); CITRON, supra note 76, at
6.
493. See CITRON, supra note 76, at 7; Molly K. Land, A Human Rights Perspective on U.S.
Constitutional Protection of the Internet, in THE INTERNET AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN EUROPE 48, 68
(Graziella Romeo & Oreste Pollicino eds., 2016); Cecil, supra note 285, at 2551; Citron & Franks,
supra note 465, at 389; Franklin, supra note 243, at 1306; Layla Goldnick, Note, Coddling the
Internet: How the CDA Exacerbates the Proliferation ofRevenge Porn and Prevents the Meaningful
Remedy for Its Victims, 21 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 583, 627 (2015). For example, Hunter Moors'
platform "Is Anyone Up," whose slogan is "pure evil," encouraged users to submit nude photos of
their ex-spouses, harm their reputation, and humiliate them. Mary Anne Franks, "Revenge Porn"
Reform: A View from the Front Lines, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1251, 1278, 1296 (2017).
494. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 386, at 416, 423 ("The courts should certainly not
extend the CDA's safe harbor to Bad Samaritans. Instead, § 230(c)(1) should be read to apply only
to Good Samaritans envisioned by its drafters: providers or users engaged in good faith efforts to
restrict illegal activity, as was true of Prodigy."). It should be noted that this Article narrows the
immunity more than the previous suggestions of Citron ("the safe harbor would be limited to
providers or users that have taken reasonable steps to prevent or address the illegality of which
plaintiffs are complaining.") See id. at 420.
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liability on intermediaries whose business models are specifically
intended to encourage behavior that is likely to result in online
harassment or other harmful speech.495 These intermediaries should
be held accountable for the ill effects resulting from their underlying
business models.496
These suggestions are a good starting point, but require more
development. Exposing only the worst actors to liability is too narrow
a solution. It allows many intermediaries that are not the worst actors
to promote harmful content without responsibility, even if they
exacerbate harm. Imposing liability on business models that cause or
exacerbate harm does not clarify where to draw the line.4 97 On one end
of the spectrum, it is clear that the worst actors-intermediaries who
condition participation on posting illegal content-should not be
shielded from liability because they are the worst actors and their
business models clearly result in ill effects.498 Conversely, it is also clear
that mere hosts should not be held liable.499 However, a gray area exists
regarding intermediaries that implicitly encourage speech torts,500 yet
are not the worst actors.501 With this regard, some scholars propose a
broader approach of conditioning section 230's shield from liability in
taking reasonable steps to prevent unlawful uses of the platforms. 5 0 2
Yet, the appropriate level of intent for holding the worst actors
responsible under section 230 remains unclear. When section 230
immunity does not apply, should actors be held to a knowledge-based,
negligence, or strict liability standard? Furthermore, what actions
should be considered when adopting the intent standard?
495. See Nancy S. Kim, Web Site Proprietorship and Online Harassment, 2009 UTAH L.
REV. 993, 993 (2009).
496. See id. at 1007, 1045. This suggestion includes platforms for gossip.
497. See id. at 1045.
498. See Doty, supra note 207, at 125.
499. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012); Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd.
v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 260 (4th Cir. 2009); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129
F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 1997); Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1065 (N.D. Cal.
2016); Glob. Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 931 (D. Ariz. 2008);
Giordano v. Romeo, 76 So. 3d 1100, 1102 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
500. See Section H1.B.2.b. One example is nudging users to post gossip and complaints. See
id.
501. See McDonald, supra note 152, at 271. Insights from the broken window social theory
illustrate how small changes in context have extensive influence on behavior. See George L. Kelling
& James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982),
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/198203/broken-windows [https://perma.cc/7Q6F-YJCS].
502. See, e.g., Citron & Wittes, supra note 386, at 419.
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d. Incentives of Speakers and Claims Directed at the Intermediaries'
Own Acts
Felix Wu discusses collateral censorship that occurs when a
private intermediary suppresses the speech of others in order to avoid
liability that otherwise might be imposed as a result of that speech.503
Collateral censorship stems from a disconnection between the
incentives of intermediaries and the original speaker.504 Intermediaries
have different incentives to carry particular content than original
speakers have to create it in the first place.505 Felix Wu argues that
"[t]hose incentives diverge both because original speakers obtain
benefits from the speech not realized by intermediaries and because
intermediaries face liability risks not borne by original speakers."506
Applying the same law to intermediaries and original speakers alike,
despite the divergence of incentives, would incentivize intermediaries
"to suppress more speech than would be withheld by original
speakers."507 Intermediary immunity reacts to the issue of collateral
censorship.508 Yet, immunity is not the appropriate response to
situations in which collateral censorship is not the problem. An
intermediary who obtains social benefits from speech does not need the
incentives that immunity provides to facilitate speech and the rationale
for immunity diminisheS.509
Felix Wu concludes that intermediary immunity should not
apply to inducement claims because these claims tend to involve the
intermediary's own direct acts. Inducement claims do not place the
intermediary in the role of a speaker, and the incentives that immunity
provides to facilitate speech are not needed for preventing collateral
censorship.510  An inducement claim is premised on showing "'clear
503. See Wu, supra note 368, at 295-96.
504. See id. at 296 ("The unique harm of collateral censorship, as opposed to self-
censorship, lies in the incentives that intermediaries have to suppress more speech than would be
withheld by original speakers. This additional suppression occurs because intermediaries have
different incentives to carry particular content than original speakers have to create it in the first
place.").
505. See id. at 296-97.
506. Id.
507. Id. at 296.
508. Id.
509. Id. at 331.
510. Id. at 344 ("Inducement claims are a type of claim to which intermediary immunity
ought not to apply, because such claims are directly targeted at the intermediary's own acts, and
do not place intermediaries in the role of speakers."). Courts have applied section 230 to immunize
intermediaries from claims that are unrelated to the classification of publishers or speakers (such
as aiding and abetting defamation). See Thomas D. Huycke, Note, Licensed Anarchy: Anything
Goes on the Internet? Revisiting the Boundaries of Section 230 Protection, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 581,
592 (2009).
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expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster unlawful speech";
thus, an intermediary seeking to avoid liability needs only to avoid
affirmative acts that form the basis for an inducement.11 In such cases,
the intermediary has no incentive to engage in collateral censorship and
the likelihood for a chilling effect is relatively low. 5 1 2
Imposing liability on extreme cases is relatively easy; however,
the normative question of liability remains unclear. Not extending
immunity to intermediaries in claims that focus on intermediaries' own
acts and do not treat them as publishers or speakers may also have an
indirect chilling effect.513 Even if exposure to liability in such cases will
not result in over removal of users' content, it may open platform design
and technology directly to litigation, leading to inefficiency.5 1 4
e. Fiduciary Intermediaries
Professor Jack Balkin applies the concept of fiduciaries to tackle
the problem of online manipulation that data collection exacerbates.515
According to this perspective-since digital companies collect vast
amounts of user data and utilize this information to predict and
influence user activity-intermediaries may be "the most important
example of the new information fiduciaries of the digital age."5 16 Under
this concept, intermediaries should neither breach user trust5 17 nor
take actions that users would reasonably consider unexpected or
abusive for digital companies to do. Fiduciary duties extend beyond an
intermediary's written policies and include duties of good faith, respect,
and nonmanipulation.5 18 Balkin proposes that legal regulation can
511. Wu, supra note 368, at 344.
512. See id. at 344-45.
513. See supra Section III.B.1.
514. See the broad liability applied in Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2015), which may lead to switching off reader comment sections, as some European websites have
already done. See Paul McNally, Guardian Digital Chief Killing off Comments 'a Monumental
Mistake', NEWSREWIRED (Feb. 3, 2015, 10:32 AM),
https://www.newsrewired.com/2015/02/03/guardian-digitalchief-killing-off-comments-a-
monumental-mistake/ [https://perma.cclD7D2-EWX5].
515. See Balkin, supra note 19 (manuscript at 78).
516. See Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment in the Second Gilded Age, BUFFALO L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 31); Balkin, supra note 54, at 1160; Balkin, supra note 19
(manuscript at 68-69); Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1229 (2016); Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make
Tech Companies Trustworthy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fiduciary/502346/
[https://perma.cc/FC9B-JR7M].
517. See ARI EzRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST: INFORMATION PRIVACY FOR AN
INFORMATION AGE 87 (2018).
518. Balkin, supra note 19 (manuscript at 78).
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manage the potential for conflicts of interest, so that intermediaries
"will be able to monetize personal data in some ways but not others."519
Indeed, the idea of fiduciary intermediaries provides a good
starting point. This solution, however, focuses on user data and breach
of trust towards the user, and not third parties.520 In addition, it does
not consider the problem of data breaches of information held by these
information fiduciaries. However, it can indirectly mitigate the
problem of manipulative inducement by limiting its most influential
strategies.521 Fiduciary duties are likely to limit intermediaries from
utilizing users' data through abusive strategies of nudging.522 Imposing
fiduciary duties can deter intermediaries from using manipulative
influential strategies that involve targeted, personalized evil nudges.523
Reducing the use of this strategy is expected to mitigate the harm of
evil nudges.524 Yet, this proposal is only complimentary to other
possible solutions and it will not solve the problem of evil nudges
altogether.
Existing suggestions for regulating intermediary liability are
limited. Therefore, a more comprehensive framework is required. The
following part suggests that negative influence caused by evil nudges
can and should be subject to third-party liability. Following this
analysis, this Article offers tailored guidelines for determining liability
of intermediaries.
IV. FROM NUDGES TO INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK
Online speech does not take place in a void, but rather in various
contexts. Each context facilitates distinctive kinds of expressions,
interactions, and activities among users.525 As Part II describes,
intermediaries can and do influence social networks by utilizing social
structures, cognitive biases, and technologies.5 2 6  Part 11 further
outlines an innovative taxonomy of intermediary nudges and
demonstrates how they influence user content, dissemination of said
content, and the credibility ascribed to it. Due to the far-reaching
519. See id. (manuscript at 70).
520. See Balkin, supra note 54, at 1162. One should note that in another article, Balkin
proposed the concept of nuisance to tackle data collection that influences third party opportunities.
Yet, at this stage, this solution is underdeveloped. Moreover, it is unclear what would be considered
a nuisance to third parties in the context of liability for speech torts, and what should be the
standard of liability for nuisance. See id. at 1164.
521. See Balkin, supra note 19 (manuscript at 77-78).
522. See Balkin, supra note 516, at 1232.
523. See Balkin, supra note 19 (manuscript at 79).
524. See Balkin, supra note 516, at 1206-07.
525. See Lavi, supra note 71, at 894.
526. See supra Section II.D (taxonomy of online evil nudges).
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influence of intermediaries, this Part advocates for the recognition of
liability to nudges as part of tort law.
Scholarly work explores nudges in similar contexts. Researchers
discuss uses of technologies for generating nudges, promoting
behavioral changes, and enhancing user privacy.527 Some studies focus
on the power of technology in persuasion and the influence of
intermediaries as social actors.528  Others refer to the cognitive
problems of internet users and propose that policy makers respond to
these problems.529 Yet, this Article is likely the first attempt to apply a
descriptive social technological model, based on social contexts, to
normative legal policy.
This Part focuses on social contexts as a central factor for
determining intermediary liability and the standard of liability.
Intermediaries influence social contexts in various ways by using
different types of nudges.530  They play a substantive role in
encouraging or discouraging speech and social dynamics.531 However,
they influence context in every architecture choice, as there is no
absolute "unbiased" context.532 It is neither applicable nor desirable to
amend inherent biases by changing policy in every situation. Therefore,
differential nuanced liability regimes must be promulgated. This
proposition strives to avoid a disproportionate chilling effect, while
deterring intermediaries from facilitating offensive content.
The following Sections integrate sociological and behavioral
insights on nudges with legal policy 5 3 3 and outline proportional negative
incentives to nudges in speech tort. The focus should be on the nature
of the nudge that pushes users to commit speech torts or, in other
words, the act of nudging. It emphasizes deontological considerations
of corrective justice but also corresponds with a consequential approach
by taking into account efficiency considerations.
527. See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach
Us About Privacy, in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY, TECHNOLOGIES, AND PRACTICES 363, 369 (2007);
LESLIE K. JOHN ETAL., THE BEST OF STRANGERS: CONTEXT-DEPENDENT WILLINGNESS TO DIVULGE
PERSONAL INFORMATION 5 (2009); Alessandro Acquisti et al., Privacy and Human Behavior in the
Age of Information, 347 SCI. 509, 511 (2015).
528. See, e.g., FOGG, supra note 15, at 90; Howard et al., supra note 223, at 84 ("Most social
bots are designed to operate over social media platforms, while pretending to be real human
users."); Jones, supra note 115, at 164 (explaining the role of smart chatbots as social actors).
529. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1883 (2013).
530. See supra Section II.D.
531. See supra Sections IIB-I.D.
532. See GILLESPIE, supra note 55, at 42; SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 118; THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 10-11; supra Section II.D.2.a.
533. See supra Part II, which reviewed these insights.
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A. The Degree of Harmful Nudges
Different nudges cause different degrees of harm.5 3 4 There are
many different types of nudges ranging from marginal to strong.53 5 The
degree of influence a given nudge has on users should play a central
role in outlining guidelines for determining intermediary liability. The
type of nudge indicates its influence on social networks and explains
the casual link between the influence and the speech tort committed by
users.536 The proposed framework applies differential standards of
liability for different types of influence and does not rely on the liability-
immunity dichotomy.
1. Differential Standards of Liability
In copyright infringement law, intermediary liability draws on a
nuanced toolbox of liability. Moreover, copyright infringement law
provides a natural starting point for this analysis. The following
Subsections review these tools and propose adjustments to tailor them
to nudges.
a. Lessons from Third-Party Liability in Copyright Infringement
Many intermediaries do not function as "mere hosts"5 3 7-thus,
their liability should be contributory. The Roommates.com case
recognized this fact.53 8 It borrowed ideas from other fields of law,
specifically contributory liability and inducement for copyright
infringement,539 though it did not explicitly mention the seminal cases
in this context.540  Yet, the analysis in Roommates.com neglects the
534. See supra Section II.D (referring to degrees of nudges in applying the framework).
535. See supra Section II.D.
536. See infra Section III.B.1.b.
537. On hosts liability, see Lavi, supra note 71, at 870-71.
538. See Defterderian, supra note 484, at 577.
539. See id. The emulating of copyright theories was reflected in the "material contribution
to illegality" test. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1168-69 (9th
Cir. 2008) ("A dating website that requires users to enter their sex, race, religion and marital
status through drop-down menus, and that provides means for users to search along the same
lines, retains its CDA immunity insofar as it does not contribute to any alleged illegality; this
immunity is retained even if the website is sued for libel based on these characteristics because
the website would not have contributed materially to any alleged defamation."); Defterderian,
supra note 484, at 576.
540. See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 914 (2005) (narrowing Sony's
rule by allowing contributory liability to run in the presence of "clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement," regardless of the substantial non-infringing uses);
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (ruling that the
manufacturers of home video recording devices, such as Betamax, cannot be liable for infringement
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element of fault dictated by copyright law and may curb the activities
of legitimate intermediaries.5 4 1 A comprehensive discussion o  theories
of liability for copyright infringement is therefore required to outline a
better model. Indeed, the objectives of defamation and copyright laws
are different-thus, the laws are not completely analogous.542
Adjusting the toolbox of liability standard in copyright to nudges,
however, would refine the analysis and bring about a better policy.
b. Toolbox of Differential Standards
Three main doctrines govern third-party liability in copyright
infringement. The first is vicarious liability, where a supervisory entity
is held responsible for the activities of violators under its control.543
This doctrine draws on agency principles and expands on them.544 The
second doctrine is contributory liability, in which a third party is liable
when direct infringement takes place, it has knowledge of the activity,
and contributes materially to the infringing conduct of the direct
infringer.545 This liability is based on participation in the activity or
supplying the means for it.546 In contrast to vicarious liability,
contributory liability requires the defendant to have actual knowledge
of the specific infringement.547 The third doctrine is inducement-or
the enticement to engage in an infringing activity.545 Under this
doctrine, the inducer "need not necessarily have the right and ability to
and holding that the test for contributory liability was whether a product "is capable of
commercially significant non-infringing uses"); Defterderian, supra note 484, at 579-80.
541. See Defterderian, supra note 484, at 579-82. For example, the Roommates.com case
may bring collateral censorship on platforms devoted to complaints. See id. at 582.
542. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the
Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 727, 736 (1986). Defamation law is premised on autonomy and
dignitary arguments whereas the traditional justification for intellectual property (IP) rights has
been utilitarian. See id.; Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV.
1328, 1328, 1345 (2015).
543. See Lichtman & Landes, supra note 435, at 398.
544. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, 76 F.3d 259, 261-64 (9th Cir. 1996); Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963); Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v.
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929); Dan Burk, Toward an Epistemology of
ISP Secondary Liability, 24 PHIL. & TECH. 437, 439 (2011); Helman, supra note 452, at 116.
545. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971).
546. See Burk, supra note 544, at 440 ("Here the indirect infringement stems not from
supervision or control, but from either participation in the infringing enterprise, or from supplying
the means to infringe, without actually committing any of the acts prohibited by the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner.").
547. See Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911); Helman, supra note 452, at
115; Daniel Kohler, A Question of Intent: Why Inducement Liability Should Preclude Protection
Under the Safe Harbor Provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 41 Sw. L. REV. 487, 493
(2012).
548. See Burk, supra note 544, at 440.
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control the violator."549 Inducement necessarily requires a degree of
knowledge of infringements in general, and an intent to encourage the
infringing activity.550 Some courts refer to this doctrine as a derivative
of secondary liability,5 51 while others refer to it as an independent
doctrine.552
Third-party liability for copyright infringement online raises
complex questions. Often, intermediaries provide tools that can
facilitate infringement (e.g., file sharing software) and subsequently
look the other way.553 The doctrine of secondary liability provides that
such behavior is unacceptable.554  The Digital Copyright Millennium
Act (DMCA) was enacted to strike a balance between online
intermediaries and the interests of copyright holders.555 This law did
not outline new standards. Rather, the DCMA added a second stage for
evaluating liability.55 6  It includes a safe harbor, which provides
intermediaries with a shield.557 Intermediaries are exempt from some
liability at a cost of fulfilling copyright enforcement duties558 that
require removal of infringing materials upon that intermediary
obtaining knowledge of such material.559
Robust litigation revolves around the degree of knowledge
needed for liability.560  Viacom International v. YouTube created
549. See id.
550. See id. (explaining that the standard of inducement does not require actual knowledge
of specific infringements-instead, it is enough to have general knowledge of infringements.);
Kohler, supra note 547, at 495.
551. See Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 398, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
("[I]nfringement claims based on secondary liability, including claims for inducement of
infringement, derive from the common law." (citing MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 930, 934-36 (2005))).
552. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, No. CV 06-5578 SVW(JCx), 2009 WL
6355911, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009) ("The first two theories (material contribution and
inducement) are known collectively as 'contributory liability."'); Kohler, supra note 547, at 502
n.118.
553. See, e.g., Kozinski & Goldfoot, supra note 454, at 367, 369.
554. See id. at 367.
555. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2018); ALS Scan, Inc. v.
RemarQ Cmties., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001).
556. See Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Social Networking Web Sites and the
DMCA: A Safe-Harbor from Copyright Infringement Liability or the Perfect Storm?, 6 Nw. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 1, 26 (2007).
557. See id. at 12.
558. See Niva Elkin-Koren, Making Technology Visible: Liability of Internet Service
Providers for Peer-to-Peer Traffic, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 15, 17 (2005).
559. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2012); Amir
Hassanabadi, Note, Viacom v. YouTube - All Eyes Blind: The Limits of the DMCA in a Web 2.0
World, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 412-13 (2011).
560. See Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). There
are different levels of knowledge: actual knowledge, objective, "red flag," "willful blindness," or
intent. See id. at 516-17, 520; Tamlin H. Bason, Court Affirms DMCA Red Flag Standard,
Recognizes Willful Blindness Liability Doctrine, BLOOMBERG: BNA (Apr. 6, 2012),
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ambiguity in this regard.61 The US Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit did not require the indirect infringer to have actual knowledge
of the infringement and was satisfied with objective knowledge that was
articulated in the "red flag" test.5 6 2 This test has led to reliance upon a
willful blindness doctrine in establishing the knowledge requirement,
namely taking actions to avoid confirming a high likelihood of
wrongdoing.563  The standard of willful blindness expands the
boundaries of liability and creates ambiguity regarding its
boundaries.564 However, the Second Circuit remanded the case to the
district court, which retreated from this approach, considered the
different standards, and apparently merged "willful blindness" into the
other two statutorily specified scienters (actual knowledge via
takedown notices or "red flags")56 5 when granting YouTube's summary
judgment motion.566 Today, most courts interpret this element as
actual knowledge of a specific infringement.5 67 The safe haven of the
DMCA does not apply to an intentional wrongdoer.5 68 In cases where
an intermediary intentionally violates the law, it can be held liable-
even if it lacks actual knowledge of a specific infringement. In other
words, mere general knowledge of infringements suffices for imposing
liability. 5 6 9 Based on the inducement doctrine, the Supreme Court held
in MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster that the intermediary was liable for
https://www.bna.com/court-affirms-dmca-nl2884908880/ [https://perma.cc/7TCK-LW5Q]. Section
512(c)(1)(A)(i) refers to actual knowledge and § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) refers to awareness of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent. Many discussions revolve around the
meaning of the apparent standard of knowledge. See, e.g., Viacom Int'l Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at
518.
561. See Viacom Int'l Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527. The N.Y. court clung to the actual
knowledge test. See id. at 520. The second circuit was satisfied with objective "red flag" sitiations
and willful blindness, and returned the case to the district court. See Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube,
Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2012). The case ended in a settlement. See Stempel, supra note
451.
562. See Viacom Int'l Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d at 520-21.
563. See Methaya Sirichit, Catching the Conscience: An Analysis of the Knowledge Theory
Under § 512(C)s Safe Harbor & the Role of Willful Blindness in the Finding of Red Flags, 23
ALBANY L. J. SCI. & TECH. 85, 86, 109 (2013).
564. See David Welkowitz, Willfulnessm, 79 ALBANY L. REV. 509, 510, 524 (2016).
565. See Eric Goldman, Viacom Loses Again-Viacom v. YouTube (Apr. 19, 2013),
https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/04/viacomloses-ag.htm [https://perma.cc/X4VW-
9MDN].
566. See Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 2d 110, 112, 115, 117 (S.D.N.Y.
2013). The case ended in a settlement. See Stempel, supra note 451.
567. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1015
(9th Cir. 2013); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007); UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2009); Corbis Corp.
v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1099 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
568. See Miquel Peguera, Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement in the Web 2.0
Environment: Some Reflections on Viacom v. YouTube, 6 J. INT'L COM. L. & TECH. 18, 24 (2011).
569. See Kohler, supra note 547, at 495; Peguera, supra note 568, at 20.
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distributing file-sharing software to users with the intent to promote
copyright infringement.570 Since the intermediary induced its users to
infringe copyrights by taking "active steps" to encourage direct
copyright infringement,5 7 1 it did not have dual purpose.572
The degree of intent is also discussed in various court decisions.
Some courts prefer a high standard of intent and focus on the
intermediary's desire to cause the harmful consequences.5 7 3 Others
choose a lower standard of intent and focus on the potential of the
intermediary's act to bring about harmful consequences.5 7 4 Together,
these judicial decisions hold that an actor may be liable for intentionally
encouraging direct infringement if the actor knowingly took steps that
are substantially certain to result in such direct infringement.5 7 5
Scholarly work suggests that it is better to require actual
knowledge to impose contributory liability, and a higher standard of
intent to hold intermediaries liable for inducement-rather than
adopting lower standards of knowledge and intent.576  Clearer
standards of knowledge and intent will maintain the DMCA's safe
harbor and reduce uncertainty.577
c. Connecting the Dots Between Mental Element and Outcome
Tort cases involving intermediary influences on speech do not
distinguish between contributory liability and inducement.575
Copyright liability doctrines can provide courts with a toolbox of
liability standards to distinguish among different situations. This
570. See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 916, 918, 938 (2005) ("[O]ne
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by
clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting
acts of infringement by third parties.").
571. See id. at 923-24, 938.
572. See id. at 943 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
442 (1984)). The intent to encourage infringement made this case different from Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., where there was no encouragement for infringement and
the US Supreme Court concluded that a video recording device was capable of significant
noninfringing use. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 923-24; Sony, 464 U.S. at 446 n.28.
573. See, e.g., Grokster, 545 U.S. at 938-39.
574. Compare id. at 935, with Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1162
(9th Cir. 2007). See the interpretation of Grokster in Perfect 10, Inc. and Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1037 (9th Cir. 2013);
Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1171.
575. See Perfect 10, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1171.
576. See Mark Sableman, ISPs and Content Liability: The Original Internet Law Twist,
THOMPSON COBURN (July 9, 2013), https://www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/blogs/internet-law-
twists-turns/post/20 13-07-09/isps-and-content-liability-the-original-internet-law-twist
[https://perma.cc/Z7FA-FTTF].
577. See Sirichit, supra note 563, at 144, 150, 186, 189.
578. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982); Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 796 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Subsection provides guidelines for adjusting this toolbox for nudges. It
first differentiates contributory liability and inducement. Then, it
clarifies the standards of knowledge and intent in the context of nudge
torts.
This new framework proposes that courts should hold an
intermediary responsible for users' defamatory content when it
knowingly contributes to the distribution of users' defamatory speech.
Courts should apply the actual knowledge test and not settle for other
lesser forms of knowledge.579 Yet, when an intermediary encourages
speech torts with an intent to promote defamation, the inducement
standard should apply.580 Nudging users to generate defamatory
content functions in a similar way to providing users with software that
facilitates infringement or directly aids in infringement.5 81 In such
cases, there is a reason to argue that general knowledge of the act
suffices to hold the intermediary responsible.582 This interpretation
might even allow the imposition of liability when the intermediary
automatically and systematically pushes users to commit speech torts
by using algorithms.583 It assumes that the intermediary has general
knowledge of the strong nudges it creates, and that it should avoid
using "evil algorithms" in the first place.5 8 4  This interpretation
balances actual knowledge of specific illegal content (under
contributory liability) and a subjective element of intent and general
knowledge (under the inducement doctrine).585
These standards of liability allow courts to impose differential
levels of liability. Consequently, liability could be imposed on
intermediaries who nudge users to disseminate negative content, even
579. See Section III.A.1.a. On other forms of knowledge, see Viacom International Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). Applying the actual knowledge test will
limit the scope of liability and resolve the confusion left by the YouTube case. See Jacob Rogers,
YouTube v. Viacom: Second Circuit Ruling Leaves Open Possibility That YouTube Is Not Protected
by Safe Harbor, JOLT DIG. (Apr. 10, 2012), https://jolt.law.harvard.eduldigestlyoutube-v-viacom
[https://perma.cc/5YNT-U9RY].
580. See McDonald, supra note 152, at 262, 274. When analyzing the inducement doctrine
in this Article's context, courts should apply the higher standard of intent as pronounced in MGM
Studios Inc. v. Grokster. See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930, 936 (2005).
581. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 923-24, 936; McDonald, supra note 152, at 262, 274.
582. The parallel developments in liability for inducement in copyright law support the
conclusion that in cases of inducement to speech torts, general knowledge suffices. For expansion
on the inducement standard in copyright, see Burk, supra note 544, at 440; Kohler, supra note
547, at 495 (similar to the decision in Grokster, 545 U.S. at 941).
583. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 923-24, 936; McDonald, supra note 152, at 262, 274.
584. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 923-24, 936; McDonald, supra note 152, at 262, 274. On the
ability to influence ex ante by design choices, see generally SKOVER &COLLINS supra note 392, at
27 (giving the example of Apple Siri's limitations on the culpability of the system); Mulligan &
Bamberger, supra note 427; Scherer, supra note 434. On policy directed algorithms, see Tene &
Polonetsky, supra note 430.
585. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930, 936, 944 n.1.
76 [Vol. 21:1:1
EVIL NUDGES
if the platform has legitimate uses and the nudge does not aim to push
users to specifically generate defamatory content.586 However, in such
cases, courts should require a higher threshold of knowledge to impose
liability. The scope of liability will be limited, and the intermediaries
would be able to avoid liability by removing defamatory content ex
post.587 In contrast, in extreme cases of evil nudges involving unsavory
actors working in bad faith moderation, the inducement doctrine allows
the application of a lower threshold.588 Courts can hold intermediaries
responsible for any defamatory speech on their platforms, even in the
absence of actual knowledge of specific defamatory content and in spite
of the removal of offensive content ex post.5 8 9 The intermediary will be
considered as a joint tortfeasor with the direct user under the
inducement standard.590 This standard will function as a substantial
negative incentive to avoid evil nudges ex ante.
The proposed framework allocates substantial negative
incentives and deters the worst actors from the beginning. In addition,
the framework re-allocates relatively moderate negative incentives to
nudges that may have legitimate purposes but can cause harm.
d. Differential Standards as a Bridge Between Deontological and
Consequential Perspectives
The proposed framework articulates both deontological and
consequential considerations. It is based on the nature of the
intermediary's conduct-the nudge-and elements of fault (actual
knowledge or intent), both of which reflect corrective justice. It also
considers efficiency and aggregated welfare since the outcome is
tailored to the type of nudge.
A strong nudge-which pushes users to commit speech torts, or
avoid participation otherwise591-is different from an ambiguous
nudge.592 When the degree of a nudge is strong, the intermediary
should be held responsible under the inducement doctrine. In such
586. See id. at 926, 937, 939.
587. This regime is similar to the notice-and-takedown regime of 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c), (j)(3)
(2012).
588. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936.
589. See Brian C. McManus, Note, Rethinking Defamation Liability for Internet Service
Providers, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 647, 653 (2001).
590. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930. On the doctrine of joint tortfeasors, see Wright, supra
note 411, at 1142.
591. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 6; McDonald, supra note 152, at 262, 274.
One can refer to a strong nudge as an "exclusionary vibe." See STRAHILEVITZ, supra note 128, at
43.
592. This differentiation is influenced by the notion of "capable of substantial non-
infringing uses" in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
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cases, an evidentiary presumption of intent applies. The degree of a
nudge also indicates a causal link between the act (nudge) and the
harmful outcome (defamatory speech). When the degree of a nudge is
weaker, courts should examine the case under contributory liability
doctrines. In such cases, there is no presumption of intent and the
casual link with the outcome is more fragile.593 Therefore, in this latter
context, actual knowledge of specific defamatory content is a
prerequisite for liability to attach.594 Actual knowledge bridges between
the intermediary's action and the outcome. It also demonstrates a
causal link between the nudge and the defamatory speech.
e. The Optimal Regime
Applying differential standards leads to nuanced and
proportional liability. The proposed framework is superior to the
overall immunity regime, which is overinclusive and does not deter bad
faith moderation,595 may foster irresponsibility,596 and undermines
victims' freedom of expression.597
Settling on a standard of inducement for intermediaries who are
by no means "good Samaritans" and immunizing all the rest is also
underinclusive. Under this regime, intermediaries who use an implicit
nudge, such as gossip and complaint websites, avoid liability. Due to
the vast influence of nudges on the flow of information,598 complete
exemption from liability for intermediaries in this gray area is
undesirable. A single standard of contributory liability regime for all
nudges is not optimal either, since websites with no legitimate aim
would take down harmful content only upon specific knowledge and
continue to proliferate.
Applying a combination of standards-inducement and
contributory liability-is superior to a negligence regime, since
negligence is open-ended and leads to uncertainty. Negligence may also
lead to hindsight and outcome biases because the reasonableness of the
593. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 932-33.
594. See McManus, supra note 589, at 651-52. In the context of third-party liability to
defamation, courts should apply the actual knowledge standard. On different standards of
knowledge, see Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 519 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
595. See Grimmelmann, supra note 314, at 103-05, 107.
596. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 386, at 413. ("An overbroad reading of the CDA has
given online platforms a free pass to ignore illegal activities, to deliberately repost illegal material,
and to solicit unlawful activities . . . . Companies have too limited an incentive to insist on lawful
conduct on their services beyond the narrow scope of their terms of service. . . . They have no
accountability for destructive uses of their services, even when they encourage those uses.").
597. See CITRON, supra note 76, at 194.
598. On this gray area, see THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 8.
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action is decided after the fact.5 99 In contrast, the proposed framework
focuses on the nudge itself or on the actual knowledge of specific
defamatory speech. These elements are clearer relative to the
negligence standard and can promote accuracy and proportionality in
legal responsibility.
2. The Proposed Framework in Action
a. Focal Point Nudges and Liability
An intermediary who pushes users to generate speech torts,
such as TheDirty.com,600 generates an illegitimate forum per se.60 1 On
this platform, it is very difficult for a user to avoid committing speech
torts. This focal point leads to a presumption of intent to promote
defamation on the part of the platform. Due to the degree of the nudge,
the intermediary should be subjected to a heavy burden of liability
under the inducement standard. Courts should hold the intermediary
responsible for every instance of defamatory speech on the platform,
even without actual knowledge of the specific defamatory speech and
despite removing the defamatory speech ex post. This regime will
disincentivize the operation of these platforms in the first place.
Yet, an intermediary who designs a focal point for complaints
and negative content, such as BadBusiness.com,602 does not exclusively
encourage speech torts. These platforms may have legitimate purposes,
and the nudge is weaker in comparison to a nudge on an illegitimate
forum. While its influence is less extensive, it may also exacerbate the
risk for speech torts. Therefore, contributory liability should apply.
599. On hindsight and outcome biases, see Yoed Halbersberg & Ehud Guttel, Behavioral
Economics and Tort Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND LAW 1, 2-
3, 10 (Eyal Zamir & Doron Teichman eds., 2014) ("[H]indsight bias ... distorts people's ex post
assessments of the ex ante probability and predictability of an event, given that this event has
already happened .... The outcome bias is the tendency to perceive conduct that resulted in a bad
outcome as more careless than the same conduct in cases where the bad outcome did not occur.");
Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight 5 Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under
Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 288, 295 (1975).
600. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 386, at 402; Knibbs, supra note 9. Platforms devoted
specifically to defamation or hate speech have no dual use and their goal is limited to distributing
illegal content. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 386, at 402, 413. Thus, even according to Sony
Corp. ofAmerica, the intermediary should be held responsible. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
601. See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 456. It should be noted that, in some cases, the
court reached an opposite conclusion and decided that the name of the platform does not indicate
intent to encourage illegal content. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1114
(9th Cir. 2007); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1107, 1109,
1111 (C.D. Cal. 2009). However, in the context of speech torts, the name of the platform should be
a sufficient reason for liability due to its far-reaching effects on the gravity of harm.
602. See Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1145 (D.
Ariz. 2005).
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The nudge itself does not indicate a mental element of intent, and courts
should hold intermediaries responsible only upon actual knowledge of
a specific speech tort. In such instances, liability can be avoided by
removing the speech ex post.
b. Channeling and Leading Nudges and Liability
Similar to focal points, courts should examine the domain of
choice given to users in drop-down menus or filter mechanisms.603 Some
intermediaries do not leave users a broad spectrum of choice and push
them to choose a defamatory option.604 The Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Roommates.com is based on this situation.605 In such cases, the degree
of the nudge indicates the element of intent and the effect of channeling
and leading is substantial. Therefore, the intermediary should be
subjected to the heavy burden of the inducement standard. This
conclusion is reinforced when the intermediary uses data mining and
artificial intelligence to create personalized nudges that match the
characteristics of every user and specifically push users to illegitimate
forums, or to be engaged in illegal activities. Unlike drop-down menus
that allow users to choose among multiple options, explicit personal
recommendations on illegal content channel the user to participate in
illegal activities without a meaningful domain of choice between
options. Instead, the intermediary chooses what recommendations
users see. Therefore, these systems should not be considered "neutral
tools."6 06 Applying the standard of inducement is likely to cause the
intermediary to amend the list of pre-made choices that lead to
defamatory speech, or avoid recommending illegitimate content
altogether.607
603. See Percival, supra note 278, at 171. Courts should examine the choice options given
to users, how many of them are illegal, and whether specific choices are emphasized or preferred
over others. See id.
604. See id.
605. See Appellants' Opening Brief at 27, Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489
F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-56916) ("Roommates tells users to select between A and B, and
where both A and B are discriminatory... . By creating the two discriminatory choices and telling
the user to select among them, Roommates plays a 'significant role' in the provision of the
information at issue.").
606. This conclusion is not in line with Dyroffv. Ultimate Software Group, Inc., No. 17-CV-
05359-LB, 2017 WL 5665670, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017). Yet, the law should differentiate
between tools that allow users to choose and tools that strongly push users to engage in illegal
content. The latter should not be considered neutral, and an intermediary that has general
knowledge of illegal recommendations should bear liability. Recommending illegitimate forums
and pushing users directly to it is different from just hosting illegal content. Therefore, an
intermediary should avoid illegal recommendations in the first place. Indeed, this may result in
less recommendations, or some degree of chilling on innovation. Yet, in such cases, a degree of
chilling is worthwhile. See id.
607. See Wu, supra note 368, at 296, 300, 343.
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When the intermediary allows a broad list of choices,608 it does
not push users to commit speech torts. The nudge is weaker and its
influence is less substantial. However, designing imbalanced menus,
which include defamatory options, may also exacerbate harm.
Therefore, courts should apply the standard of contributory liability
and hold the intermediary responsible if defamatory expressions are
not removed ex post.
c. Encouragement Nudges and Liability
Courts should examine whether an intermediary's
encouragement is concrete and specifiC.6 09 A strong nudge specifically
pushes users to commit speech torts or avoid participation. In such
cases, responsiveness to the intermediary's explicit push would surely
lead users to disseminate defamatory expressions. The nudge provides
an indication of the intermediary's intent and a causal link to speech
torts. Therefore, there are strong justifications to impose the heavy
burden of liability by using the inducement standard.610 However,
when the encouragement is implicit and participation still leaves a
choice not to commit speech tort, it can be interpreted in more than one
way and has a weaker influence.611 Therefore, the normative standard
should be contributory liability.
When the intermediary uses a combination of multiple nudging
strategies to exacerbate harm,612 courts should also apply the
inducement standard.613 In such cases, even if each one of the nudge
strategies leaves users a choice to avoid defamation, together they have
a cumulative effect. The combination of nudges indicates intent and a
608. See GW Equity LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, No. 3:07-CV-976-O, 2009 WL 62173,
at *13 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009); Whitney Info. Network, Inc..v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, No. 204-
CV-47-FTM-34SPC, 2008 WL 450095, at *10 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2008). In these cases, only some
of the options channeled users to negative content. See GW Equity, 2009 WL 62173, at *13-14;
Whitney, 2008 WL 450095, at *10. The court granted immunity due to the wide domain of choice
and unconsciously used the criteria of the degree of nudge. See GWEquity, 2009 WL 62173, at *14;
Whitney, 2008 WL 450095, at *10, 12.
609. See Doty, supra note 207, at 132.
610. The slogan of the hypothetic platform Harassthem.com is "Don't Get Mad, Get Even."
See Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 489 F.3d 921, 928 (9th Cir. 2007). This slogan
explicitly encourages users to harm others as revenge. See FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187,
1195, 1199, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009).
611. See FTC, 570 F.3d at 1200; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 6. For example, using
slogan such as "Keep it Juicy" encourages gossip but not necessarily defamation.
612. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 72, 248. For example, an intermediary may
use a combination of focal points, channeling and leading, and encouragement strategies. See
supra Section II.D.
613. The lesson on cumulative nudges and an inducement standard is learned from the
Supreme Court's decision in MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936 (2005).
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causal link between the nudges and user speech torts. This cumulative
effect should be considered a strong nudge.
Additionally, courts should disincentivize intermediaries who
nudge users to commit speech torts and directly profit from the
commission of those torts. Nudging speech torts and charging fees for
their removal614 should also indicate the intermediary's intent and lead
to liability under the inducement standard.615
In sum, the proposed framework allows courts to impose
nuanced burdens of liability depending on the nudge and bridge
between the deontological and consequential perspectives. It also
strikes an optimal balance between free speech and reputation.616 The
combination of inducement and contributory liability allows different
levels of deterrence depending on the degree of a nudge. Finally, they
promote corrective justice,617 efficiency,618 and innovation.619
Table 2. Summary of the Guidelines for Differential Liability
to Tort Nudges
Standard of Focal Points Channeling and Encouragement
Liability FocalPoints Leading Encouragement
Inducement Strong nudges that * Designing menus, * An explicit
push users to filters, or tags that encouragement o
commit speech torts include only options commit speech tort.
and constitute This nudge pushes
"illegitimate forums" users to commit
614. See Glob. Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 930 (D. Ariz.
2008); RIPOFF REPORT, supra note 201.
615. On these programs, see MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005);
Glob. Royalties, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 930.
616. See Lavi, supra note 71, at 933. Differential standards of liability lead to proportional
chilling effects and strike an optimal balance between various constitutional rights. See supra
Section II.B.1. Such standards will not hinder the open market of ideas disproportionately. See
Lavi, supra note 71, at 933.
617. See supra Section III.B.2.a. According to corrective justice considerations, when the
influence of a nudge is low, the action itself (the nudge) does not fulfill the element of wrongful
cause of harm. See Lavi, supra note 61, at 183. In such cases, a more profound mental element
(actual knowledge) is required in order to impose liability. See id. at 183. In contrast, a strong
nudge reflects the element of cause indicating intent. See id. at 184. Imposing liability for strong
nudges on their own can be justified by corrective justice considerations. See id.
618. See supra Section III.B.2.b. Liability for strong nudges creates more benefits than
costs. See Lavi, supra note 61, at 187. However, when the nudge is ambiguous, the costs of
avoidance are higher. See id. at 186. In such cases, it would be inefficient to discourage the action
itself; rather, a different standard of liability should be imposed-a contributory liability regime.
See id.
619. See Kim, supra note 11, at 424. This Article's proposed framework does not impose
liability on technology, but rather on action and the mental element that adds value to the
technology. See supra Section m.B.2.c. Moreover, the framework avoids curbing technological
development and can adapt to changing technologies. See Kim, supra note 11, at 421; supra Section
III.B.2.c.
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B. The Proposed Framework and the Law Bridging the Gaps
The current law provides immunity for intermediaries,620 such
that they are not treated as publishers for material they did not author
620. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012); supra Section III.A.1.
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or develop.621  Courts usually interpret this immunity broadly.6 22
However, this overall immunity scheme was constructed when the web
was at its genesis.6 2 3 As technologies advance and the web becomes
more prevalent, the increased potential for online torts leads to a
substantial increase in the gravity of harm.62 4 Therefore, it is time to
challenge the immunity regime and refine it.625
A large body of scholarly work suggests one way to narrow
immunity is by amending section 230.626 Some suggest that immunity
should not apply to intermediaries that materially contribute to illegal
or tortious content627 and propose ways for Congress to revise section
230 to withdraw protections from such intermediaries.628 A broader
621. See § 230; supra Section IIIA.1. There are some exceptions to the immunity. See §
230(e)(1)-(5). This Article focuses on defamation in civil law, but it should be noted that immunity
is limited to civil claims and does not apply to cases that are based on federal criminal law. See §
230(e)(1). In addition, the Senate recently passed a bill that holds online intermediaries
accountable for third-party content that encourages sex trafficking. See Allow States and Victims
to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act, H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. (2018); Zeynep Ulku Kahveci, Allow
States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (FOSTA): Senate Passes Bill Making
Online Platforms Liable for Third-Party Content Enabling Illegal Sex-Trafficking, JOLT DIG.
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/allow-states-and-victims-to-fight-online-sex-
trafficking-act-fosta-senate-passes-bill-making-online-platforms-liable-for-third-party-content-
enabling-illegal-sex-trafficking [https://perma.cc/6BZS-VCZH]; Eric Goldman, 'Worst of Both
Worlds'FOSTA Signed Into Law, Completing Section 230's Evisceration, TECH. & MARKETING L.
BLOG (Apr. 11, 2018), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/04/worst-of-both-worlds-fosta-
signed-into-law-completing-section-230s-evisceration.htm [https://perma.cc/65JY-FSPX]. For
another perspective, see Mary Graw Leary, The Indecency and Injustice of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 553, 620 (2018).
622. See supra Section III.A. 1.
623. See Leary, supra note 621, at 574 ("In 1997, when cases first percolated through the
court system, the Internet was in its infancy.").
624. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 386, at 411-12; OLIVIER SYLVAIN, KNIGHT FIRST
AMENDMENT INST., COLUMBIA UNIV., DISCRIMINATORY DESIGNS ON USER DATA 12 (2018) ("[T]hese
developments undermine any notion that online intermediaries deserve immunity because they
are mere conduits for, or passive publishers of, their users' expression."). Online intermediaries
pervasively shape, study, and exploit communicative acts on their services and with greater power
comes greater potential for harm. See GILLESPIE, supra note 55, at 43 ("[The moment that a
platform begins to select some content over others, based not on a judgment of relevance to a search
query but in the spirit of enhancing the value of the experience and keeping users on the site, it
[becomes] a hybrid [of conduit and media].").
625. See Sylvain, supra note 246, at 208.
626. See, e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST., COLUMBIA
UNIV., SECTION 230's CHALLENGE TO CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 6-7 (2018); Citron &
Wittes, supra note 386, at 418 ("Platforms should enjoy immunity from liability if they could show
that their response to unlawful uses of their services was reasonable."); Sylvain, supra note 246,
at 214 (urging Congress to maintain the immunity but to create an explicit exception from the safe
harbor for civil rights violations).
627. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 386, at 419 ("A modest alternative to a sweeping
elimination of the immunity for state law would be to eliminate the immunity for the worst
actors.... [S]ites that encourage destructive online abuse or that know they are principally used
for that purpose should not enjoy immunity from liability.").
628. See id.; Cecil, supra note 285, at 2549; Goldnick, supra note 493, at 626-27. Some
scholars even suggest revising § 230 to include a general notice-and-take-down provisions. See
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approach is revising section 230 and conditioning intermediary
exemption from liability in taking reasonable steps to prevent or
address unlawful uses of its services.629
However, courts-without legislative changes--can set the
proper boundaries of immunity.630 Applying the proposed guidelines
allows courts flexibility in accommodating the dynamic online
environment.631  According to a proper reading of section 230,
intermediaries that nudge speech torts are "responsible" at least "in
part" for creating or developing defamatory content and should not
enjoy the immunity.632
Courts can broadly interpret the decision in Roommates.com to
narrow section 230's immunity.633 Due to the increasing influence of
nudges in the digital age, as well as the substantial harm they cause,
this provides the proper solution.
C. Addressing Objections to the Proposed Framework
Several objections to this framework can be anticipated-thus,
some wrinkles must be ironed out. The first objection is directed at the
very idea of acknowledging liability for evil nudges. One may argue
that even a strong explicit nudge that pushes users to commit speech
torts always leaves users the option of ignoring the nudge or avoiding
participation.634 As some courts have stated, users are not forced to
Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Losing Their License to Libel: Revisiting § 230 Immunity, 30
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1505, 1554 (2015).
629. See Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2019) ("Modest
adjustments to Section 230 could maintain a robust culture of free speech online without extending
the safe harbor to bad actors or, more broadly, to platforms that do not respond to illegality in a
reasonable manner."); Citron & Wittes, supra note 386, at 419; Citron & Wittes, supra note 314,
at 471.
630. See Tremble, supra note 250, at 867. For suggestions on judicially narrowing
immunity without additional amendments, see id.; Sylvain, supra note 246, at 214 (suggesting an
even narrower interpretation of the immunity by courts since some intermediaries are not passive
conduits). The interpretative route is also preferred by Citron and Wittes. See Citron & Wittes,
supra note 386, at 418 ("If the courts decline to move § 230 in this direction, Congress should
consider statutory changes.").
631. See Tremble, supra note 250, at 867.
632. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f)(3) (2012); Franklin, supra note 243, at 1334.
633. See FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198 (10th Cir. 2009); Vision Sec., LLC v.
Xcentric Ventures, LLC, No. 2:13-cv-00926-CW-BCW, 2015 WL 12780892, at *2 (D. Utah Aug. 27,
2015) (concluding that a service provider is not neutral if it "specifically encourages development
of what is offensive about the content") (citing Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521
F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008))).
634. See, e.g., GW Equity LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, No. 3:07-CV-976-O, 2009 WL
62173, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9, 2009).
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generate illegal content,635 leaving no sufficient justification to impose
intermediary liability.
Indeed, individuals are not forced to generate speech torts. The
possibility that a user can avoid generating a speech tort, despite the
nudge, raises complex questions regarding the limitations of liability
for nudges. However, in the context described in this Article, online
intermediaries use sophisticated technologies and strategies to exert
hyper-control and influence over their platforms. These tools can
efficiently influence users to commit speech torts and lessen the control
over their own decisions to publish content.636 As demonstrated,
intermediaries utilize users' cognitive biases and influence the flow of
information.637 Due to intermediaries' centralized power, their nudges
are far more influential than those nudges generated by an average
individual user. Furthermore, the internet forms an exceptional
context.638 On the internet, nudges have an extensive effect on social
networks and the flow of information.639 Consequently, the push is so
strong that it may be very difficult for a user to avoid speech torts.640 In
this unique setting, intermediary nudges substantively increase the
likelihood and gravity of harm.64 1  Therefore, there are strong
justifications to hold an online intermediary responsible for evil nudges.
The second objection is the potential for overdeterrence imposed
by the proposed framework relative to the current immunity regime.
The proposed guidelines do not provide a precise formulation for
proscribed conduct.642 They require weighing the degree of a nudge,
and may lead to uncertainty.64 3 The answer to the question of which
type of nudge will exclude an intermediary from immunity remains
inconclusive. Outside the scope of the worst actors that should be
subjected to an inducement standard, the scope of liability is vague.
Due to this ambiguity, more motions to dismiss will be denied-
635. See id. at *5-6; Whitney Info. Network, Inc. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, No. 204-CV-
47-FTM-34SPC, 2008 WL 450095, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2008).
636. See generally Wang et al., supra note 378 (addressing the ability of nudges to influence
self-control).
637. See generally id. Intermediaries use insights on network structures and technologies,
such as big data and artificial intelligence, to efficiently nudge. See supra Section II.D.
638. On this perspective, see LIPTON, supra note 277, at 4.
639. See RAINIE & WELLMAN, supra note 51, at 285 (describing the news ecology that digital
networks created). In the context of nudges, the technological ecosystem makes it easier to nudge-
resulting in more influential nudges at the network level. See id. In addition, new technologies like
big data and AI allow intermediaries to create nudges with accuracy and manipulate users. See
Yeung, supra note 115, at 15.
640. See Yeung, supra note 115, at 8. On the influence of nudges in the age of big data, see
id.
641. See Levi, supra note 19 (manuscript at 26); supra Section II.D.
642. See supra Section IV.A.2.
643. See supra Section IV.A.1.c.
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allowing lawsuits to proceed from preliminary stages. Accordingly, this
will increase administrative costs. Intermediaries who are neutral to
tortious content may also act defensively and remove any content in
response to complaints, even if it is not defamatory. This results in
censorship and stifles the development of innovative platforms.
Indeed, the proposed guidelines reduce certainty relative to the
overall immunity or other rule-based formulations of liability.
However, balancing the overall costs and benefits against the
alternatives leads to the conclusion that relative ambiguity is a
worthwhile price. The alternative of a rule-based formulation for
liability may entail more certainty, but will lead to distortions and less
accuracy by being both over and underinclusive.644
A nuanced liability creates more benefits than shortcomings.
The framework outlines differential standards, which include different
elements and thresholds of liability that allow fitting proportional
negative incentives to different degrees of nudges. This regime
promotes efficiency more than other proposals reviewed in scholarly
work.6 4 5 In addition, today, more than a third of claims already survive
a section 230 immunity defense.646 The proposed guidelines structure
judicial discretion, assist courts in applying open-ended standards, and
adjust intermediary liability in torts for nudges. By structuring judicial
discretion, courts are likely to reach more consistent, just, and efficient
outcomes relative to the inconsistency reflected in the case law today.
Certainty and consistency will grow over time as precedents applying
the proposed guidelines accumulate.
The third objection is directed at nonsalient or nontransparent
nudges. This objection argues that the guidelines do not fit them
because it is difficult to recognize this type of nudge and its influences.
Thus, with regard to these types of nudges, the guidelines result in
underdeterrence.647 For example, channeling and leading nudges are
non-salient and their aim to influence speech torts is not obvious to
internet users.648 In contrast to direct persuasions to commit speech
644. See Lavi, supra note 71, at 859; supra Section 11I.C. For instance, an overall immunity
regime will not disincentivize intermediaries to design illegal forums. See Lavi, supra note 71, at
885-86. Consequently, they will continue to use various nudging strategies and push users to
publish and disseminate speech torts. See id. at 886. An overall "notice-and-takedown" safe haven
does not always lead to an optimal level of deterrence and can be over- or underinclusive. See id.
at 887. Thus, it will not bring to an optimal level of deterrence when the intermediaries explicitly
nudge users to generate speech torts without leaving room to make their choice. See id.
645. See supra Section IV.A.2.
646. On this inconsistency, see supra Section II.A. 1. According to an empirical study, more
than a third of the claims survive a § 230 defense. See Ardia, supra note 240, at 392; Kosseff, supra
note 282, at 20.
647. See Sunstein, supra note 24 (manuscript at 35).
648. See supra Section 1I.D.2.
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torts, imbalanced options in drop-down menus apply to non-deliberative
thinking and influence decision making subconsciously.
Additionally, with some encouragement nudges, the victim of
speech torts is not aware of the nudge and its influences on the social
network's context.649 Today, intermediaries can nudge only some users,
for instance, in the "influential" hubs in the social network.650 They can
also personalize messages, appeal to specific users in private messages,
and encourage users to disseminate defamatory content.65 1  As
described above,652 many intermediaries collect data on users and use
artificial intelligence and complex algorithms to target their nudges
more efficiently and exacerbate harm.6 53
When an intermediary applies nontransparent strategies, a
victim of speech torts may be unaware of the intermediary's
contributory liability or inducement.654 Consequently, that victim will
not be able to prove the intermediary's liability. The result of imposing
liability on nontransparent nudges will be underdeterrence and
inefficiency. This argument is valid; however, it focuses on specific
situations of nontransparent nudges such as channeling and leading
that are nonsalient even to the user and some of the encouragement
that is nontransparent to third parties. Thus, it does not undermine the
proposed guidelines. Market forces and complementary suggestions
can mitigate the problem of underdeterrence and narrow the gap. For
instance, a user may reveal the goal behind a particular nontransparent
channeling and leading nudge and publicize it.655 Alternatively, an
"influential" user in the social network who has been subjected to a
649. See supra Section II.D.3.
650. See Aral & Walker, supra note 69, at 337.
651. See TUROW, supra note 60, at 139. On intermediary abilities locating the central hubs
in the platform and conveying specific messages to them, see id.; Aral & Walker, supra note 69, at
337; Danielle Keats Citron & Neil M. Richards, Four Principles for Digital Expression (You Won't
Believe #3!), 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 1353, 1362 (2018) ("[O]pportunities are neither limitless nor
uniform.").
652. See supra Section II.D.
653. See Levi, supra note 19 (manuscript at 26). In an experiment, Facebook showed some
users fewer posts containing emotional language. See Grimmelmann, supra note 66, at 222.
Facebook discovered that users who saw fewer positive posts used more negative words. See id.
Facebook generated a nontransparent encouragement nudge to disseminate negative content. See
id. For another recent example of nontransparent nudges, see Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group,
Inc., No. 17-cv-05359-LB, 2017 WL 5665670, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2017). On opaque processes
of algorithms, see PASQUALE, supra note 395, at 6. On the use of big data and artificial intelligence
by intermediaries, see Balkin, supra note 54, at 1184.
654. See supra Section II.D.2.
655. See Shmuel Becher & Tal Zarsky, Seduction by Disclosure: Comment on Seduction by
Contract, 9 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 72, 76 (2013).
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poorly timed nudge may simply perceive this message as a nuisance.656
In response, he might make the public aware of this practice, thus,
bridging the information gap.65 7 Due to the intermediary's concern for
its reputation, it may ex ante avoid this strategy. In addition,
regulators can call upon, or even fund, independent researchers
specifically to analyze digital practices and attempt to uncover biased
algorithms and manipulative practices of intermediaries' evil nudges.658
These solutions have the potential to mitigate this problem.
Nevertheless, they would reveal only some of the cases of
nontransparent manipulative nudges to the public.
Yet, the guidelines do not preclude complementary, related legal
adjustments that may mitigate this problem. One complementary
solution may be imposing transparency obligations on intermediaries
to disclose their nudging policy. 6 5 9 Disclosure of nudging strategies may
increase the awareness of prospective targets to the intermediary's
contribution to their potential harm-thus aiding actual victims in
their attempts to satisfy their burdens of proof in courts. However, even
if the intermediary complies with disclosure requirements, this solution
appears to be insufficient because users often do not read or
comprehend disclosures.660
656. See FOGG, supra note 15, at 43. On the importance of timing, see ALESSANDRO
ACQUISTI ET AL., TIMING IS EVERYTHING? THE EFFECTS OF TIMING AND PLACEMENT OF ONLINE
PRIVACY INDICATORS 319 (2009).
657. See Becher & Zarsky, supra note 655, at 76. On flows of information among internet
users, see id.
658. See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power,
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1684 (2017) (focusing on nontransparent, manipulative practices in a
related context of sharing economy platforms and suggesting that third party independent
research can reveal some of these manipulative practices-thus having the potential for mitigating
the problem of nontransparent evil nudges of intermediaries); Niva Elkin-Koren & Maayan Perel,
Algorithmic Governance by Online Intermediaries, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND MARKET REGULATION (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 16-17)
(focusing on a related context of copyright algorithmic enforcement, which is committed without
transparency, and proposing that private initiatives committed to protecting online free speech
can retrieve information on improper practices of intermediaries and increase awareness among
policy makers, the press, and the public for online violations); Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren,
Black Box Tinkering: Beyond Disclosure in Algorithmic Enforcement, 69 FLA. L. REV. 181, 181
(2017) (proposing that the public can tinker the algorithmic black box and reveal improper
algorithmic enforcement).
659. See Sunstein, supra note 24 (manuscript at 35). On virtues of transparency in related
contexts, see Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright
Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473, 478 (2016) (focusing on a related context and suggesting
transparency and public oversight to mitigate the problem in the context of algorithmic copyright
enforcement); Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1540 (2013).
660. On this point, see SUNSTEIN, supra note 25, at 150; Sunstein, supra note 24
(manuscript at 37); supra Section II.A. Additionally, transparency comes at a price and does not
always lead to efficiency and fairness. See Tal Zarsky, The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An
Analytic Road Map to Examine Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision
Making, 41 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 118, 122 (2016).
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A better complementary legal policy is bridging the deterrence
gap by adjusting compensation in these situations. Scholarly work
aimed at solving tax evasion proposes a similar solution.66 1 In the
context of this Article, courts can impose higher compensation for
nontransparent nudges, which are rarely discovered. Adjusting
compensation to the probability of enforcement will increase the
expected compensation for nontransparent nudges and disincentivize
these strategies.662 In addition, when courts find the intermediary
liable for inducement in nontransparent ways, there is a justification
for awarding punitive damages.663 Such cases might also lead to
governmental investigation and penalties for unfair or deceptive acts,
designs, or practices under the FTC Act.664 Nuanced compensation and
penalties that are sensitive to nontransparent strategies and account
for the probability of enforcement may narrow the deterrence gap.
V.CONCLUSION
This Article is the third in a series of scholarship that advances
a context-based theory of liability to speech torts.66 5 This Article aspires
to take initial steps to address online intermediaries' contributory
liability in cases of speech torts. It demonstrates that intermediaries
can and do influence social contexts. They use different nudging
strategies-pushing users to generate specific types of content, while
influencing social dynamics and affecting the flow of information. It
further shows that nudging strategies exacerbate harm. Therefore,
overall immunity should not apply to intermediaries that push users to
disseminate defamatory speech. Following this conclusion, this Article
applies multidisciplinary insights to legal policy and offers an
innovative, theoretical, and practical framework for regulating
661. See Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the
Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 599 (2006).
662. See id. at 571. Ex ante risk management takes into account the probability for paying
compensation and the amount. See id. at 602-03. A larger amount of compensation for
nontransparent nudges balances the low probability for discovery and thus lead to more effective
disincentives to use this type of nudge. See id.
663. On punitive damages, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1)-(2) (AM. LAW
INST. 1979); Volker Behr, Punitive Damages in America and German Law - Tendencies towards
Approximation of Apparently Irreconcilable Concepts, 78 CHI-KENT L. REV. 105, 105 (2003);
Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil Justice
System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 60 (2002).
664. See Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act of 1914 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(a) (2018).
Intermediaries' practices can be viewed as matters of consumer protection, privacy, data security,
and technology policy.
665. See Lavi, supra note 71, at 855; Lavi, supra note 61, at 149. The first part focused on
hosts' indirect liability. See Lavi, supra note 71, at 859. The second focused on intermediaries'
direct liability. See Lavi, supra note 61, at 147-48.
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intermediary nudges. Drawing from intermediary liability in copyright
infringement, this Article proposes guidelines that apply differential
standards of liability.
The guidelines outline different negative incentives depending
on the degree of influence. Each aims to structure judicial discretion
and assist courts in accommodating just and efficient policy. The
guidelines direct courts to more systematic and consistent decisions and
allow intermediaries, which are repeat players in court, to make ex ante
predictions about the scope of their liability, which can lead to efficient
risk management.
This framework also has broader influences beyond the scope of
this Article. Currently, the law does not limit the influence of
intermediaries on users' content as long as the intermediaries do not
violate the law.6 6 6  Intermediaries are free to influence online
information and promote the generation and dissemination of content
that is in-line with their ideological or commercial goals.6 6 7 However,
changes to intermediaries' incentives in the context of speech torts may
have indirect effects on other contexts as well. Outlining specific
procedures that apply only to nudging defamation may be complex since
the line between defamatory speech and other types of speech is not
always clear.6 68 An intermediary that aims to run efficient risk-
management and reduce its exposure to liability may avoid generating
strong nudges and leave users with broader choices in general. The
proposed guidelines can also extend to nudges that strongly push users
towards arguably immoral or unethical behavior.669 This may have an
indirect effect in restraining undesirable nudges and incentivizing
intermediaries to engage in fairer practices in general.
This Article constitutes the first sustained examination of the
role of evil nudges in tort law. However, it is not the last word on this
topic. Looking ahead, it inspires further discussions on intermediary
liability in related contexts and liability for nudges in general. It raises
intriguing legal questions on the scope of intermediary liability for
666. See Ardia, supra note 240, at 377.
667. See Calo, supra note 109, at 1001. On utilizing cognitive biases in online markets, see
id.
668. See Lavi, supra note 61, at 178. For example, courts can decide that an expression
benefits from defamation law defenses. See id. at 178-79. In addition, the line between a
defamatory speech and other types of speech, such as privacy infringing speech and even criminal
offences, is blurred online and different types of speech may overlap. See Anita Bernstein, Real
Remedies for Virtual Injuries, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1457, 1464, 1468 (2012).
669. For example, Ashley Madison is a platform with a focal point on extramarital affairs
that sports the slogan, "Life is short. Have an Affair." ASHLEY MADISON,
https://www.ashleymadison.com/ [https://perma.ce/B2ZU-ENRW] (last visited Oct. 3, 2018).
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creating focal points for nudging terror and incitement.670 It also raises
ethical and legal questions regarding the scope of intermediary liability
for nudges that influence users to generate positive content. This type
of nudge may, for instance, lead to glorifying specific products and
mislead third parties about their market value. Should the law
regulate these practices? When should the law consider nudges as
manipulation?671  How should the law react to the use of
nontransparent nudges that push voters to vote for a specific
candidate672 or disseminate positive fake stories, which potentially
influence elections, as exemplified by the Facebook-Cambridge
Analytica scandal?673
Should the law hold intermediaries liable for nudges when they
manipulate individuals and hinder their own self-interests, as opposed
to those of third parties? Are lessons from the online experience
transferable to other contexts of liability for nudges offline? What
lessons should be learned for nudges at the age of the loT that allows
far more manipulative influences?674 These are some challenges that
should be discussed in future research.
670. See Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 881 F.3d 739, 743-44, 750 (9th Cir. 2018); Fields v. Twitter,
Inc., 200 F. Supp. 3d 964, 968, 976 (N.D. Cal. 2016). This Article may allow courts to better
interpret the scope of the Antiterrorism Act (ATA). See Antiterrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331,
2333 (2018).
671. This question is controversial. See Hansen & Jespersen, supra note 32, at 3;
Wilkinson, supra note 378, at 342.
672. See, e.g., Samuel, supra note 19.
673. See SCHNEIER, supra note 69, at 84; Zittrain, supra note 69, at 335, 336; Samuel, supra
note 19; Tufekci, supra note 124. Some believe that Facebook used an algorithm to promote fake
content in favor of then presidential candidate Donald Trump, and thus influenced the election
results. See id.
674. See HILDEBRANDT, supra note 117, at 41 (referring to the elimination of the dichotomy
between online and offline as the "onlife world"); SILVERMAN, supra note 15, at 300, 305; TUROW,
supra note 122, at 19 (explaining that, in the future, in-store surveillance will be much more
extensive and will build monitoring into people's routine activities); Michal S. Gal & Niva Elkin-
Koren, Algorithmic Consumers, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10-17 (2017) (explaining the potential of
the loT to improve customers' lives and addressing the objections and limitations of an algorithm
that will improve customers shopping decisions and even decide on their behalf).
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